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”The objective of stealth is to keep the adversary guessing until it is too late” 
/David Lynch, Jr, 2003 
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ABSTRACT 
There is an ongoing duel between military sensor development and developments in 
signature management. The last decade, with warfare characterized by joint expedi-
tionary operations and asymmetry, has favored sensors. However, on account of the 
worsening security situation in Europe, there is now also an increasing interest in 
efforts to increase survivability of own military platforms. Spectral design is one of 
several promising technologies with extensive research potentially suitable for Low 
Observable platforms. It involves creating desired spectral optical responses from 
surfaces, in this case reducing contrast to background, by choosing suitable materi-
als and structures.  
The challenge to a military decision-maker, faced with inherent uncertainties con-
cerning the future and with limited resources, is how to choose among alternative 
capabilities, technologies or equipment. Correspondingly, on account of the system 
character of the signature attribute, researchers in technologies for signature man-
agement has difficulties communicating relevant basis for these decisions.  
The scope of this thesis is therefore to find and analyze patterns in decision situa-
tions involving technology or technical systems for military use, and the purpose is 
to propose conceptual and methodological contributions to support future decision-
making. The technology focus is on spectral design and the application in focus is 
signature management of Low Observable military platforms. The research objec-
tive is addressed from a military system and capability centric perspective using 
methods from several disciplines in the military sciences domain. The result is syn-
thesized from four separate studies: 1) on spectral design using systematic review of 
literature, 2) on military utility using a concept formation method, 3) on modeling 
for how to operationalize a link between spectral design and measures of military 
utility using methods of military operations research, and, 4) on cases of systems 
engineering of military Low Observable platform designs.  
In summary, the result of the work presented in this thesis is a compilation of relat-
ed work in military sciences, systems engineering and material optics into a frame-
work to support effective decision-making in relevant contexts. The major contribu-
tion to theory is a proposed concept called Military Utility, capturing how to com-
municate the utility of technical systems, or technology, in a military context. It is a 
compound measure of Military Effectiveness, Military Suitability and Affordability. 
Other contributions can be expected to support decision-making in practice;  
- the so-called Ladder-model is a template for how to quantitatively operationalize 
the military effectiveness dimension of Military Utility regarding the use of spec-
tral design;  
- an applied Ladder-model is demonstrated, useful for analyzing the military utility 
of spectral designs in Low Observable attack aircraft;  
- a probabilistic framework for survivability assessments is adopted into a meth-
odology for doing the analysis, and lastly;  
- a generic workflow is identified, from relevant development programs, including 
decision-situations that can benefit from the adopted methodology. 
Keywords: military utility, survivability, signature management, systems engineering, cam-
ouflage, Low Observable Technology, spectral design, multi-spectral.
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SAMMANFATTNING 
 
Det finns en ständigt pågående kamp mellan militär sensorutveckling och signatur-
anpassning. Det senaste decenniet, som karaktäriserats av asymmetrisk krigföring 
och gemensamma expeditionära operationer, har gynnat sensorerna. Nu har emel-
lertid intresset för effektivare skydd av egna militära plattformar ökat till följd av den 
försämrade säkerhetssituationen i Europa. Spektral design är då en av flera lovande 
teknologier med potential att användas vid signaturanpassning och det bedrivs en 
omfattande forskning. Teknologin kan sägas omfatta tekniker för att skapa en yta 
med de optiska egenskaper som önskas. I den tillämpning som studeras i den här 
avhandlingen är syftet att minska ett objekts kontrast till bakgrunden, d.v.s. dess 
signatur, och det sker genom lämpligt val av ytors material och struktur. 
 
Militära beslutsfattare står ofta inför en stor utmaning då de ska välja mellan fram-
tida förmågor, teknologier eller utrustning. Sådana beslutssituationer präglas ofta av 
stor osäkerhet och en begränsad ekonomi. Sett från det andra hållet är det ofta svårt 
för forskare inom teknologier för signaturanpassning att kommunicera relevant be-
slutsunderlag, på grund av signaturers speciella systemkaraktär.  
 
Avhandlingen omfattar en undersökning med syftet att finna och analysera eventu-
ella mönster i beslutssituationer rörande teknologier eller tekniska system för militär 
användning. Målet är att lämna konceptuella och metodmässiga bidrag till stöd för 
framtida beslutsfattning. Teknologin i fokus är spektral design och tillämpningen är 
signaturanpassning av militära plattformar. Forskningsfrågan adresseras från ett mili-
tärt förmågecentrerat systemperspektiv med metoder från flera discipliner inom mi-
litärvetenskapen. Resultatet har sammanställts från fyra separata studier: 1) av spek-
tral design med hjälp av systematisk granskning av tidigare forskning, 2) av militär 
nytta med hjälp av en metod för konceptformering, 3) av modelleringen av en länk 
mellan spektral design och mått på militär nytta med hjälp av militär operationsana-
lys, och, 4) av design av smyganpassade plattformar med hjälp av fallstudier.  
 
Resultatet från studierna bildar sammantaget med relaterad tidigare forskning från 
militärvetenskap, systemteknik och materialoptik ett ramverk till stöd för effektivare 
beslutsfattning. Det främsta bidraget till teoribildningen utgörs av ett förslag till 
koncept kallat militär nytta. Konceptet fångar hur nyttan med tekniska system, eller 
teknologier, bör kommuniceras i militära sammanhang. Militär nytta är här ett sam-
manvägt mått bestående av militär effektivitet, av militär lämplighet och av över-
komlighet. Andra bidrag förväntas stödja beslutsfattning direkt i praktiken; 
- den s.k. stegmodellen kan användas som mall vid kvantifiering av den militära ef-
fektivitetsdimensionen vid värdering av den militära nyttan med spektral design; 
- användningen av stegmodellen har demonstrerats i fallet med smyganpassade at-
tackflygplan; 
- ett sannolikhetsbaserat ramverk för överlevnadsuppskattningar har anpassats att 
användas som analysmetod, och till sist; 
- ett generiskt arbetsflöde med relevanta beslutssituationer där analysmetoden kan 
komma till nytta har identifierats genom studier av tidigare utvecklingsprojekt. 
 
Nyckelord: militär nytta, överlevnad, signaturanpassning, systemteknik, kamou-
flage, smygteknik, spektral design, multispektral  
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CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
Here the key concepts used throughout the thesis are presented and explained brief-
ly in order to assist readability. The references indicate where in the thesis the con-
cepts are defined or derived. 
Capability means being able to do something in the military domain and being able 
to do it well. In the military science domain, one also speaks of Fighting power 
and Warfighting capabilities (Sect.2.1). 
A Design is a solution that satisfies system requirements (INCOSE 2015). In this 
thesis, design also includes the process of synthesizing such a solution. 
Engineering is used in the sense “the design and manufacture of complex prod-
ucts” (Merriam-Webster 2016b). In this thesis there is a hierarchy implied. Systems 
Engineering includes Survivability Engineering, which in turn includes Signature 
Engineering. 
Low Observable Technology is used for passive signature reduction purpos-
es. Passive signatures require external illumination (Lynch 2004, p.3). In this thesis, I 
have also included signatures due to thermal emissions. 
Military Effectiveness is a measure of the overall ability to accomplish a mission 
when the Element of Interest (EoI) is used by representative personnel in the envi-
ronment planned or expected for operational employment of the military force 
(Sect.7.2.1). 
Military Utility is a central concept in this thesis. The definition proposed, and the 
interpretation used, is: “The Military Utility of an Element of Interest (e.g. an air-
craft), to a military actor, in a specific context, is a compound measure of the mili-
tary effectiveness, the EoI’s suitability to the military capability system, and of the 
affordability” (Sect.7.2.1). 
A Model is a representation of reality. Examples are maps, process descriptions, 
miniature models, mathematical expressions, etc. (Sect.6.3). 
Optical wavelengths ranges from ultra violet (UV) via the visible (VIS) and near 
infrared (NIR) to the thermal infrared (TIR) spectral bands. 
Platform is used as a common term for any vehicle on land, at sea, in the air, or in 
space. Attack aircraft, naval ships and armored combat land vehicles are examples 
used in this thesis. 
The Signature of an object in this thesis is understood as any characteristic of an 
object making it distinguishable from the background with a sensor (Bohman 2003). 
The focus is on the optical part of the electromagnetic spectrum (Sect.4.3).  
 
x 
Signature Management comprises actions taken to minimize the contrast between 
an object and its background (Bohman 2003). In this thesis the term Signature Engi-
neering is sometimes used as a synonym to stress that the actions of interest are taken 
during development (Sect.4.3). 
 
Signature Engineering, see Signature Management. 
  
Spectral design is the technology in focus. It describes the ability to create a de-
sired spectral optical response from a surface in favor of the application of interest 
by choosing suitable materials and structures (Ch.5).  
 
A spectral design is the result of spectral design, such as a pigment or a paint coat-
ing. Spectral designs are applied in products such as platforms, uniforms, or camou-
flage materiel (Ch.5). 
 
Survivability is the capability to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environ-
ment (Ball 2003). 
 
A System is a concept used in this thesis to describe both complex physical prod-
ucts, abstract constructions, such as warfighting capability, and human activities 
such as warfighting scenarios. When specifically discussing the engineering of a sys-
tem, the following definition is used - “an integrated set of elements, subsystems, or 
assemblies that accomplish a defined objective. These elements include products 
(hardware, software, firmware), processes, people, information, techniques, facilities, 
services, and other support elements” (INCOSE 2015). See section 1.3.1. 
 
Stealth design involves reduction of both active and passive signatures (Lynch 
2004, p.3). 
 
Technology is used with the meaning "the practical application of knowledge espe-
cially in a particular area" (Merriam-Webster 2016c). The work reported here can 
thus be said to involve the study of the use of spectral design technology in the en-
gineering of military products. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 umans have used their cunning for concealment and deception in hunting, 
and in warfare, since the beginning of mankind. In a military context the 
term camouflage was first used during World War I. The French lexical 
meaning is ”to make up for the stage” (Hartcup 1979) and a military defi-
nition is  ”the use of natural or artificial material on personnel, objects or tactical 
positions with the aim of confusing, misleading or evading the enemy” (NATO 
2015; Conley 1988). It developed into a branch of warfare as it became evident that 
rifled guns could produce accurate long-range fire and as reconnaissance aircraft 
started to appear far beyond the frontline. During the two world wars huge efforts 
were made to conceal factories, airfields, ships, aircraft, troops etc., or to make them 
look like something else, uninteresting to the attacker. In its early days, camouflage 
was an art form developed and inspired by artists and engineers, and produced using 
paint and natural materials. During the second half of the twentieth century, with 
the development of sensors in spectra other than the visible, e.g. radars and infrared 
cameras, it has instead become a domain for scientists and technologists. The 
term Signature Management is now used to describe actions taken to minimize the con-
trast between an object and its background (Bohman 2003). The methods applied 
are described as Low Observable (LO), or stealth, technology. The military purpose, 
however, is still the same, to increase the survivability of platforms, soldiers and 
sailors in order to complete a mission. 
In the air stealth aircraft, such as the F-117 Nighthawk and B-2, have proven effec-
tive (GAO 1997; Jenn 2005). At sea, stealth war ships seem to have won approval in 
navies all over the world, e.g. the Visby-class corvette in the Swedish Navy (2009), 
the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate in the Russian navy (2013), and the Zumwalt-
class destroyer in the US Navy (2016). On the battlefield, concealment still involves 
using creativity and natural materials such as covering vehicles with tree branches or 
moss, but also using technologically advanced camouflage nets and mobile camou-
flage systems. The threat to expeditionary forces is expected to increase and become 
multispectral, due to proliferation (including among non-state actors) of advanced 
optronic, infrared and microwave sensors (Bohman 2012). Consequently, during the 
last decade research into soldier-related materiel has increased, typically combat uni-
forms, aiming to reduce signatures in the face of new sensor threats. In addition, the 
worsening security situation in Europe has led to calls for prioritizing national de-
fense and has also increased interest in high-end technology for land platforms, 
which is expected to capitalize on stealth technology developed for air and sea plat-
forms1.  
Signature is a measure of an object’s observability and can be defined as any charac-
teristic of the object making it distinguishable from the background with a sensor 
1 Rickard O. Lindström, FMV  (the Swedish Procurement Agency), personal communication, March 2015 
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(Bohman 2012). A ship, for instance, can be detected at different ranges, due to 
noise from engines and propulsion, fluctuations it induces in the Earth’s magnetic 
field, signals emitted by its own sensors or communication systems, reflections from 
active enemy sensors, thermal radiation from heated parts of the hull and exhaust 
pipes, and simply due to reflected sunlight. From this, two fundamentals of signa-
ture management emerge: first, that signature reduction efforts are dictated by the 
sensor threat anticipated, and second, there is a balance to be found between signa-
ture reduction efforts in the respective sensor domains (e.g. (Lynch 2004; Bohman 
2003)). Because implementing LO Technology (LOT), thus reducing the signature, 
will always be associated with a cost, measured either in monetary terms, or in pen-
alties to other attributes of the object (Ball 2003). Consequently, one should not 
invest in signature reduction efforts in domains void of sensors, and there is no 
sense in optimizing one domain if this means that the object is easily observed in 
another. 
Following on from these challenges, in this thesis LOT is considered to span not 
only domain specific design, production techniques and choice of materials, but also 
modeling, simulation and measuring for the purpose of evaluating or verifying sig-
nature reduction efforts (Bohman 2003). In the domains of electromagnetic sensors, 
radar and thermal infrared, signature engineering is, to a large extent, about con-
struction efforts, such as shaping the platform or screening heat sources. However, 
in the optical part of the spectrum, from ultra violet (UV), via the visible (VIS) and 
near infrared (NIR), to the thermal infrared (TIR) spectral bands, the properties of 
the surface have a considerable influence on the signature. In this thesis, spectral de-
sign is the ability to create a desired spectral optical response from a surface, which 
benefits the application of interest, by choosing suitable materials and structures. 
The technique is used in several military applications, such as the optical filter on 
head-up displays, laser protective coatings on optics or heat radiation control on 
satellites. In this thesis, the focus is on using spectral design in efforts to reduce sig-
natures.  
 
Research into materials and techniques potentially suitable for spectral design in the 
optical and thermal spectra is extensive, though not necessarily driven by military 
needs (Paper I). Designs for spectrally selective coatings can be divided into two 
categories, (1) paints and pigments and (2) periodic surface structures. The latter can 
be further divided into subcategories in order of increasing complexity: (a) one-
dimensional structures, (b) multidimensional structures, and lastly (c) biomimic and 
metamaterials. The author presented a licentiate thesis in 1993, entitled Preparation 
and Characterisation of Sputtered Titanium- and Zirconium Nitride Optical Films (Andersson 
1993), on work (Andersson et al. 1992; Veszelei et al. 1994; Veszelei et al. 1993; 
Andersson et al. 1994) in the 2a category. However, today important work is being 
done in all categories. Many researchers have taken on the challenge of combining 
the desired spectral behavior of dyes and paints in VIS and NIR, with low emissive 
properties in TIR - while maintaining resistance to wear and tear (Wake & Brady 
1993; Hallberg et al. 2005; Rubežien et al. 2009). Interesting work is being done in 
electrochromic multi-layer coatings where researchers are pushing the envelope of 
being able to electrically control the optical response across a wide optical band 
width (Granqvist et al. 2009). In the biology and metamaterial category, researchers 
seem to be within reach of customizing optical spectral responses by combining 
3 
relatively simple materials with advanced production methods from the electronic 
industry, with inspiration from biology (Yablonovitch 1987; Aliev et al. 2006; Sun et 
al. 2013). Some even believe it may be possible in the future to create invisibility 
cloaks of so-called metamaterials at optical wavelengths, at least in some respects 
and for narrow bandwidths (e.g. Chen and Alù (2011)).  
Although developments in spectral design technology are potentially useful in mili-
tary equipment, an interesting question has been raised in the combat aircraft com-
munity. ”How much stealth does a system (i.e. a platform, my comment) need?” 
(Lynch 2004, p.46). In the past it seems efforts have only been limited by the budget 
(Lynch 2004, p.46). Consequently, the cost has increased, a lot. The obvious answer, 
given the complexity depicted in the background above, is of course – it depends. 
As already stated, the value depends on the sensor threat, and hence the adversary. 
It is dependent on environmental conditions because signature is a measure of con-
trast with the background, be it in the desert, at sea, in wooded terrain, in winter, at 
night etc. Arguably, it is also dependent on the military actor using the equipment, 
i.e. what are the objectives of the mission, what tactics will be used, what risks are 
acceptable, and are there other means of survivability? Though seemingly intangible, 
the question has been addressed in a growing Survivability Engineering community. 
The preferred approach is linking technical performance to a platform’s effective-
ness as a weapon system (Ball & Calvano 1994; Ball 2003; Soban 2001). So far, most 
of the research has focused on assessing features for reducing radar signature, or on 
other means of protection.  
In order to utilize the potential of spectral design, it is critical that there is traceabil-
ity between the military needs and the spectral design requirements. Otherwise, 
there is a risk that stakeholders will fail to properly convey needs to contractor de-
sign organizations trying to realize feasible solutions. Alternatively, seen from the 
other direction, there is a risk that researchers will fail to argue effectively for re-
search and development projects, or important progress, that will ultimately have 
the potential to save the lives of soldiers and sailors. That traceability, connecting 
military needs and spectral design requirements, is either absent or vague today, 
which makes informed assessments and decision-making difficult. Table 1-1 shows 
previous research related to the problem and illustrates how the full breadth of the 
issue has not yet been addressed.  
The complex problem depicted is by no means unique to the domains of LOT. It is 
but one instance of the more generic problem of how to assess the military utility of 
any technology, or equipment. This is a typical problem addressed in defense plan-
ning when military decision-makers choose between alternatives by working down a 
decision tree from capability gaps to a working solution. The traditional cost-
effectiveness view is, however, questioned by researchers, who have elaborated the 
cost dimension (Larson 1996; Axberg et al. 2013; Sivertun 2012) and capability as-
pects (Anteroinen 2013). This is why the thesis problem aspects of Table 1-1 are 
divided into two categories, one concerning the specific area of application, and the 
other concerning assessing military utility in general. Related work is further elabo-
rated in chapters 2-5. 
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1.2 Research purpose, objective and question 
Given the problematic background, there is a long, uncertain and sometimes time-
consuming decision chain between the military needs on the battlefield and an op-
timized platform signature adapted to the situation. This chain involves the balanc-
ing of needs and design choices for many different technical and tactical solutions. 
The aim of the research described in this thesis, from a practical perspective, is to 
propose methodological contributions to a framework for effective decision-making 
regarding spectral design in signature management. From a scientific perspective, 
the research attempts to develop a view of how military utility is affected by ad-
vancements in technology. The principle research objective is, therefore, to answer 
the following research question: 
- How can the military utility of spectral design be assessed in order to support deci-
sion-making in the development of balanced Low Observable platform design? 
In order to divide the research into manageable focus areas, and to enhance tracea-
bility of results back to the principle objective, the research question is operational-
ized into a set of sub-questions. “Spectral design” represents the technology in ques-
tion and “the development of… Low Observable platform design” represents its 
application. Thus, there is a question of how the two relate (Q1). One problem area 
is how to assess the “military utility” of the applied technology, which, firstly, re-
quires a thorough understanding of the concept (Q2), and then requires an assess-
ment method (Q3). Lastly, the demand for “balanced…design” requires study of 
the need for decision-making when balancing conflicting needs and requirements 
during development (Q4). Table 1-2 shows the derived research sub-questions. 
Table 1-1 An overview of central work related to the thesis. The columns present aspects of the thesis 
problem and the rows present centrally related work. The Q1-Q4 notations refer to the research sub-
questions presented in the next section. 
5 
Table 1-2 The research question divided into sub-questions 
Q id Research sub-question 
Q1 How (technical parameters, techniques and materials) does spectral de-sign affect Low Observable military platform design? 
Q2 How should military utility be defined in order to support decision-making?  
Q3 How can the military utility of spectral design in a Low Observable plat-form be assessed?  
Q4 How can the proposed model support decision-making in the develop-ment process of Low Observable platforms? 
1.3 The Interdisciplinary systems approach 
The problem depicted is undoubtedly complicated. It involves understanding the 
needs of a military force engaged in battle with an adversary in some physical and 
social context. This military force is trying to defeat its adversary through effective 
allocation of its equipment and personnel. The problem also involves understanding 
the process of transforming military needs into the best possible choice of equip-
ment, in this particular case down to the detail of the technologies to be used. We 
know from the background description that the equipment of interest is expected to 
be the result of balanced design, i.e. satisfying sometimes contradictory require-
ments. Furthermore, the problem also involves understanding how electromagnetic 
waves interact with surfaces of the equipment, in order to find the technical parame-
ters of interest.  In summary, the problem comprises sub-problems that are linked 
and interlock via different perspectives on military equipment. There is also a gradu-
al increase in the level of detail. The complexity, the interlocking, the balancing of 
the design of complicated equipment and the recursiveness implied, are indicators 
that a systems approach is required (Churchman 1968; Ingelstam 2012, pp.12–33). 
1.3.1 The system concept 
Complex phenomena have characteristics or behavior that are lost in the examina-
tion of its parts. The classical example (Bertalanffy 1968) is an organism, such as a 
human being. It has life as long as all the organs function together. An individual 
organ, e.g. the heart, however, has no life and thus will only give limited information 
about itself. Thus, life is a property of the entire organism – an emergent property. An 
aircraft is another example. Correspondingly, it is characterized by its ability to fly 
cargo from point A to B (although it is heavier than air). However, if the aircraft is 
dismantled, this property is lost. In both cases, important information is lost if either 
the organism or the aircraft is studied simply as a collection of its parts. Instead, 
they should be studied as a whole – as systems of interacting elements having emer-
gent properties. This similarity between organisms, and many other phenomena in 
society, was first pointed out by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1920s. He is often 
referred to as the first modern system theorist and he was the founder of general 
systems theory (Lawson 2010; Ingelstam 2012). 
From the 1950s onwards, system theory and application have developed and be-
come established in many fields of research, including social sciences, engineering 
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and management. Regardless of the disciplinary field, most system theorists agree on 
the use of the common set of characteristics below to describe a system (INCOSE 
2015). 
The first of these characteristics is that a system consists of some form of elements, 
and relationships between them (see the network diagram of a system on the left in 
Figure 1-1). Elements can be physical, e.g. a jet engine in an aircraft, or abstract, e.g. 
activities in a process.  
Secondly, there is a purpose behind why these particular elements are interconnected, 
i.e. there is a system behavior or characteristic that would not exist unless these par-
ticular elements interact the way they do. See the discussion about the organism and 
the aircraft above. Of course, in a man-made system this purpose, or objective, is usu-
ally why the system was constructed in the first place.  
Thirdly, it must be possible to distinguish the system from the rest of the world by 
identifying a boundary, which is defined by the interest, e.g. the responsibility, of the 
viewer. The elements and relationships within the system boundary are often said to 
belong to the viewers System of Interest (SoI).  
Fourthly, elements and relationships outside the boundary, but of some importance 
to the system, belong to the environment. Consequently, elements within the system 
of interest have relationships with elements in the environment. These relationships 
form interfaces with the environment, and systems that exchange information or en-
ergy, in some form, with the environment are called open systems. 
Figure 1-1 Illustration of the System concept. To the left in a network diagram and to the right in a 
hierarchy diagram. 
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Because of their complexity, it is often beneficial to view elements themselves as 
systems. On one hand, some might think a jet engine in itself is a complicated sys-
tem.  On the other hand, someone else views combat aircraft as elements in an air 
defense system. Therefore, there is a hierarchy within a system, which sometimes 
justifies discussing different system levels. A system hierarchy diagram is shown on the 
right hand side in Figure 1-1. Elements within the system of interest, that are them-
selves systems, are sometimes called subsystems. 
Using a “systems approach” (Churchman 1968) acknowledges that the problem at 
hand is too complex to be solved directly since it is too intertwined with other ques-
tions, i.e. the problem has system characteristics. The problem solving then has two 
basic challenges. Firstly, the problem itself needs to be analyzed because the pur-
pose or objective of the system is often unclear. Secondly, it is important to create 
an accurate model of the analyzed system as a system. Dependencies and interac-
tions between elements often form the central properties of the system. According 
to Churchman, you then use the methods necessary to do the actual systems analy-
sis. 
1.3.2 The systems approach model 
The systems approach applied to the problem in this thesis is based on the possibil-
ity of modeling military situations as systems and to recursively link effects to lower 
system levels, i.e. technical subsystem levels, and to technology levels. The idea is to 
be able to observe measurable changes in the military situation model at the top sys-
tem level, when spectral designs are adjusted at the technology level. Given that we 
know how we would like to shape the military situation, and that we can monitor 
any changes due to spectral design, then it should arguably be possible to assess the 
military utility of such adjustments. 
Applying the systems approach model, the problem depicted can be described as 
having (at least) three system levels: the military system level, the technical system 
level, and the spectral design technology level (see the illustration in Figure 1-2). The 
components and their relationships have differing characteristics at the different 
levels. Consequently, there is a need to borrow methods from various scientific dis-
ciplines to conduct the analysis. 
At the topmost level a systems approach developed by Lawson (Lawson 2010, p.23) 
is applied. It explains how the military force of interest can be seen as a system re-
sponding to a problem, which in turn is viewed as a situation system. The latter 
comprises the military force of the adversary. Note that the model also accounts for 
the decision process of arranging the responding system from system assets. War is 
a social endeavor, which is why social science, especially military science, supports 
analysis at the military system level. Enhanced survivability requirements are pre-
sumed to emerge from interaction with the situation system, and from interactions 
between such things as equipment, operators, and doctrine, within the respondent 
system. Consequently, assessments of utility have to be made at the military system 
level. The science supporting quantitative decision-making at the military system 
level can be found in the field of Military Operations Research (MOR). 
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At the middle level of the system model, military requirements are transformed into 
methods, organization - and technical systems, e.g. platforms, which are the focus in 
this thesis. This latter transformation is a core activity in systems engineering. In systems 
engineering, methods such as modeling and simulation are used to support require-
ments analysis, i.e. the central activity that links military system level requirements to 
lower level design requirements.  
At the technology level, signature management using spectral design of surfaces conceals 
considerable complexity, which must be clarified in order to understand its relation-
ship with the military platform design. Analyzing the optical response of a surface 
requires the application of material optics.  
1.4 The research design 
The division of the research question into four sub-questions has made it possible 
to address each research sub-question in separate studies, and to choose a method 
suitable for each study (Denscombe 2014, p.147). The thesis thus comprises four 
different studies, reported in six papers. The research sub-questions have largely 
been addressed in the order stated above. 
The initial study, the Technology study, reported in Paper I, comprises a review of tech-
nologies and materials available for spectral design, and aims to identify those char-
acteristics or technical variables relevant to the military application chosen – i.e. 
camouflage. A first order model of the systems engineering process, linking spectral 
design to military utility, is presented as a hypothesis in order to promote discussion 
among peers. Hence, Paper I address the first question (Q1) and ties earlier experi-
mental research, reported in the licentiate thesis (Andersson 1993), to the research 
presented in this thesis.  
The Concept development study, reported in Paper II, contains a concept analysis, which 
aims to answer the second research sub-question (Q2), and to propose a concept of 
Figure 1-2 Model illustrating the systems perspective on the thesis research problem. The sub-model at 
the top illustrates that the military level of the system is adopted from Lawson (Lawson 2010, p.23) 
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military utility suitable for the first order systems engineering model presented in 
Paper I. 
In the Case study, reported in Papers III and IV, the Systems Engineering processes 
of the Swedish multirole armored platform (SEP), and, in part, those of the Swedish 
Visby class corvette, were reviewed using a case study method. Lessons were identi-
fied from the modeling and evaluation of platform signatures and from the design 
activities, including relevant measures and requirements. The results were used as 
input to the Modeling study (Q3), but primarily as input to discussion of how to use 
the proposed assessment model in the systems engineering of Low Observable plat-
forms (Q4). 
In the Modeling study, modeling and simulation were conducted to show how the mili-
tary utility can be linked to the surface properties of a platform using a quantitative 
model, thereby showing that effective evaluation is possible. In Paper V, the neces-
sity of the systems approach is demonstrated by balancing the radar and infrared 
signature properties of a combat aircraft executing a mission. In Paper VI, the de-
pendence of the IR signature on material emissivity is investigated. Together, these 
last two papers address research sub-question three (Q3). 
1.5 Assumptions and delimitations 
In this thesis, it is assumed that development programs in the near future will adhere 
to methods and principles developed in the field of systems engineering. Therefore, 
to be useful in practice, assessments of utility will have to support decision-making 
in the systems engineering process. 
Furthermore, I assume that improved quantitative bases for decisions will assist de-
cision-making in systems engineering. Discussion of human decision-making is not 
within the scope of this thesis. 
Utility can be assessed from many perspectives, such as economic or game theory. 
In this thesis, I have limited the scope to assessment methods originating from the 
traditions of Military Operations Research (MOR) and systems analysis. These sci-
entific disciplines are the roots of contemporary systems engineering practice. The 
quantitative character of MOR is, for example, necessary in requirements analysis, 
the core process in systems engineering. Requirements are responsible for com-
municating military needs to designers of technical systems, and they have to be 
measurable to be verifiable. Therefore, any proposals put forward in this thesis as a 
result of using these methods should increase the relevance of the results in practice.  
The technological scope of this thesis is limited to the study of spectral design.  
Spectral design is in turn limited to its use in signature reduction. In addition to the 
applications mentioned in the introduction, the use of spectral design for controlling 
the signature of decoys is perhaps of equally great interest.  
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1.6 Scope and structure 
The scope of the extended summary in the thesis is more than a summary of the 
results reported in the appended papers. The aim is to report the results of an inte-
grated research project based on the main research question, but using data collect-
ed from the appended papers. 
The first five chapters form an extensive theoretical background to the thesis prob-
lem, including a review of related work. Due to the interdisciplinary approach, it is 
relatively voluminous. Figure 1-3 illustrates the scope of each background chapter in 
relation to the systems model approach. Chapter 2, Theory: Military System Level, pre-
sents important concepts and theoretical background necessary for analyzing the 
military level problem domain. Chapter 3, Theory: Military Operations Research, presents 
background and related work on how to quantitatively assess the performance of 
lower system levels at the military system level. Chapter 4, Theory: Technical System 
Level, presents concepts in Systems Engineering used to address the technical system 
level element of the research problem, including related work in the areas of Surviv-
ability Engineering and Signature Management. Finally, Chapter 5, Theory: Technology 
Level, introduces the application of spectral design in its context at the technology 
level, including fundamental concepts in material optics. 
The last three chapters follow a traditional structure. Chapter 6, Research Methods, 
presents the methods used in the respective studies and discusses concerns regard-
ing their feasibility. Chapter 7, a Summary of study results, consolidates the results nec-
essary from the appended papers to answer the thesis research question. Chapter 
8, Discussion and conclusions, answers the thesis research question and highlights the 
contribution of the thesis. 
Figure 1-3 How the background chapters of the thesis relate to the systems model approach 
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2
THEORY: MILITARY SYSTEM LEVEL  
hen studying the utility of equipment for military purposes, logic says 
it is fruitful to start by answering the question: how should wars be 
fought? Therefore, this chapter presents important concepts and the-
oretical background necessary for the analysis of the military level 
problem domain. The chapter begins with an introduction to fighting power and 
warfighting capability, followed by a description of the Principles of war. In this thesis, 
the principles of war are then used as the theoretical foundation for the survivability 
attribute and for understanding the benefits of camouflage, concealment and decep-
tion. The chapter ends with a discussion of the role of military operational planning 
and a review of related work relevant to assessments of military utility. 
2.1 Capability 
The general meaning of the word capability is being able to do something (Merriam-
Webster 2016a). In the military science domain, the ability to fight is defined by the 
Fighting power of a military actor. The fighting power in turn comprises three interde-
pendent components: the conceptual component, (the thought process), the moral 
component (the ability to get people to fight); and the physical component (the 
means to fight) (DCDC 2014, p.25-). Hence, what the actor wants to do is a product 
of the conceptual component. The manpower and equipment required to do it con-
stitute the physical component, and the resolve to do it is a product of the moral 
component. For the discussions in this thesis, the model is merely used to point out 
that there is more to fighting power than technology; however, equipment does af-
fect both the way military fight and the morale of warfighters. 
From a management perspective, fighting power can be viewed as a portfolio, i.e. a 
collection of warfighting capabilities (DoD 2008). Each warfighting capability might 
then refer to an objective, a task that needs to be accomplished in support of the 
objective, or the task force necessary to conduct these tasks. This view has devel-
oped within a concept called capabilities-based planning, since the end of the Cold 
War. The purpose is primarily to support military capabilities management in uncer-
tainty (Fitzsimmons 2007). As an example, a Swedish traceability model has been 
implemented (SwAF 2011). Here warfighting capability is defined as “a specific ac-
tivity, for which resources have been acquired and trained, in order to achieve a de-
sired effect that varies depending on scenario and ambition” (SwAF 2011). An ex-
ample from the portfolio, related to the Modeling study, is the engagement capabil-
ity: The ability to suppress or destroy enemy ground based air defenses. Another 
example of direct interest is the protection capability: The ability to protect objects 
on the ground against attack (SwAF 2011). One of the merits of the above approach 
to capability, highlighted by Anteroinen, is that “it attempts to provide capabilities 
suitable for a wide range of challenges while working within an economic frame-
work that necessitates choice” (Anteroinen 2013, p.16). This functional method of 
viewing and expressing capabilities highlights the broadening of missions for which 
forces should be prepared, and the joint perspective.  An important result is that it 
W
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shifts the generation of requirements away from a platform centric 
focus (Fitzsimmons 2007). Lastly, for the purposes of this thesis it is important to 
point out that the word able in the capability definition also means doing something 
successfully (Axberg et al. 2013, p.22). Hence, the survivability attribute, described 
later, is present in many warfighting capabilities. From here on, when the term ca-
pability is used in the thesis, it refers to warfighting capabilities in the sense de-
scribed above, unless otherwise stated. 
As identified by Anteroinen (Anteroinen 2013, pp.17–18), several nations have 
found it useful to think of and manage military capabilities as systems. In the US the 
system elements comprise; Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership 
and education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) (DoD 2008). In Australia the 
system elements are referred to as fundamental inputs to capability; these are: Personnel, 
Organization, Collective training, Major systems, Supplies, Facilities and training 
areas, Support, Command and management (AUS MOD 2014). Similarly, in UK the 
elements are referred to as eight defence lines of development: Training, Equipment, Per-
sonnel, Infrastructure, Concepts & Doctrine, Organization, Information and Logis-
tics (TEPIDOIL) (Yue & Henshaw 2009). The common aim is to obtain a holistic 
view of capability development, thereby shifting attention away from the traditional 
platform centric approaches and towards non-materiel aspects. Regardless of the 
categorization of elements, we realize that any component in a system, e.g. the tech-
nical element, has dependencies on other elements. Consequently, and important in 
this thesis, a component only has military utility (See Paper II) if it is a contributing 
element in a capability system. The term technical system is used to label the technical 
element of an operational military capability system when it is beneficial to view the 
element itself as a system.  
2.2 Principles of war 
Many contemporary military doctrines refer to the so called Principles of War as 
guidelines to commanders and their staffs for the planning and conduct of warfare 
(e.g. DCDC 2014)). The phrase usually refers to the modern principles of war de-
scribed by British General Fuller in 1916. His work was published in a journal article 
entitled “The Principles of War, with Reference to the Campaigns of 1914–1915”. 
No doubt his work was influenced by the writings of military theorists such as Sun 
Tzu, Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. However, Fuller considered this set of 
principles to represent the most important non-physical factors that affect the con-
duct of military operations at all levels. The widespread use of the principles in 
modern military doctrines a hundred years later seems to validate his view. The ex-
act definitions and number of principles vary. In 1927 Fuller considered them to be 
nine (Fuller n.d.). In the 2014 British defense doctrine they are ten (DCDC 2014, 
pp.30–31): Selection and maintenance of the aim, maintenance of morale, offensive 
action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, co-
operation and sustainability. Security is the principle of particular interest in this the-
sis. 
2.3 Security, force protection or survivability? 
A contemporary view of security is “providing and maintaining an operating envi-
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ronment that gives freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objec-
tives” (DCDC 2014, p.50). The principle entails balancing the likelihood of loss 
against achieving objectives (DCDC 2014, pp.30–31),  i.e. warfare involves inherent 
risk. Consequently, it is impossible to avoid all risks, but such measures should be 
taken to ensure that achieving the mission is worth the anticipated cost in lives and 
losses in materiel. Managing these risks demands protecting high-value assets, be 
they troops or platforms, such as ships or aircraft. Within the framework of a mili-
tary operation these measures are normally referred to as force protection – “the means 
by which operational effectiveness is maintained through countering the threats 
from adversary, natural and human hazards, including fratricide, in order to ensure 
security and freedom of action” (DCDC 2007). Instead, survivability measures are 
actions taken, for the same purpose, but during the engineering of equipment and 
platforms. Therefore, it is seen as an attribute of a military platform, e.g. a combat 
aircraft, a combat vehicle or a naval ship. As Survivability relates to security, it can 
be defined as the capability to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile 
environment (Ball & Calvano 1994; Ball 2003, p.1). This thesis focuses on efforts 
to avoid hostile threats. 
2.4 Camouflage, concealment and deception 
NATO defines camouflage as ”the use of natural or artificial material on personnel, 
objects or tactical positions with the aim of confusing, misleading or evading the 
enemy” (NATO 2015). A typical example of camouflage is the pattern and colors 
chosen for combat uniforms. The aim is for soldiers to blend in with typical back-
grounds in the presumed war zone. Another example is the use of dazzle paint 
schemes on naval and merchant ships during the First World War, to confuse Ger-
man submarine commanders about such things as their type and heading (Hartcup 
1979, pp.35–47). See Figure 2-1. 
Although, in contemporary national doctrines, manuals and handbooks it seems  the 
term camouflage is almost always used together with the terms concealment and 
deception, e.g. in the US DOD dictionary (DOD 2010). Hence, in military glossaries 
one has to look for the meaning of CC&D, or CCD.  The term is, however, fre-
Figure 2-1 British Kil class patrol gunboat H MS Kildangan painted in dazzle 
camouflage. Photo: The British Government 
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quently used in the field of zoology. Hartcup concludes that nature’s use of camou-
flage is really for the same purpose as in warfare, i.e. to survive by being inconspicu-
ous (Hartcup 1979, p.9). The lion’s color blends in with the colors of the savannah, 
as does the antelope’s – and they are both there to eat. 
In British doctrine, camouflage is given as one of the means of deception at the tac-
tical level – “Tactical deception incorporates all measures to mislead an opponent in 
the battlespace, which are planned by component commanders and below, and may 
be used to complement an operational deception plan. Tactical deception is short-
term and is usually based on physical measures such as camouflage, concealment, 
displays, feints or demonstrations.” (DCDC 2007). Using decoys of soldiers, vehi-
cles or weapons is one example of deception at the tactical level. The purpose can 
for instance be to confuse an adversary regarding the true size or intention of a mili-
tary force. Again, turning to the animal world for similarities, one finds that decep-
tion is also used in nature. Some species of fish and butterflies, for instance, have 
patterns resembling pairs of eyes considerably larger than their own, to scare off 
species feeding on them.  
The historical and natural examples have another factor in common; the sensors of 
interest, eyes or perhaps monochrome cameras, are only sensitive to the visible por-
tion of the electromagnetic spectrum. In the contexts discussed in this thesis there 
are additional sensor threats in the battlespace. There are Night vision goggles sensi-
tive to near infrared, and there are sights and imaging cameras sensitive to the short, 
medium and long wavelength infrared spectra. There are even multispectral sensors 
developed for field use, covering almost the entire optical spectrum (Sect.4.3.3). 
Consequently, means for camouflage, concealment and deception must develop 
accordingly.  
In summary, the terms camouflage, concealment and deception blend together un-
der the heading tactical deception. In this thesis, when the aim is specifically to ana-
lyze utility for camouflage, the aim is to evaluate the use of natural or artificial mate-
rial on personnel, objects or tactical positions in order to reduce conspicuousness to 
military sensors.  
2.5 Operations planning – the design of a respondent system 
NATO allied joint publications define a military operation as the “ military action or 
the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military 
mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, 
defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign” 
(NATO 2013). A mission is defined as a task with a stated purpose. As a key princi-
pal, NATO state that operations should be directed towards objectives contributing 
to achieving a desired end state, that is, an acceptable situation. Any operational plan-
ning process includes: understanding the (unacceptable) situation, identifying the 
desired end state, and designing an appropriate course of action that will make ef-
fective use of the limited resources at the disposal of the commander (See the 
NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive for an example of a planning 
process currently in use). Thus, analogous to the military system model depicted in 
Figure 1-2, operations planning comprises decisions on the design of a suitable re-
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spondent system. 
Given the description of capability (Sect.2.1), the alternative designs available to the 
commander and staff are limited by decision-making that took place years ago in the 
capabilities-based planning process, including whatever technical systems were de-
veloped and acquired. In turn, the performance of these technical systems is, at least 
to some extent, limited by decision-making that took place years earlier in the mili-
tary technology research and development processes. Therefore, all of these deci-
sion situations involve assessing which combination of ends, ways and available 
means (including technical systems and technology, i.e. the focus here) will have the 
greater probability of success for a military force, in the same uncertain future situa-
tion. The main difference between the decision situations described is the time 
frame, and thus the degree of uncertainty in the assessments made. When planning 
an operation, the staff will probably have a good idea of whom the adversary is, the 
performance of their own equipment, and the conditions in the area of operations. 
However, when, for example, developing a low observable platform as part of de-
veloping a new capability, the scenarios will be thematic and perhaps both the threat 
systems and friendly systems will be conceptual. Consequently, the decision situa-
tions mentioned are variations of the same phenomenon – identified in this thesis 
as assessments of military utility.  
2.6 Concepts of military utility – related work 
In light of the discussion above (section 2.5), we expect an assessment of military 
utility to support an armed force's decision about which candidate technology to 
choose (seen as one of the technologies in a technical system, in turn seen as a 
component in a capability system), while balancing the desired effect against limited 
resources. Therefore, the question in this section is what definition of military utility 
to use in order to take account of all necessary aspects, and to provide a good basis 
for the decision-making in focus. 
Traditionally in the military domain, analysis based on cost-effectiveness is used to 
compare the expected utility of different alternatives in order to support decision-
making regarding the acquisition of materiel. In textbooks, this kind of assessment is 
called a trade-off analysis or an analysis-of-alternatives. See for example Lewis et al (2007). 
However, cost-effectiveness does not seem to be relevant in all the decision-
situations depicted. Some scholars have, for example, found that in the operations 
planning situation, the cost dimension only makes sense if it has a wider meaning 
than purely monetary, such as loss of lives or materiel (Larson 1996; Axberg et al. 
2013; Sivertun 2012). 
The systems engineering community use a concept called the operational utility, which 
is “the degree to which the system in focus enables users to accomplish organiza-
tional missions and achieve stated goals and objectives, while posing no unaccepta-
ble safety, environment or health hazards or risks to its operators or public” 
(Wasson 2006, p.50). In this concept, the desired effects dimension, the undesired 
effects, and the limiting factors of an operation are considered in greater depth. 
However, there seems to be a need to develop the limited funding dimension and to 
specify the concept from a military organizational viewpoint.  
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The US Department of Defense uses a concept called operational effectiveness. The def-
inition is “a measure of the overall ability of a system to accomplish a mission when 
used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for opera-
tional employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, sup-
portability, survivability, vulnerability, and threat” (DoD 2012). The desired effect is 
defined as accomplishing the mission. In addition, it also seems to relate to the ca-
pability aspect, as it implies that a perfect fit with the organization, doctrine etc. is a 
prerequisite. The US Department of Defense also uses a concept called operational 
suitability. This is defined as “the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily 
placed in field use with consideration to reliability, availability, compatibility, trans-
portability, interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human fac-
tors, habitability, manpower supportability, logistics supportability, documentation, 
environmental effects and training requirements” (DoD 2012). Hence, in the con-
text of this thesis, operational suitability could be considered a candidate concept 
for characterizing how well a technology, or a technical system, fits within a capabil-
ity system. Thus, a combination of operational effectiveness and operational suita-
bility seems to address both the desired effect and capability aspects of the military 
utility concept sought here. 
Furthermore, the military-utility concept sought is required to enable quantitative 
assessments, as stated in the introduction (Sect.1.5), in order to support the systems 
engineering process. However, there are also important qualitative aspects to con-
sider. Utility is in essence the quality of something being potentially useful (OD 
2014; McLean & McMillan 2014). Stensson argues that having this focus promotes 
optimization of the design for those scenarios the design organization can think of 
in advance, at the expense of usefulness and safety in practice (Stensson 2014; 
Stensson 2015). He proposes a concept called situated usefulness with the aim of mak-
ing designers aware of the problem, and promoting designs that enable the system’s 
operators to make full use of their skills, creativity and experience. He describes the 
concept as a field of two tensions. Too much focus on calculative effectiveness or safety 
will hamper the systems generative qualities, potentiality and resilience. This might ren-
der the system useless and the safety brittle in unexpected situations. In addition, 
too much focus on avoiding undesired effects, that is, focusing on safety and resili-
ence, will hamper effectiveness and potentiality. Nevertheless, he stresses that de-
signing in order to manage foreseeable situations is necessary; otherwise, the genera-
tive qualities might be completely irrelevant. However, there is a balance to be 
found. 
When doing a literature search on the topic “military utility” on the web-of-science 
there are only thirteen hits2, including Paper I. It seems the only previous formalized 
use of the term to be found is in the US Department of Defense acquisition process 
for assessing the operational utility of new technology in demonstrators. These as-
sessments are called “Military Utility Assessments” (AcqNotes.com 2016). Their use 
is obviously related to the need for a concept in this thesis, but it does not fully cov-
er all the necessary aspects. 
2 June 1st 2017 
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In summary, we have found no concept that captures all the aspects important to 
the military decision-maker when assessing the military utility of technologies to be 
used in military technical systems, and then in capability systems. Therefore, the aim 
of the Concept development study (Paper II) was to propose such a concept, based 
on related concepts from the military and systems engineering domains. 
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3
THEORY: MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH  
n this thesis there is a need to use both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
The systematic literature review, the concept analysis and the case study 
methods used are typical examples of qualitative research methods, where the 
collected data is soft and rich – and not presented in numbers. However, as 
stated in the introduction, the methodological contribution is required to sup-
port the quantifying of military performance/needs at the military system level, and 
then to link these measures to those at more detailed system levels. These abilities 
are developed within the field of Military Operations Research (MOR).  
In this chapter, military operations research is first defined and its merits are de-
scribed in general. Next, the fundamentals of modeling and simulation are dis-
cussed, followed by an introduction to generic MOR studies. In the second half of 
the chapter a probabilistic framework, specifically suitable for survivability assess-
ments, and used in the Modeling study, is first presented. This is followed by a re-
view of related literature.  The chapter ends with a discussion of the implications of 
uncertainty and complexity in warfare modeling. 
3.1 Merits of quantitative assessments 
At the beginning of the Second World War, the British government asked Professor 
P.M.S. Blackett and colleagues to support military operations. There were numerous 
cases where the tactical use of new equipment had not been optimal. In several of 
those cases, performance was enhanced significantly by the application of scientific 
methods. This event is said to mark the birth of MOR, or military Operational 
Analysis (OA) as the discipline is also known (Jaiswal 1997, p.3). It was acknowl-
edged that scientific analysis, sometimes rather simple, could bring significant im-
provements to military systems and capabilities. 
During the decade after WWII, military operations research was used to support 
decisions in current or near future military operations. Due to the increasing com-
plexity in government technology programs at the beginning of the 1960s, such as 
Polaris and Gemini, there was a need to develop decision-making methods. The 
main challenge was the increasing timespan for the development of advanced mili-
tary systems, and with it the need for life cycles in the 15-20 year range. The uncer-
tainties arising from this perspective on weapons acquisition threatened to increase 
costs enormously. The answer was a new scientific discipline called systems analysis. It 
was defined as the “systematic approach to helping a decision maker choose a 
course of action by investigating his full problem, searching out objectives and al-
ternatives, and comparing them in the light of their consequences, using an appro-
priate framework - insofar possible analytic” (Quade & Boucher 1968; Jaiswal 1997). 
Initially systems analysis supported military decision-making in the long term, while 
military operations research supported it in the short term. In the military domain 
today, however, systems analysis is regarded as an integral part of military operations 
research and the two labels are used interchangeably (Jaiswal 1997, pp.4–5). 
I 
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Nowadays MOR analysts work both in military operational staffs and in supporting 
procurement agencies. Their work is similar to that of staff officers, i.e. to create 
bases for decisions. The difference is the sophistication in methods used, which are 
often based on statistics and mathematics (Loerch & Rainey 2007, p.4).  The aim is 
to enable the decision-maker to make a rational, informed, decision about military 
issues. Jaiswal has illustrated the scope of MOR by presenting a set of typical ques-
tions to be answered, e.g. “What will be the consequences if the force levels are re-
duced on a unilateral, bilateral or multi-lateral basis?” or “If the various factors in-
fluencing the performance of a system can be expressed qualitatively, can the per-
formance be quantified?” or; “What is the effectiveness of a weapon system or a 
tactical plan in a plausible combat scenario?” (Jaiswal 1997, p.1). Versions of the 
latter two are addressed in this thesis; e.g. see Papers I and VI respectively. The 
formal definition of MOR is “Operations research is a scientific method of providing defense 
departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control” 
(Jaiswal 1997, p.6) (Morse & Kimball 1951).  
The key term is quantitative. The simple argument for using a quantitative approach, 
supported by the discussion above, is of course that it complements qualitative re-
sults obtained from other sources as a basis for decisions. Nevertheless, some of the 
merits of quantitative methods are highlighted below.  
In Paper II it is pointed out that legislation demands objective evaluation of tenders 
for contracts to develop military materiel. The solution is to grade the design solu-
tions in different aspect-areas (such as stealth), to give these areas numerical weights 
and compare the resulting compounded product of the respective tenders. Of 
course, there will still be some room for arbitrary judgements, but a quantitative 
model makes the procedure more transparent. 
In Paper IV the focus is the requirements analysis process during the engineering of 
military materiel. Quantifying the needs of warfighters in the military domain, in 
order to be able to communicate them to the design organization, is the driver of the 
engineering process. Quantifying these needs using measurable metrics is also nec-
essary in order to be able to verify that the product delivered satisfies the require-
ments. The results in Paper IV indicate that requirements that are not quantified 
may suffer from low priority during design. Use of MOR enables identification of 
these needs and relevant measures. 
In Papers V and VI some aspects of the random nature of warfighting are modeled 
using probabilistic methods (which are particularly suitable when studying survivabil-
ity, see Section 3.4). The duel between an aircraft strike package and a ground based 
air defense system is modeled in a quantitatively based scenario. This adds flexibility 
since it is possible to tune numerous tactical and technical parameters to monitor 
the consequences. Specifically, the procedure can be used to determine whether un-
certainty in a particular parameter is great enough to influence decisions. 
Lastly, it can be understood from all three examples that quantifying needs and 
properties forces MOR analysts to define the phenomena analyzed explicitly and 
unambiguously. This has been pointed out as a merit in itself. Loerch & Rainey 
stress that recommendations from MOR analysts are seldom the only basis for deci-
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sions available to the decision-maker. Decisions are often based on a combination 
of MOR-results and more informal information. However, not infrequently, deci-
sion-makers find that the most important contribution from MOR is in fact the 
structured framing of the problem (2007, chap.4). No doubt quantitative results can 
be used to support a qualitative discussion (Liwång 2015, pp.46–47).  
3.2 Modeling 
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler” is a quote often 
attributed to Albert Einstein. The statement concerns scientific theories in general 
but is certainly appropriate when it comes to models and modeling. A model is an 
abstraction of reality and comes in many forms, such as maps, organizational charts, 
process descriptions, miniature models, analytic (mathematical) expressions, etc., 
and even notional forms. We use them because “the real world is too complicated 
for us to reason about and contains many details that that are not necessarily rele-
vant” (Washburn & Kress 2009, p.1). Hence, any analyst is faced with the delicate 
challenge of finding a model that is both simple enough to understand, and, when 
used, produces relevant observations about the real world phenomenon of interest. 
If the model is too simple, the observations might very well be misleading. An im-
portant consequence is that an analyst has to understand the limitations of a model 
to use it properly.  
Simulation should be understood as “an experiment where a model is used for the 
monitoring and understanding of the behavior and causality in a modeled phenom-
enon during a period of time” (Holm 2007, p.12) (translated from Swedish). The 
terms modeling and simulation are often used interchangeably in the literature. Model-
ing or simulations supporting military studies can be performed as any activity on a 
scale from a computer program to a war-game, or military exercise, involving hu-
man decision-makers (Washburn & Kress 2009, p.3). 
Within the MOR community, the problem solving method in Papers V and VI 
would be referred to as an example of warfare modeling. This concept involves the 
broad scope of models and methods that are applicable to warfare 
lems (Bracken et al. 1995, pp.1–2). On the detailed end of a resolution-scale, weapon 
system modeling is used to assess certain system attributes by using analytic models of 
the systems, statistics and probability techniques. Next on the scale, combat model-
ing (Washburn & Kress 2009) is used to address operational problems related to 
force structure, combat development and tactics. At the low-resolution end, theater-
level modeling is used to solve strategic issues, such as defense budgeting or analyzing 
arms control agreements. As a rule, more detailed models are used to produce input 
to those with less resolution. Consequently, the Modeling study is probably best 
described as a combination of weapon systems modeling and combat modeling.  
The analytic models used in warfare modeling are either deterministic 
or stochastic. Deterministic models state exactly what will happen as if there were no 
uncertainties, while stochastic models assume uncertainties, use random variable 
inputs and make indefinite predictions of the results (Washburn & Kress 2009, p.2). 
The modeling in the Modeling study (Papers V and VI) falls into the deterministic 
category. 
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3.3 MOR studies 
There are many versions of the scheme for OR studies in the literature (e.g. (Loerch 
& Rainey 2007; Jackson 2003)); they look slightly different as different scholars em-
phasize different parts, but the core is the same (see definition of systems analysis 
above). Here the version by Jaiswal (1997, chap.7) is reproduced and used for illus-
trative purposes, because it is generic in nature. See Figure 3-1. 
The initial step comprises activities for capturing 
and formulating the problem. If possible, it involves 
discussions with the decision-maker in order to 
understand the problem correctly. Then, the ob-
jectives of the study, variables affecting the study, 
and Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) are defined. 
The initial step ends with the identification of 
possible alternative solutions. In the Modeling 
study, measures of survivability were central. Al-
ternatives were simply defined by varying size, 
speed, altitude, and the coating properties of the 
aircraft. 
The second step comprises developing a model that 
can help answer the study question. In MOR, as 
stated above, analytic expressions producing 
quantitative results are preferred. In our example 
from the Modeling study, a mathematical expres-
sion for calculating the predicted loss of aircraft is 
formulated. This model, however, also needs in-
put from models of the scenario, the combat air-
craft, its coatings, its weapons, the adversary’s 
weapons and sensors etc. (Sect.6.3, 7.3). 
In the third step, the models are used to collect data. In some cases it is possible to 
find analytic solutions directly, but more often the models are implemented and ex-
ecuted in a simulation environment.  Data to feed the models can often be found in 
experimental data. Jaiswal points out that in this step links are established between 
system variables and the top level MoE (1997, p.9). In the Modeling study (Papers V 
and VI) the overall aim is to show that it is actually possible to make an explicit link 
between a material’s optical properties and the military utility of an aircraft. 
When entering the fourth step, MoE values for the respective alternatives have been 
assigned, but are they useful in a comparison of alternatives? The models used have 
to be validated. Due to the nature of military systems, results from field trials for 
comparison purposes are scarce. Hence, according to Jaiswal, the validation meth-
ods available are usually expert opinions, sensitivity analysis or hypothesis validation 
(1997, chaps.9–10). Sensitivity analysis reveals whether uncertainties in parameters 
alter the relative priority of the alternatives. Hypothesis validation is understood as 
pairwise comparisons of high-level responses from the model with assessments of 
what would happen in the real world, given the same events. In Papers V and VI the 
Figure 3-1 A generic scheme for OR 
studies 
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model describing the military scenario model was validated in a discussion with mili-
tary experts, while the more detailed models representing sensor and weapon re-
sponses were validated by comparing them with results reported in earlier research 
(Sect.7.3.2). If necessary, the analyst has to go back, modify, and redo earlier steps, 
as indicated in Figure 3-1. 
The final step in the OR scheme illustrated is evaluation and implementation. In this step 
the resulting alternatives, and their respective MoEs, are compared, and conclusions 
are drawn. Finally, the MOR analyst synthesizes the analysis results, answers the 
study question and makes a recommendation to the decision-maker. 
3.4 The probabilistic framework for survivability 
By using a MOR approach to demonstrating the impact of survivability on military 
activities, we understand that there is a need to find measures and models to link 
them. The applicatory mission example chosen for the Modeling study is an air-to-
surface air operation to neutralize a ground based air defended point target. For this 
particular situation, Robert E. Ball has worked out a theoretical probabilistic frame-
work for survivability assessments (2003, chap.1.1).  
3.4.1 The one-on-one scenario 
Survivability is an attribute of a military platform defining its capability to avoid or 
withstand a man-made hostile environment (Ball & Calvano 1994; Ball 2003, p.1). 
Because of the random nature of combat, survivability is measured by a probability, 
PS. The complementary event, where the platform does not survive, is described as 
a kill, and the killability of a platform is denoted PK. Thus, in probabilistic terms sur-
vivability can be expressed as: 
PS = 1 –PK. Eq. 3-1 
Survivability is in turn generally composed of three probabilities: the susceptibility, 
the vulnerability and the recoverability (Ball & Calvano 1994; Kim & Lee 2012). The 
susceptibility denotes the probability that the platform is hit by a weapon or by its 
parts, PH, and the vulnerability denotes the probability that the platform is killed if it 
is hit, PK|H. The recoverability refers to a platform’s damage control and thereby its 
ability, including that of the crew, to reconfigure and continue its mission. In the 
aircraft survivability discipline (Ball 2003), survivability is often estimated without 
regard to recoverability and is hence given by: 
PS = 1 –PH· PK|H, Eq. 3-2 
while in ship or land combat vehicle survivability disciplines, the kill is not necessari-
ly total. For a more detailed discussion of the latter case, and recoverability, see Ball 
and Calvano (1994). 
The expression “breaking the kill chain” is of uncertain origin, but is a useful con-
cept for analyzing survivability measures. The kill chain epithet refers to the one 
path in a probability tree of events that leads to the platform being killed (Ball 2003, 
p.11). All the others lead to the platform surviving. In the Modeling study (Papers V 
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and VI), the concept is applied to the probability of an attack aircraft being killed by 
an air defense surface-to-air missile, and this situation is used for illustration. In a 
scenario with one threat and one aircraft (The One-on-One scenario), the aircraft is 
killed:  
x given that the threat is active, PA,  
x given that the aircraft is detected, PD|A,  
x given that a weapon is launched, PL|D,  
x given the weapon intercepts, PI|L,  
x given a hit, PH|I, and then  
x given that the aircraft is vulnerable to the hit, PK|H.  
If the kill chain (the product of the probabilities listed) is inserted into Equation 3-1, 
survivability can be written: 
PSS = 1 – PA· PD|A· PL|D· PI|L· PH|I· PK|H.  Eq. 3-3 
Thus, any tactical or technical measures taken to reduce probabilities in the kill 
chain will break the kill chain, or at least enhance the survivability. On-board elec-
tronic warfare can be used to prevent the surface-to-air missile system from being 
activated, thus reducing PA ; or, signature reduction efforts can be used to reduce 
detection range, thus reducing PD|A , etc. This is the basic principle behind surviva-
bility engineering and signature management, which are further elaborated in Chap-
ter 4.2 and Table 4-1. 
3.4.2 The military systems study 
The one-on-one scenario is often too simple a model. The survivability discipline 
stems from an understanding of the fact that the mission, the context and the ad-
versary weapon systems all significantly influence the relative importance of each 
survivability enhancement feature, and from the fact that the attributes of a plat-
form, e.g. a combat aircraft, naval ship or main battle tank, are interdependent (Ball 
2003, p.44). Consequently, each feature used to enhance one attribute could have an 
undesired impact on another. In the following, these undesired effects are included 
in secondary effects. 
A simple example would be the impact of adding armor to a patrol vehicle - the 
physical protection is enhanced, but mobility is reduced. There is obviously an op-
timal balance to be found in the effectiveness of attributes. Therefore, Ball advo-
cates using a system effectiveness concept to study the overall utility of platforms in a 
specific military context, i.e. at the military system level illustrated in Figure 1-2. He 
argues that the system effectiveness of a military platform comprises three dimen-
sions: defensive survivability, offensive capability and availability (Ball 2003, p.765). The pre-
fix defensive is omitted in the following text. In order to study the effects of surviv-
ability measures in all three dimensions, Ball divides military activities into engage-
ments, missions and campaigns. A mission comprises a series of engagements and a 
campaign in turn comprises a number of missions. A survivability assessment has to 
be conducted at the mission level, to take the secondary effects on offensive capa-
bility into account, and at the campaign level to take the secondary effects on availa-
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bility into account. 
At the engagement level, the one-on-one scenario is considered the basic element 
for the derivation of an analytic link between survivability and measures of mission 
effectiveness. The probability (PSS) of one aircraft, flying within range of a Surface-
to-Air-Missile (SAM) system, engaging with one shot, and surviving, is given by 
Equation 3-3. This is the most common measure of survivability, but since it is not 
the only one, Ball indexes it with “ss” for single-shot.  
More generally, in multiple shot or multiple engagement scenarios there are two 
possible situations to consider. Either the outcomes of later engagements are affect-
ed by the outcomes of earlier engagements, or they are not. The probability of de-
pendent engagement outcomes is rather difficult to assess; therefore, they are usual-
ly assumed to be independent (Ball 2003, p.18). One should, however, be aware of 
this simplification. 
In a typical mission, several aircraft are involved in multiple encounters with air de-
fense systems. Hence, the survivability measures of interest at mission level are the 
Loss Rate, LR, or the Survivability Rate, SR. These are given by 
SR= 1 - LR = 1-  ௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௔௜௥௖௥௔௙௧௦ ௞௜௟௟௘ௗ ௜௡ ௢௡௘ ௠௜௦௦௜௢௡௧௢௧௔௟ ௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௦௢௥௧௜௘௦ ௙௟௢௪௡ . Eq. 3-4
At campaign level, survivability refers to the probability of an aircraft surviving a 
campaign consisting of N missions. Campaign Survivability, CS, becomes 
CS = PS1 · PS2…· PSN =(1- PK1)(1- PK2)…(1- PKN), Eq. 3-4 
where PKi denotes the ith mission loss rate and PSi denotes the ith mission survival 
rate. Thus, if A is the number of aircraft available initially, the number of aircraft 
remaining after a mission is A · LR, and after a campaign, A · CS.  
In summary, survivability, the first dimension in system effectiveness, is measured 
using different metrics, depending on the complexity of the scenario. At engage-
ment level, the measure most often used, according to Ball, is the probability that a 
platform survives a single shot PSS, or the probability that it is killed PK|SS. At mis-
sion level, the measure mostly used is the Survivability Rate, SR or the Loss Rate, 
LR. At campaign level, Ball argues that the most interesting measure of survivability 
is the number of platforms remaining at the end of the campaign. 
The second dimension of system effectiveness, availability, is measured using the 
likelihood the aircraft is available for a mission, AA (Ball 2003, p.47).  The third dimen-
sion, the offensive capability, is quantified using the Mission Attainment Measure, 
MAM, which ranges from 0 to 1. From a probability point of view the MAM is the 
conditional probability that the platform can successfully accomplish the mission, 
given that it survives (Ball 2003, p.48). Hence, when evaluating the MAM for a spe-
cific mission, the platform operates as if the threat were present, with appropriate 
tactics, but the killing effects of the threat are not considered. The compound Meas-
ure Of Mission Effectiveness, MOME, is simply defined as the product of survivability, 
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availability and offensive capability.  
3.5 Survivability assessments – related work 
In MOR studies involving issues of survivability, a common denominator seems to 
be the application of Balls probabilistic framework (2003); this is seen in combat 
aircraft survivability analysis (Soban & Mavris 2001; Fielding & Nilubol 2004; 
Thokala 2009; Thokala et al. 2012; Soban & Mavris 2013), in naval ship survivability 
analysis (Ball & Calvano 1994), and in land combat vehicle survivability analysis 
(Guzie 2004; Goh 2014; Burgess & Svetoslav 2015).  
Problems addressed in survivability studies are typically formulated with objectives 
related to measures of survivability and the overall measure of mission effectiveness. 
Measures of survivability, like the loss-rate, are normally used as constraints, but for 
unmanned aerial vehicles they can be used as possible trade-offs (Richards et al. 
2009). In some applications the framework has also been adapted to include life-
cycle cost as a constraint (Soban & Mavris 2000b; Soban & Mavris 2001; Fielding & 
Nilubol 2004; Thokala 2009). The idea is that, if it is possible to link platform de-
signs to life cycle cost in a military campaign model, economic limitations will affect 
the availability of platforms, which will in turn affect the top level MoEs used for 
decision-making.  
Modeling activity in survivability studies has been developed and thoroughly de-
scribed by Soban and Mavris, in an effort to develop a methodological framework 
to support the preliminary (or conceptual) design process for combat aircraft 
(2000b; Soban 2001; 2001). Viewing an air campaign as a system is central. Figure 
3-2 illustrates a basic example of a possible result of such modeling activity. It is a 
multi-level system model adapted from Soban and Mavris (2000a). The illustration 
shows how they link technical parameters (requirements, design limitations or eco-
nomic variables etc.) to measures of effectiveness at the campaign level in two steps 
– firstly, via response functions in a technical system model, and then via response
functions in a mission level model. For example, Figure 3-2 indicates how the lethal-
ity of an aircraft (a measure of performance (MoP)) depends on the technical re-
quirements of payload and speed. The red graphs in the respective matrix elements 
are plots of the modeled response functions; for example, lethality is expected to 
increase with increasing payload or speed. 
At the mission level, the MoPs then become input variables to response functions 
of output measures of effectiveness (MoEs). For example, it can be seen how losses 
are expected to increase as the detectability and range of the threat air defense sys-
tem increase. At the top, mission level measures of effectiveness are combined into 
campaign system measures of effectiveness, such as the MOME (Sect.3.4.2). When 
defining response functions, Soban and Mavris use physics based calculations to 
find point values and then use regression analysis to extrapolate. Their justification 
for using regression analysis is that it minimizes calculation time. 
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The modeling approach in this thesis is based on the framework proposed by Soban 
and Mavris, and is further elaborated in section 6.3. The rationale is that their analy-
sis scheme was developed for survivability research, and they have shown that it can 
be used for evaluating both the system effectiveness and cost dimensions. Presuma-
bly, this latter property has potential in assessing military utility, a concept with more 
than one dimension (Paper II). Other academics have also used the framework, but 
their survivability models only seem to take into account radar signature and vulner-
ability reduction features (Fielding & Nilubol 2004; Thokala 2009; Thokala et al. 
2012). The aim in this thesis is to contribute with an adaptation for use in applica-
tions to reduce signatures in the optical electromagnetic spectrum. 
3.6 Uncertainty and complexity  
The modeling approach chosen implies being able to predict the behavior of a mili-
tary situation system, when adjusting some of its elements, i.e. it is assumed that it is 
possible to describe a military system using linear (causal) models. However, given 
the emergent properties of a system, and the inherent uncertainty about the future, 
is it possible to learn anything of value from such a model? 
 
In his thesis on risk analysis, Abrahamsson (2002) made an excellent review of the 
characteristics of and methods for dealing with uncertainty in quantitative modeling. 
Basically, he concludes that obtaining acceptable reliability in model predictions re-
quires managing uncertainties related to: 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3-2 A basic example of a multi-level model linking technical parameters governing platform 
performance to measures of system effectiveness. The diagram is adapted from Soban and Mavris 
(Soban & Mavris 2000a). The red lines in the respective models are graphs illustrating the model 
response to varying the respective input parameters. 
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1. specifying the correct problem or scenario the model is intended to address (Oth-
erwise the model “produces correct results for the wrong problem” 
(Abrahamsson 2002).)),  
2. formulating a conceptual model of the problem taking all relevant entities, processes 
and interactions into consideration, whilst omitting the rest (See section 3.2.),  
3. formulating a computational model with suitable resolution for the intended use of 
the model (i.e. the set of equations and parameters needed to obtain quanti-
tative results),  
4. estimates of the input parameters to the computational model, and finally, 
5. calculation and documentation of results. 
 
I have chosen to use Abrahamsson’s classification to describe briefly how the corre-
sponding uncertainties are treated in this thesis. Uncertainties of the first kind relate 
directly to difficulties in forecasting the future use of a technical system. The sys-
tems engineering approach chosen prescribes involving the end user organization 
when working out relevant scenarios and concepts of operation. The importance of 
this activity, success factors, and its role in the process of developing a low observa-
ble platform is discussed in the Case study (Sec.6.4). Uncertainties of the second 
kind are largely addressed through the application of survivability engineering 
(Sec.4.2), where identifying interdependent attributes and balancing requirements 
from a holistic viewpoint are central. The formulation of a conceptual model tem-
plate for evaluating spectral design technology in the Technology study (Sec.7.1) and 
the Concept development study (Sec.7.2), comprising the Ladder-model and the 
military utility concept respectively, includes in depth discussions on the matter. The 
modeling study demonstrates how to apply the template in practice, including how 
to use influence diagrams to avoid formulating too simple a model (Sec.7.3). In this 
thesis, uncertainties of the third and fourth kinds are largely addressed using the 
probabilistic framework for survivability presented above (Sec.3.4). One advantage 
is the ability to represent natural randomness with probabilities or probability distri-
butions in input parameters. The feasibility of this is demonstrated in the Modeling 
study (7.3). Typically, uncertainties of the fifth kind are managed by expert valida-
tion, comparisons with similar studies, peer reviews etc.  
 
The approach described is not without its critics. Some academics in the field 
of complexity theory would consider a military situation system complex in a sense that 
makes OR, i.e. analysis through traditional cause-and-effect modeling, practically 
futile. Complexity theorists argue that there is a significant difference between com-
plicated systems and complex systems. A combat aircraft, for instance, would be con-
sidered an example of the former, since it is possible to model its behavior using 
physical relationships. It is a complex product, but as a system it is merely compli-
cated. Complex systems are “constituted of such intricate sets of non-linear relation-
ships and feedback loops that only certain aspects of them can be analyzed at a 
time” (Cilliers 1998, p.3). Complexity is said to increase with the number of interact-
ing elements, their diversity, their interconnectivity and their adaptability. From this 
perspective, complexity is usually associated with living things or social systems. 
Sociological systems are said to have strong emergence, when compared to physical-
chemical systems.  See Emmeche et al. (Emmeche et al. 1997) for an in-depth inves-
tigation of this property. In brief, sociological systems rely for their operation on the 
same laws that govern physical-chemical systems; however, physical-chemical laws 
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cannot completely account for the operations of sociological systems, because such 
systems are also governed by biological, psychological and social laws. The main 
implication for the context of this thesis is that it will never be possible to predict 
the evolution of a comprehensive military situation using causal models. It is possi-
ble to model quite complicated technical systems and, in principle, to predict their 
behavior, because they obey physical-chemical laws. However, any military situation 
system comprises technical system components and human operators; hence, it qual-
ifies as a sociological system and is already considered too complex to model, even 
when it comprises a small number of entities.  
 
However, because even social systems have to obey physical laws, we should at least 
be able to use the results from causal technical system modeling as boundary condi-
tions when modeling military situation system behavior in predetermined scenarios. 
In this thesis, predetermined scenarios typically have well-defined military objec-
tives, predetermined tactical options, and rational operators, which is why the com-
plexity of the military situation system is presumably manageable. The ambition of 
the approach described is to identify tipping points in military situation systems of 
predetermined scenarios, made possible by changes in the physical boundary condi-
tions. For example, tipping points could present an operator with the opportunity to 
do something completely different, and presumably more efficient, in order to meet 
military system objectives. No doubt, technology enabling such a tipping point has 
military utility. As far as engineering technical systems is concerned, this ambition 
must be good enough. Design decisions have to be made before a system is actually 
used. Applied systems scientists have taken this path before. Flood and Carson say, 
we must agree goals and system objectives beforehand, because “drawing up a de-
sign assumes we know the purpose of that design” (1993, p.121). Jackson concludes 
that a unified systems theory is not possible. Therefore, taking the OR approach 
might be correct “assuming that people (i.e. shareholders (my remark)) share values, 
and that systems can be mathematically modeled” (1995, p.27).  
 
In summary, my argument is that the modeling approach described will enable 
comparison of the benefits of different technical designs in military situations, and 
hence, potentially, assessment of their military utility - if only in relation to prede-
termined scenarios that are simple enough to model. Further discussion of the im-
pact and possible mitigation of uncertainties related to each study can be found in 
the respective validity and reliability sections in Chapter 7. 
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4  
THEORY: TECHNICAL SYSTEM LEVEL 
 
hen discussing military utility, ultimately only solutions that are feasi-
ble in the real world are of interest. If systems analysis is the science 
for understanding a complex real world problem and arriving at a 
conceptual technical solution, systems engineering is required to cap-
ture the concept and construct a working solution for the real world 
(Lawson 2010). In this chapter, general concepts of systems engineering are pre-
sented, followed by a presentation of the survivability engineering specialty, and the 
signature management discipline within that. 
4.1 Systems engineering 
In order to increase my chances of contributing to engineering practice, I have cho-
sen to adopt the INCOSE (International Council on Systems Engineering) view of 
systems engineering. Their systems engineering handbook (INCOSE 2015) is con-
sidered best practice by many defense agencies and corporations worldwide, and it is 
consistent with the ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 standard. In the following, systems 
engineering is described from three different aspects: a perspective, a process and a 
profession.  
 
Firstly, systems engineering can be described as a perspective, referring to its theo-
retical foundation in systems thinking: “systems engineering is an interdisciplinary ap-
proach and means to enable the realization of successful systems” (INCOSE 2015, 
p.11). The success-factors highlighted are: customer needs and the required func-
tionality must be addressed early in development; the entire life cycle of the resulting 
system must be considered from the beginning; and all relevant engineering disci-
plines and specialties should be involved in a team effort. Here, survivability engi-
neering and signature management are considered disciplines of special interest.  
 
Secondly, systems engineering can also be viewed as a process: “systems engineering 
is an iterative process of top-down synthesis, development and operation of a real-
world system that satisfies, in a near optimal manner, the full range of requirements 
for the system” (INCOSE 2015; Eisner 2008). The systems engineering standard 
identifies four process groups: the technical processes, the technical management 
processes, the agreement processes and the organizational project-enabling process-
es. Paper IV examines the tailoring of these processes to fit the engineering of Low 
Observable military platforms.  
 
Thirdly, systems engineering is a profession. It forms “a discipline that concentrates 
on the design and application of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It 
involves looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and all 
the variables and relating the social to the technical aspect” (INCOSE 2015, p.11). 
In Paper IV, the effect of the mindset of the program management, and of the allo-
cation of responsibilities to project members are part of the study. 
 
W 
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Some terminology frequently used in systems engineering needs clarification. All 
man-made systems pass through a life cycle, from inception to disposal. In the sys-
tems engineering standard referred to here, the life cycle has been divided into a 
number of stages, each with labels characterizing the state of the system. See Figure 
4-1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 The generic life cycle of a system according to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015   
 
The concept stage (INCOSE 2015, pp.29–31) begins when the need for a new system 
of interest is identified. It ends with the selection of a high-level conceptual solution 
for development. In between, ideas, methods, new technologies etc., are explored 
and evaluated. One method used to evaluate concepts and to explore the use of new 
technologies is to develop concept demonstrator systems. The benefits of this 
method are discussed further in Papers III and IV in reviews of the Low Observa-
ble technology demonstrator projects SAT/Mark (armored vehicle) and Smyge (na-
val vessel).  
 
The development stage (INCOSE 2015, p.31) starts with input from the concept stage. 
The aim is to develop a system of interest that meets stakeholder needs and the re-
quirements of the subsequent life cycle stages. It ends with delivery of blueprints for 
the system of interest, and potential prototypes. Papers III and IV include reviews 
of the development programs for the SEP armored modular vehicle and for the 
Visby-class corvette.  
 
In the production stage, the system of interest is manufactured; in the utilization stage it 
is used in its operational environment; in the support stage it is maintained, and in 
the retirement stage it is taken out of service.  
 
However, after design (in the development life cycle stage) 80% of the total life cy-
cle cost has already been committed (INCOSE 2015, p.13). This is the reason why 
this thesis focuses on the first two life cycle stages. This is where good decision-
making is of the greatest importance. The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) should be under-
stood as the total cost of implementation and ownership of a system over its entire 
life (SEBoK 2016), i.e. including development and use etc. 
 
A stakeholder in a system of interest is any person or organization that has a legiti-
mate interest in the new system or capability made possible. Sponsors of the devel-
opment and users are typical examples, as are agencies responsible for inspections 
etc. Their “expectations, needs, requirements, problems, issues and perceived risks 
and opportunities” (INCOSE 2015, p.279) are termed stakeholder needs, or simp-
ly needs.  
 
The system requirements are derived from needs identified through the technical pro-
cesses of systems engineering. These are fundamental to the development process. 
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They define “what the system needs to do, how well, and under what conditions, as 
required to meet project and design constraints” (INCOSE 2015, p.281). System 
requirements are the formal communicators of customer needs to the design organ-
ization and, hence, they form the core of the contract between procurer and con-
tractor.  
 
As system requirements are allocated to subsystems, and to lower level elements, 
during the design process, they are broken down into greater detail. However, it is 
important to maintain traceability from each lower level system requirement to the 
original needs because each requirement carries a price tag. Contradictory require-
ments do occur and have to be subjected to trade-off studies in order to find the best 
obtainable solution.  
 
Both the system architecture and the design activities in the technical processes aim to 
enable creation of the solution required. System architecture is, however, more ab-
stract and addresses the principles, concepts, properties and characteristics of the 
system of interest. 
4.2 Survivability engineering 
The survivability engineering discipline was developed in the naval and aerospace 
engineering communities (e.g. Ball & Calvano 1994; Ball 2003). From the perspec-
tive of this thesis, the field has been formalized by academics, of whom one of the 
more prominent is Robert E. Ball. He defines survivability as “the capability to 
avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment”. Because of the random na-
ture of combat, survivability is usually measured as the probability of surviving an 
engagement, a mission or an entire campaign; as discussed in section 3.4 above.  
4.2.1 Interdependent attributes 
As stated in the introduction, use of this discipline is justified by the interdependent 
nature of attributes in military platforms, and the fact that survivability enhancement 
features might have undesired effects on other attributes - and vice versa. 
Here attributes should be understood as an observable characteristic or property of 
the system of interest (INCOSE 2015, p.6), such as the speed of a combat aircraft. 
Survivability engineering is thus not about building the most survivable aircraft - or 
ship, or other combat vehicle – possible. It is about building a cost-effective military 
system. 
 
Ball illustrates this point in a simple analysis of a combat air support mission. The 
two MoEs considered are the number of friendly aircraft lost (survivability), and 
number of enemy tanks killed (offensive capability) in a campaign. The two MoPs 
considered are the Radar Cross Section (RCS) and its effect on survivability, and the 
amount of antitank ordnance carried. However, because low RCS requires weapons 
to be carried internally, the amount of ordnance carried is limited, more sorties have 
to be flown and there is a trade-off to be made. Thus, survivability enhancement 
measures can affect the offensive capability to such a degree that the cost in terms 
of killed aircraft is higher than it would be with less survivable aircraft. “Setting the 
survivability performance thresholds too high can be fatal to an acquisition pro-
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gram; setting them too low can be fatal to the aircraft in combat” (Ball 2003, 
p.pxxxv). Hence, trade-off studies at several system levels, using systems analysis 
with its inherent decision-making, are an important part of survivability engineering. 
4.2.2 Survivability enhancement features 
Returning to the “breaking the kill chain” concept (Sect.3.4.1), it is understood that 
survivability is improved if any of the probabilities in Equation 3-3 are reduced. 
From here on, any particular characteristic of the aircraft (platform) (be it specific 
equipment, shaping, materials, armaments or tactics) that reduces probabilities in the 
kill chain, is referred to as a survivability enhancement feature. Some typical examples are 
listed in Table 4-1 (Adapted from (Ball 2003, p.35)). 
 
Table 4-1 Typical survivability enhancement features in combat aircraft survivability engineering. 
          Kill chain probability Survivability enhancement features 
Su
sc
ep
tib
ili
ty
 re
du
ct
io
n 
P A,  
(Threat Suppression) 
tactics, precision guided munitions, mission 
planning systems, fighter escorts, anti-radiation 
weapons, self-defense missiles and guns  
P D|A,  
(Detection avoidance) 
stand-off weapons, night-time capability, on-
board electronic attack, stand-off electronic 
attack, low signatures, terrain following, chaff, 
threat warning, situational awareness, good tar-
get acquisition, mission planning systems, tac-
tics 
P L|D,  
(Engagement avoidance) 
stand-off weapons, on-board electronic attack, 
stand-off electronic attack, low signatures, good 
target acquisition, situational awareness, chaff 
and flares, threat warning, speed and altitude, 
mission planning systems 
PI|L,  
(Threat avoidance) 
on-board electronic attack, low signatures, chaff 
and flares, threat warning, speed and altitude, 
maneuverability 
PH|I,  
(Hit avoidance) 
low signatures, chaff and flares, maneuverability 
V
ul
. R
ed
. PK|H,  
(Threat or hit tolerance) 
Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flight 
controls, redundant and separated hydraulics, 
armor etc. 
 
From Table 4-1 two points of interest to the thesis should be made. Firstly, it is evi-
dent that survivability has to be viewed as a capability, since it is affected by both 
tactical and technical features. Secondly, a low signature affects several links in the 
kill-chain, because not only does it reduce the probability of detection, but it also 
reduces the probabilities of being engaged, intercepted or hit. 
4.2.3 Finding a balanced design 
So far reports of experiences from survivability engineering, including signature en-
gineering, have mostly come from the combat aircraft community. The design ob-
jective can be summarized as finding a balance in system requirements, given inter-
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dependent attributes, and the pursuit of an effective weapon system.  
 
The most important success factors of the survivability engineering process can be 
listed as follows (Ball 2003, pp.44–50, 174): 
x Measurement of the system effectiveness of a combat aircraft in terms of of-
fensive capability, availability and survivability, 
x Evaluation of the design of a platform as a component in a mission system, 
x Consideration of survivability by the design team at an early stage, because 
retrofitting survivability features usually adds unnecessary penalties to the de-
sign, e.g. weight or cost, and 
x Continuous close cooperation by survivability engineers with designers, pro-
gram managers and operators, where all are allowed real influence. 
 
In the Case study (Papers III and IV) these points are revisited in a comparison of 
results from a study of the survivability engineering of a combat vehicle and a naval 
vessel. 
4.3 Signature management 
The aim of signature management is to reduce the contrast between the object of 
interest and its background. Lowering the signature of soldiers or platforms reduces 
their susceptibility to enemy actions, hence improving security through enhanced 
survivability of one’s own forces (Sect.2.3). Technology used to accomplish signa-
ture management with this aim, is referred to as Low Observable Technology (LOT). 
This thesis focuses specifically on efforts made during engineering of a platform, on 
the threat from electro-optical sensors and on spectral design technology. However, 
because both the Technology study and the Modeling study relate to radar sensors 
and signature reduction efforts at radio frequencies, this section also includes some 
background on these topics. 
4.3.1 Contrast – the technical performance measure 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the typical scene of interest in this thesis. An imaging sensor is 
used at a distance to discriminate between an object and its background. Given the 
definition (Sect.1.1), signature is a measure of contrast. Consequently, an optical 
sensor has to measure the difference between signals from the object and its back-
ground. A common measure of contrast is the difference in luminance (luminous 
power per unit solid angle per unit projected source area) originating from the ob-
ject and its background respectively (Bohman 2003, p.76). In practice, the sensor 
measures the difference in irradiance, i.e. irradiated power per unit area (White 2012),  
C = Eobj – Ebgnd [W/m2],   Eq. 4-1 
where Eobj is the irradiance originating from the object, and Ebgnd  is the irradiance 
originating from the background. This is the contrast measure used for the infrared 
signature modeled in Papers V and VI.
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However, it is possible to measure other contrasts with a suitable optical sensor 
(Bohman 2003, pp.76–86). Gloss and color are wavelength dependent and are exam-
ples of spectral contrasts. Size, shape and orientation are examples of so-called spatial con-
trasts. Finally, temporal contrasts detect movement or differences between images of a 
scene taken in sequence.  
If the object is large enough, relative to the distance at which the signature is to be 
reduced, the object’s internal contrasts also matter. A combat uniform, for example, 
typically comprises three different colors arranged in a pattern. Preferably, the col-
ors are the statistically most common background colors in the area of operations, 
in order to reduce color contrast. However, the pattern also has to be chosen so that 
the internal noise-level of the object, as compiled by a sensor, is similar to that of the 
background. Noise-level comes under measures of spatial contrast. 
The radiation emitted by an object in the scene in Figure 4-2 comprises both reflected 
radiation, originating from external sources such as the sun, moon or stars, and self-
emitted radiation, so-called thermal emittance. The latter depends on the surface tem-
perature and surface properties of the object. Consequently, contrasts, such as the 
difference in luminance between the object and its background, are bound to 
change during the course of the day, depending on changes in temperature, humidi-
ty and lighting conditions, etc. Before the radiation emitted is collected by the sen-
sor, it is attenuated from absorption and scattering in the atmosphere (Driggers et al. 
2012; Bohman 2003; Jacobs 2006). The physical processes discussed will be further 
elaborated in the next chapter, in relation to spectral design. 
Given the inherent dependence on background, signature management and spectral 
design require a thorough analysis and characterization of backgrounds in the antic-
ipated areas for military operations. For example, see work done by the Swedish 
Defence Research Agency, e.g. (Zdansky 2012; Kariis et al. 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4-2 A typical scene with a sensor detecting an object at a distance. 
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Papers III and IV report on lessons learned from signature management in the de-
velopment of LO platforms, including the Technical Performance Measures (TPM) 
used in the signature evaluation of entire platforms.  Paper I identifies the technical 
parameters that are most relevant to the spectral design of their surfaces. 
4.3.2 Atmospheric windows 
Figure 4-3 shows the wavelength dependent transmittance of the atmosphere and 
the spectra in which modern sensor systems operate (Jacobs 2006, p.xiv). For large 
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum the atmosphere is more or less opaque due to 
aerosol or molecular scattering, or absorption, which limit sensor range (Driggers, 
Ronald G.; Friedman, Melvin H.; Nichols 2012, chap.6). Other wavelength bands 
can be used as so-called windows, because the atmosphere does transmitt there. 
Consequently, the sensitivity of sensors is tuned to these wavelength bands in order 
to optimize range. For radio frequencies the atmosphere is almost completely trans-
parent and hence suitable for such sensors as surveillance radars, with wavelengths 
ranging from centimeters to meters (Skolnik 2001, p.12). Given that this thesis fo-
cuses on reducing the optical signature of an object at a long distance from the sen-
sor, the atmospheric windows define the wavelength bands of interest. The UV, 
VIS, NIR, SWIR, MWIR and LWIR atmospheric windows are indicated in the de-
tailed diagram in Figure 4-3. 
4.3.3 The sensor threat 
The need for signature management is defined by the threat and, more specifically, 
by those sensors that alert an adversary. Sensors in the military domain are either 
used to collect data to support decision-making, or to guide weapons to targets. Mil-
itary tasks such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, early warning, fire con-
Figure 4-3 A diagram of the transmittance of the atmosphere to electromagnetic radiation. The optical 
part of the spectrum is highlighted. The respective spectra in which modern sensor systems operate are 
also indicated. 
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trol or tracking, place different demands on different sensor systems. Relevant 
MoPs at the technical system level are typically range, coverage, sensitivity, resolu-
tion and detection probability.  
 
The demands on a sensor system often cause conflicting requirements and lead to 
compromises. Hence, to prioritize the need for LOT efforts, sensor systems are 
usually sorted into primary sensor threats and secondary sensor threats (Bohman 2003). 
Primary sensor threats have the capability to support detection while secondary sensor 
threats need guidance, but can be used for classification, recognition or identification of a 
target. Classification typically means distinguishing between a building and a vehicle; 
recognition means distinguishing between say, a truck and an infantry fighting vehi-
cle, and identification means being able to determine the type and nationality of an 
infantry fighting vehicle. Rules of engagement based on the international laws of 
war require identification of an enemy target before engagement. In short, primary 
sensor threats aim to increase PD|A in the kill-chain, while secondary sensor threats 
aim to increase PL|D. See Eq. 3-4.  
 
A sensor is either active or passive. In the UV to SWIR wavelength band, sensors can 
detect an object by reflected sunshine, moonlight, starlight or sky-shine (Mahulikar 
et al. 2009). In the MWIR to LWIR wavelength band, a sensor can detect an object’s 
(the target’s) self-emitted thermal radiation (Jacobs 2006, chap.2). Hence, in the op-
tical spectrum it is possible to use passive sensors (such as the eye, night vision gog-
gles, or infrared cameras). In the RF wavelength band, on the other hand, radar sen-
sors use actively emitted radiation to detect reflections off the target. The probabil-
ity of detecting an active sensor is greater than that of detecting a passive one, be-
cause the actively emitted radiation can be used for locating or homing.  
 
The resolution of a sensor is a measure of the smallest difference it can detect in the 
quantity that it is measuring. In the context of this thesis, it is an important measure 
of a sensor’s ability to produce data for detection, classification, recognition or iden-
tification. An electro-optical imaging sensor, e.g. a digital camera, produces images 
of the scene on its focal plane array detector; see the illustration in Figure 4-4. The 
detector is comprised of an array of NH · NV detector elements. These elements are 
sensitive to photons at particular wavelength intervals, depending on the detector 
materials. For example, a b/w camera is a sensor where the detector elements are 
sensitive to photons in the 0.4-1.1 μm (VIS and NIR) wavelength interval. The pho-
tons received by each detector element are transformed into pixel signals, which are 
processed or presented to an operator on a monochrome display. The principle is 
the same in TIR (Driggers et al. 2012, chap.8). Electro-optical imaging sensors may 
have different modes or configurations for different tasks, e.g. a potential surveil-
lance sensor will have a wider field-of-view (șH and șV angles in Figure 4-4), while 
that for a potential identification sensor will be narrower.  
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According to the so-called Johnson criteria, the spatial resolution necessary for a hu-
man operating an infrared imaging system to identify say, a truck, is 8.0 pixels across 
its minimum dimension. The Johnson criteria for the recognition and identification 
of large numbers of targets were defined in the middle of the last century, with the 
support of field trials and human observers (Johnson 1958; Driggers et al. 2012).  
 
The spectral resolution of a sensor is a measure of its ability to resolve features in the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Hence, with these sensors it is possible to distinguish 
between objects solely from spectral information. A digital color camera, for exam-
ple, has detector elements sensitive to three different wavelength intervals in VIS: 
red (~0.7 μm), green (~0.55 μm) and blue (~0.4 μm). This very common type of 
sensor makes it possible to distinguish between say, a blue vehicle and a red vehicle. 
However, development is moving towards multi-spectral or hyper spectral sensors, able to 
resolve hundreds of wavelength bands across the optical spectrum (Hallberg et al. 
2014, p.32 et seq). These sensors have the potential to produce unique spectral fin-
gerprints of different surface materials. Hence, in principle it is possible to identify a 
target even if only one pixel of the object is in the line of sight, see the illustration 
in Figure 4-5. In the foreseeable future hyper spectral sensors are regarded as a rather 
exclusive threat, but if they start to appear on the battlefield in the future, they are 
expected to stretch signature management requirements for materiel (Bohman 2012, 
pp.64–65). 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Illustration of an electro-optical imaging sensor viewing a ground target 
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A typical example of a sensor with temporal resolution is surveillance radar equipped 
with Moving Target Indication (MTI). It exploits the Doppler shift between the 
transmitted pulse and that received to detect a target radial motion towards, or away 
from, the radar (Skolnik 2001, chap.3). The use of MTI makes it is possible to filter 
out clutter, i.e. unwanted echoes from terrain, sea waves, clouds etc. For electro-
optical imaging sensors, the methods are not that well established. However, by 
processing consecutive images of, for example, a camouflaged combat vehicle 
standing still at the edge of a forest, in principle, it is possible to detect the target 
simply because of the background vegetation moving in the wind. “The phenome-
non could be described as Moving-Background-Indication”3 (Lars Bohman, corre-
spondence, 21-06-2016). 
 
The theoretical maximum detection range, Rmax, of a passive infrared sensor can be 
found using the equation (White 2012, chap.19): 
 
ܴ௠௔௫ =  ඥܫ ܧ௧௛௥Τ  , R   Eq. 4-2  
where I is defined as the angular power density from the source [W/sr], and Ethr is 
the minimum detectable irradiance at the sensor [W/m2].  
 
The theoretical maximum detection range of a monostatic (both transmitting and 
receiving) radar can instead be found using (Skolnik 2001, chap.2) 
 
ܴ௠௔௫ =  ቈ ܲݐܩ
2ߣ2ߪ
(4ߨ)3ܵ݉݅݊
቉
1/4
,   Eq. 4-3 
 
where Pt is the transmitted power [W], G is the antenna gain, ɉR is the wavelength 
[m], V is the radar cross section (RCS) of the target [m2], and Smin is the minimum 
detectable signal [W].  
 
Lastly, the false-alarm-rate is an important characteristic of a sensor. The minimum 
detectable signal Ethr for an imaging electro-optical sensor (See Equation 5-2) is a 
system parameter tuned to balance the need for range with the probability of false 
targets (clutter). This threshold is determined for each task, i.e. separately for detec-
                                              
3 Lars Bohman,  FOI (the Swedish Defence Research Agency), personal communication, June 2016 
 
Figure 4-5 Illustration of the spectrally resolved emission of radiation by a fictitious target as 
recorded by a hyper spectral sensor. 
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tion and identification (Jacobs 2006, p.21). The same is true for Smin in radar (See 
Eq. 5-3). When using spectral design for signature management purposes, the aim is 
to reduce the emitted signal from the target below Ethr or Smin.  
 
In the Modeling study, reported in Papers V and VI, both radar and infrared imag-
ing sensors are modeled as sensor threats to an attack aircraft. 
4.3.4 Controlling signature in UV-VIS-NIR 
If we assume measures have been taken to use no active emitters, such as headlights 
or taillights on a military platform, the information collected by a sensor in the UV-
VIS-NIR part of the electro-magnetic spectrum originates from reflections. Conse-
quently, the signal depends on the external source of radiation (e.g. the sun), on the 
size, shape and orientation of the reflecting surfaces in relation to the source and 
sensor, and on the reflecting properties of the surfaces. Therefore, signature man-
agement of a military platform in this part of the spectrum is largely about reducing 
its size (if possible), shaping, and using it wisely during operation. However, in 
common with all contrast measures in this part of the spectrum, signature manage-
ment also involves controlling the reflective properties of the platforms surfaces. In 
the context of this thesis, this is achieved using spectral design, which is elaborated 
in chapter 5. 
4.3.5 Controlling signature in TIR 
When moving from the traditional UV-VIS-NIR region of interest to TIR, the self-
emission component of radiation emitted from a surface, the thermal emittance, be-
comes important. Its spectral distribution and magnitude are essentially a function 
of the surface temperature, T, and the emissivity, H(O). The total emittance within a 
spectral band can be expressed as (Driggers et al. 2012, p.126): 
 
ܧ(ܶ) =  ׬ ߝ(ߣ) ௖భఒఱ
ଵ
ቈ௘
೎మഊ೅ିଵ቉
ఒభ
ఒమ  ݀ߣ       [W/m2],  Eq. 4-4 
where c1 and c2 are Planck´s radiation constants; c1 = 3,7418 x 108 WPm4/m2 and  
c2 = 1,4388 x 104 Pm K.  
 
The emissivity describes the surface emission characteristics. For perfect radiators, 
so-called blackbodies (e.g. the sun), the emissivity = 1. For real bodies the emissivity 
varies with surface properties and temperature. In practice, many materials can be 
approximated to so-called grey bodies, with constant emissivity, H< 1, in TIR 
(Bohman 2003, p.134). Metal surfaces are typically highly reflective in IR and H< 
0.05, while for most naturally occurring materials H> 0.50. 
 
However, the thermal radiation leaving the surface of a real object is always the sum 
of self-emission and radiation reflected from the objects environment. Since an elec-
tro-optical imaging sensor cannot distinguish between the sources of radiation, the 
signal that can be collected is called the apparent emittance and is written: 
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ܧ௔௣ =  ׬ [ߝ(ߣ)ܧ(ߣ, ௦ܶ௧) + ߩ௟ܧ(ߣ, ௔ܶ௘)ఒమఒభ ]݀ߣ,  Eq. 4-5 
where U l is the reflection coefficient for the long wave infrared interval of interest, 
O1 to O2, Tst is the surface temperature of the target, and Tae is the apparent temper-
ature of the environment (Jacobs 2006, p.11).  
 
However, a useful thermal signature measure has to take the atmospheric transmis-
sion in the range of interest, W(O,R), into consideration. Thus, the thermal signature 
can be written: 
 
߂ܧ௔௣ =  ׬ ߬(ߣ,ܴ)[ܧ௔௣(ߣ, ௦ܶ௧)െ  ܧ௔௣(ߣ, ௕ܶ)ఒమఒభ ]݀ߣ,  Eq. 4-6 
where Tb is the temperature of the background (Jacobs 2006, p.14).  
 
In conclusion, to minimize signature in the thermal infrared region, firstly, basically 
two technical variables must be controlled: the surface temperature and the surface 
properties of the object. In signature management, these are tuned to match the 
apparent emittance of the target with that of its background. Secondly, the accepta-
ble tactical detection range determines the acceptable residual contrast. 
 
Controlling the surface temperature of a platform is largely about managing heat 
flows to and from the surfaces. Because thermal energy is transported in three ways, 
- conduction, convection or radiation - measures are preferably taken during con-
struction using isolation, ventilation and shielding technologies. Figure 4-6 is a prin-
ciple diagram illustrating heat flows, denoted Q, and possible measures to reduce 
them. The theory of heat and mass transfer from a signature perspective is thor-
oughly covered by, for example, Bohman (2003) and Jacobs (2006). 
 
Controlling the thermal signature by tuning a surface’s optical properties is achieved 
using spectral design techniques, which are further elaborated in chapter 5. Figure 
4-7 is used here to illustrate the concept. It comprises two pictures of the same can  
 
 
Figure 4-6 Illustration of principal heat flows inside a military platform, and heat exchanges with the 
environment to and from the surface of the platform’s hull (Bohman 2003, p.90; Jacobs 2006, 
p.30). 
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filled with hot water. 
 
The picture on the left in Figure 4-7 was taken using an ordinary color camera. The 
picture on the right was taken using the sight of a Bill missile system (RBS 56). The 
sight is sensitive in the LWIR wavelength band, 8–12 μm. A small piece of house-
hold tape was put on the can, covering some of the text. It is transparent and cannot 
be detected in the left-hand picture, which only covers the visible part of the spec-
trum. However, in the right-hand picture there is considerable contrast between the 
tape and the bare surface of the can. Although the surface temperature can be ex-
pected to be the same for the entire can, the tape obviously emits with much greater 
intensity than the aluminum surface. This is due to the difference in surface emissiv-
ity, probably below 0.1 for aluminum, but around 0.9 for plastic tape. Evidently, 
thermal signature is greatly affected by surface properties and hence can be influ-
enced through spectral design.  
 
In conclusion, thermal emissions from a surface depend on both the temperature of 
the surface and the emissivity of the surface. Measures for controlling the tempera-
ture, and hence creating the best possible conditions for spectral design, have to be 
taken during basic construction of a platform. These engineering principles are dis-
cussed in the Case study in Papers III and IV. 
4.3.6 Controlling radar signature 
The radar signature is usually expressed using a target’s radar cross section, RCS. See 
Eq. 5-3. The basic monostatic definition is “the ratio of the scattered power to the 
incident power in the direction of the observer at infinity” (Lynch 2004, p.34). 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4-7 Two pictures of the same can filled with hot water. To the left a picture taken with a color 
camera. To the right a picture taken using the LWIR sensor of the Bill missile system (RBS 56).  A 
small piece of transparent household tape is covering the brand name. Photo: the author. 
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In the monostatic case, convenient for this principle discussion, the aim is to avoid 
backscatter towards the transmitting radar. Consequently, the most important 
means for signature reduction is shaping, e.g. avoiding surface normals, edge nor-
mals, dihedrals and visible cavities in anticipated threat directions (Lynch 2004, 
pp.35–36).  
 
In order to reduce the RCS further, it is also possible to exploit radar absorbing ma-
terials (RAM) (Saville 2005). There are usually drawbacks in usability or maintenance 
when using these materials (Cho et al. 2015), but if applied on critical parts of the 
construction they can reduce radar signature considerably (Lynch 2004, p.45). How-
ever, in order for absorption to take place the incident electromagnetic field must 
penetrate the material without scattering at the surface (Lynch 2004, p.45).This has 
implications for spectral design. A thin metallic conducting film, deposited on areas 
with RAM to reduce the optical signature, would ruin efforts to reduce the radar 
signature. 
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5  
THEORY: TECHNOLOGY LEVEL 
– SPECTRAL DESIGN 
Spectral design is “the ability to create a desired spectral optical response from a surface, which 
benefits the application of interest by choosing suitable materials and structures” (Sect.1.1). 
 
n the previous chapter we learned that signature management in the optical 
wavelength region is largely about controlling properties such as the shape, size 
and surface temperature of the object of interest (a military platform). We also 
understand, from the discussion about survivability engineering, that these proper-
ties in turn are products of compromises during the systems engineering process. 
However, in the optical part of the electromagnetic spectrum, surface properties 
also have a great influence on a platform’s signature. This is why spectral design is 
an interesting option for reducing the residual optical signature to acceptable levels, 
particularly if it can be assumed that a platform’s surfaces only have a marginal ef-
fect on functional performance. Despite important progress in materials science in 
recent decades, the sensor threat in military theaters in the near future makes this 
ambition challenging, as discussed in the introduction. In principle, it requires the 
signature of a military platform to be reduced multi-spectrally, from UV to LWIR. 
See the illustration in Figure 5-1. 
 
The Technology study, Paper I, comprises a review of potentially useful techniques 
and materials, and identifies those characteristics of a surface that must be con-
trolled, given advances in sensor technology. Furthermore, the Modeling study, in 
Papers V and VI, presents proposed models of the optical response of the surface 
of an aircraft. This chapter is an introduction to central concepts, and the physical 
phenomena exploited, in controlling optical signatures using spectral design. The 
chapter ends with a short overview of possible applications in military materiel. The 
purpose is to provide the background necessary for summarizing the results of the 
studies mentioned above (Ch.7). 
I 
 
Figure 5-1 An illustration of the effect of using spectral design to reduce the signature of a platform multi-
spectrally, from UV to LWIR. The signature should be understood as the contrast between platform and
background, i.e. the difference between the respective signals picked up by a multi-spectral sensor. In prin-
ciple, the signal originates from any characteristic that can be detected, e.g. the irradiance. O denotes wave-
length. 
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5.1 The optical constants of a material 
Light is electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths within the visible region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The interaction between electromagnetic radiation and 
matter is described by Maxwell’s equations (Born & Wolf 1970, p.1). For optical 
wavelengths the magnetic interaction is considered negligible and one solution ob-
tained is the transverse monochromatic plane wave (See e.g. (Arwin 2014, pp.94–95)) 
 
ࡱ(ݖ, ݐ) =  ࡱ૙ ݁െ
2ߨ݇ݖ
ߣ  ݁݅(2ߨ݊ݖߣ െ߱ݐ),  Eq. 5-1 
with wavelength Opropagating along the z-axis. The square of the amplitude, |E|2, 
is proportional to the intensity of the radiation and is easily measured. The refractive 
index, n, and the extinction coefficient, k, are characteristics of the medium and are re-
ferred to as its optical constants - although they both vary with wavelength. The first 
exponential function has a real exponent and damps the wave as it propagates 
through the medium. This is why k is used as a measure of attenuation, or absorp-
tion. The second exponential function produces a phase shift, if compared to the 
same wave traveling the same distance in a vacuum.  
 
Note that it is sometimes convenient to compound the optical constants in the so-
called complex refractive index, N = n+ ik. 
 
In a dielectric (non-absorbing) material, the extinction coefficient is negligible. 
 
To conclude, the optical constants of a material have a great influence on the appli-
cation of spectral design. Choosing materials with optical characteristics suitable for 
the application is key. The licentiate thesis covers the characteristics of thin films of 
titanium- and zirconium nitride, and how to determine the optical constants of the 
respective materials (Andersson 1993). 
5.2 Polarization 
If the x and y components of the electric field vector of a light wave propagating in 
a z direction, ࡱ(ݖ, ݐ), are completely correlated the light is said to be totally polarized. 
If there is no correlation, the light is said to be unpolarized, like radiation originating 
from the sun or ordinary lamps (Arwin 2014). Polarization features arise from the 
geometrical orientation, shape, shading and roughness of an object surface. In gen-
eral, man-made objects with smooth surfaces have more defined polarization signa-
tures than natural objects, and tend to take on a polarized component in reflected or 
emitted radiation (Bergström et al. 2012). The ratio of the intensity of polarized light 
to the total intensity of light radiated from a surface, is called the Degree of Polarization 
(DoP) (Arwin 2014). Paper I proposed low DoP as one of the technical perfor-
mance measures for materials and structures suitable for signature management 
purposes. 
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5.3 Reflectance and transmittance 
If Maxwell´s equations are used to solve the boundary problem of a propagating 
wave at a smooth surface between two media, the Fresnel reflection and transmis-
sion coefficients are obtained (Born & Wolf 1970, p.40), 
 
ݎ௣ =  ேభ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೔)ି ேబ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೟)ேభ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೔)ା ேబ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೟) , ݎ௦ =  
ேబ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೔)ି ேభ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೟)
ேబ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೔)ା ேభ ୡ୭ୱ(ఏ೟) and Eq. 5-2 
  
ݐ௣ =  ଶேబ ௖௢௦(ఏ೔)ேభ ௖௢௦(ఏ೔)ା ேబ ௖௢௦(ఏ೟) , ݐ௦ =  
ଶேబ ௖௢௦(ఏ೔)
ேబ ௖௢௦(ఏ೔)ା ேభ ௖௢௦(ఏ೟) , Eq. 5-3 
where ݎ௣ and ݎ௦ are the reflection coefficients of light polarized parallel to and per-
pendicular to the plane of incidence, respectively. The angle of incidence to the sur-
face normal is denoted ߠ௜ (The angle of reflection ߠ௥ = ߠ௜ in Figure 5-2 a) and the 
angle to the normal for refracted, transmitted, light is denoted ߠ௧. The Fresnel ex-
pressions show the relationship between the observable reflectance of a surface, R 
= ࢘ ή ࢘כ, and its optical properties, where N1, for example, is the complex refractive 
index of a coating material and N0 is that of the ambient air. Similarly, 
the transmittance, T = ࢚ ή ࢚כ(ܰ1/ܰ0)19T, can be obtained from the ratio of transmitted 
power to incident power. 
 
Intuitively, the reflective properties of a surface are important because reflected light 
is the reason we human beings see objects (that do not actively emit radiation them-
selves) with our eyes. One of the technical performance measures proposed in Pa-
per I is spectrally selective reflectance. 
  
 
 
Figure 5-2 a) An electromagnetic plane wave, with components polarized parallel (P) and perpendicular 
(S) to the plane of incidence, reflected and transmitted at a smooth boundary. b) Multiple reflections in a 
thin film. 
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5.4 Interference 
In the case of a thin film, i.e. when the film thickness is comparable to the wave-
length of the light, there will be two boundaries to consider and hence multiple re-
flections. See Figure 5-2 b. Part of the light transmitted through the first boundary 
will be reflected at the second, and so forth. In summing up these contributions one 
will have to consider their phase. This phenomenon is called interference. If the con-
tributions to the light interfere destructively, the waves will be canceled out, and if 
they interfere constructively, they will enhance the reflectance. For example, when 
designing anti-reflection coatings using a thin film of a dielectric (often an oxide), 
the physical thickness, d, is chosen so that the optical thickness, d·O is a quarter of a 
wavelength. This will result in destructive interference, and if the extinction coeffi-
cient in both the thin film and the substrate is negligible, the reflectance at this par-
ticular wavelength will be zero.  
 
Techniques exploiting interference in applications of spectral design are described in 
Paper I and in the licentiate thesis (Andersson 1993; Andersson et al. 1994).  
5.5 Photonic crystals (PhC) 
If the periodic structure is developed from the 1-dimensional (1-D) case of a multi-
layer coating (above), to 2-D or 3-D, the result is called a Photonic Crystal (PhC) 
(Yablonovitch 1987; John 1987; Prather et al. 2009). Depending on the optical 
properties of the two materials involved and the periodicity of the structure, the 
propagation of light within a certain electromagnetic wavelength band is prohibited. 
A so-called band-gap appears. Thus, the material becomes a perfect reflector in this 
part of the spectrum. Hence, by using the right combination of dielectric materials 
in suitable structures, it is theoretically possible to create materials that are reflective 
in a wavelength band of choice, but which transmit in all other parts of the spec-
trum. In addition, if the structure is 3-D, the angle of incident light is not an issue. 
Academics believe that developments in PhC will benefit greatly from production 
techniques used in the electronics industry (Prather et al. 2009).  
5.6 Polaritonic materials 
There are materials that exhibit forbidden band-gaps similar to PhCs, which do not 
originate from interference. In some materials, light of specific wavelengths can 
cause lattice vibrations, called polaritons. The optical consequence is an interval of 
high reflectance, known as the reststrahlen band or the polaritonic bandgap, that is char-
acteristic of the bulk material (Sigalas et al. 1994). Sigalas et al. studied GaAs, but in 
Paper I, other materials more suitable to signature management applications, are 
mentioned.  
5.7 Absorptance 
The fraction of radiant flux neither reflected nor transmitted is absorbed in the me-
dium, and is usually transformed into heat. This fraction, A, is called absorptance and 
the conservation of energy requires that 
 
R(O) + T(O) + A(O) = 1.   Eq. 5-4 
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5.8 Scattering 
Radiation (light) reflected from a smooth mirror-like surface is specular, i.e. the an-
gle of reflection is the same as the angle of incidence, as in Figure 5-2 a (ߠ௥ = ߠ௜ ).  
Light reflected from a rough surface is diffuse, i.e. scattered in all directions. In a sig-
nature management context, the former surface is denoted glossy and the latter as low 
gloss.  
 
A perfectly diffuse surface, a lambertian surface, scatters with equal intensity in all 
directions, regardless of angle of incident light. See the scatterer furthest left in Fig-
ure 5-3. In Papers V and VI the aircraft skin is modeled as a lambertian surface.  
 
When the wavelength of incident radiation is the same size as the scattering particle, 
the interaction is described as Mie scattering (Born & Wolf 1970, p.652-; Hallberg et 
al. 2014, p.16-). The direction of scattering is primarily forward. Solar scattering in 
mist, or clouds, are illustrative examples.  
 
Scattering against particles considerably smaller than the wavelength of the light 
(typically less than a tenth) is described by Rayleigh scattering (Born & Wolf 1970, 
p.652-; Hallberg et al. 2014, p.16-). Backscattering is significant and the attenuation 
by scattering is proportional to 1/O4. The Rayleigh scattering phenomenon can, for 
example, be used to explain the blue color of the sky and the red color of the sunset. 
In the former, the short blue wavelengths are scattered heavily as sunlight passes 
through the atmosphere; in the latter, primarily the long red wavelengths pass 
through the thick atmosphere to the observer as the sun is close to the horizon. 
Scattering phenomena are used in this thesis when discussing the attenuation of op-
tical wavelengths in the atmosphere or the properties of paints; see Papers I, V and 
VI. 
 
Figure 5-3. Illustration of scattering phenomena: diffuse scattering from a rough surface, Mie scattering 
from a spherical particle with diameter approximately the same size as the wavelength, and Rayleigh 
scattering from a particle much smaller than the wavelength of incident light. 
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5.9 Emittance and emissivity 
The emissivity, H(O), describes a surface’s emission characteristics, as discussed in 
section 4.3.5. For real bodies the emissivity varies with materials and coatings, but 
also with structure and temperature. The emissivity equals the absorptance accord-
ing to Kirchhoff´s law of thermal radiation and, for opaque materials, the following 
expression can be obtained from Equation 5-4:   
  
H(O) = 1 – R(O    Eq. 5-5 
Thus, the emissivity of a material can be measured indirectly by measuring the re-
flectance. In practice, many materials are approximated as gray bodies (Sect.4.3.5). 
5.10 Applications in military materiel 
The most common means for reducing the signature of military materiel is to apply 
suitable paint. Paint coatings generally consist of pigments and a binder. The optical 
response is the sum of several phenomena (Wake & Brady 1993; Hallberg et al. 
2005); see Figure 5-4. 
 
The incident light is either, absorbed in the coating, reflected at the binder bounda-
ries, transmitted into the coated material, or scattered through reflection at the pig-
ment boundaries. Part of the optical response from the surface is also due to ther-
mal emissions. 
 
In spectral design these phenomena are manipulated. Transmittance and reflection 
at the binder boundaries are affected by the choice of binder materials, usually a 
resin or a polymer. However, the main purpose of the binder is to provide adhesion 
to the coated surface, to protect the pigments and preserve their optical properties. 
Generally, the optical response is tuned by controlling scattering, reflection and ab-
sorption from pigments within the coating. Hence, in an ideal case, the desired mul-
tispectral response is obtained by mixing pigments of suitable size, shape and mate-
rials. Consequently, the binder’s absorption should be as low as possible throughout 
the wavelength region of interest. Emission from the surface due to backscatter will 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Illustration of optical processes in a paint coating, which together create the optical response 
of a painted surface. 
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increase if materials are chosen whereby the ratio of the refractive index of the par-
ticles to that of the binder increases.  
 
Designing and applying paint coatings is a commonly used technique for spectral 
design, because it is relatively easy to apply, protective properties can be built in and 
it is fairly cheap. However, as requirements extend to thermal infrared wavelengths, 
there are challenges. A typical requirement is to reduce the thermal signature of a 
platform that is warmer than its background. Part of the solution is to apply low 
emissive paint, thereby lowering the apparent temperature contrast. Traditional or-
ganic and inorganic pigments used to damp reflectance in VIS cannot be used, since 
they also absorb TIR and thus cause high emissivity (Wake & Brady 1993).  
 
For example, if a coating comprising multiple layers of thin films, of suitable materi-
als and thicknesses, is applied to a smooth substrate, it is also possible to exploit the 
interference (Sect.5.4) phenomenon for spectral design purposes. In my earlier re-
search (Andersson et al. 1992; Veszelei et al. 1994; Veszelei et al. 1993; Andersson et 
al. 1994), for example, the application was to design heat mirror coatings for win-
dow glazing in warm climates. In order to reduce the need for air-conditioning, only 
the visible wavelengths of the solar radiation should be transmitted, while all other 
wavelengths should be reflected. Hallberg et al. (Hallberg et al. 2005) report having 
used this technique to tailor the spectral reflectivity of pigments in low emissive 
paints for camouflage purposes in the infrared wavelength region. The metal-based 
multilayers were broken down into pigments and applied in a binder. 
 
Hence, spectrally designed materials can be used as pigments to be applied in paints. 
There are also other applications. Pigments can be melted into, or coated onto, fi-
bers used in the fabric of combat clothing; materials can be applied in structured 
coatings directly onto a protected surface; spectral designs can be applied in decals 
or on panels, which in turn are mounted on the protected surface, etc. The pictures 
in Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-5 show examples of spectrally designed products used in 
camouflage applications in the field. 
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Figure 5-5 Combat vehicles concealed with camouflage nets and soldiers in combat uniforms during a 
Swedish army exercise in 2015. The camouflage paint on the vehicles, the nets and the uniforms are all 
examples of spectral design applied to reduce signature. Note that in this picture we can only assess the 
result in the visible wavelength spectrum since the photographer used a common color camera.  
Photo: Anna Norén, Swedish Armed Forces. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Main battle tank during a Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) field trial. Photo: Mats 
Carlsson, Swedish Armed Forces. 
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6  
RESEARCH METHODS 
he purpose of this chapter is to describe the choice of research methods 
for the different studies in the thesis, and their consequences for the in-
terpretation of results.  
 
The systems approach described in the introduction (sect. 1.3) was chosen 
to enable analysis of the military system level, the technical system level and the 
technology level parts of the research problem separately, but with clearly recog-
nized relationships linking them together. The overall aim is to develop and demon-
strate a valid method for assessing the military utility of spectral design, and a rele-
vant and useful definition of the key concepts, that assists decision-making in the 
systems engineering of LO military platforms. 
 
The research design presented in the introduction (Sect.1.4) takes advantage of be-
ing able to address the four research sub-questions in different studies, choosing 
methods suitable for each study.  
6.1 Systematic literature review (Q1) 
6.1.1 Aim and rationale 
In the Technology study (Paper I), a systematic literature review method was chosen 
with the aim identifying: 1) relevant technical variables affecting signature manage-
ment, and, 2) tentative techniques and materials for spectral design. The difference 
between a systematic review and any traditional literature review is simply transpar-
ency regarding how decisions about the selection of sources are made, and how the 
search is conducted (Denscombe 2014, chap.9). The benefits are reduced potential 
for bias and increased reproducibility.  
6.1.2 Possible consequences 
One obvious limitation to the method is that unpublished research evidence will not 
be included (Denscombe 2014, chap.9). Thus, the method works best for research 
areas that have already attracted a lot of attention. Another challenge is limiting the 
scope of the review without missing important results. 
6.1.3 Approach 
The technical parameters were derived from an analysis of the sensitivity of poten-
tial sensor threats at tactical distances. Hence, the analysis was based on the logic 
that only those properties of emitted radiation from an object that can be detected 
by sensors must be controlled using spectral design. Potential sensor threats were 
identified using a report on the development and proliferation of contemporary sen-
sors for ground targets issued by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Bohman 
2012). 
 
T
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The technical parameters identified were then used in the second step to form an 
indicator instrument to probe research databases. The uncertainties introduced by 
relying on one source for the sensor threat were assessed to be acceptable for the 
technology study because the overarching goal is methodological. The literature re-
view method allowed probing of civilian progress as well as military progress, but 
had to be limited in scope. Articles were filtered in several steps, first by title, then 
by abstract. For some research areas, review articles were used in order to limit the 
need to go further back in time. 
 
The literature review method used is described in detail in Paper I, including key-
word-patterns for database searches, accessed databases, and filtering criteria. The 
validity of the approach and the reliability of the Technology study are discussed in 
section 7.1.4. 
6.2 Concept analysis (Q2) 
6.2.1 Aim and rationale 
In the Concept development study (Paper II) the aim was to develop a concept for 
military utility, suitable for technology assessments, using the systems approach 
model and MOR. The approach chosen is generally called concept analysis, a process 
where the characteristics of a concept, and its relationships with other relevant con-
cepts, are clarified. There are two fundamentally different approaches (Goertz 
2006). The first and traditional type aims to capture how a concept is used in prac-
tice. The other approach focuses on the phenomenon of interest, i.e. first, a useful 
concept is developed - and then it is labeled. Given the objective described above, 
we chose the second approach. The rationale was that the aim is not to understand 
how other academics use the term military utility, but to develop a concept useful in 
the context defined by the problem. The specific method applied supports both the 
capture of specific phenomena and of reliable measurements (Goertz 2006; Goertz 
2012). 
6.2.2 Possible consequences 
One disadvantage of choosing a method that focuses on the construct of a useful 
concept, rather than semantics, is that there might be a discrepancy between the 
resulting definition and how the term is usually perceived. Another disadvantage, of 
quantifiable concepts, is the well-known risk of choosing indicators simply because 
they are measurable, and not because they capture the phenomenon. A third disad-
vantage of the method described, as it relies on a large group of practitioners work-
ing in the problem domain, is the foreseeable risk of ending up with a consensus 
solution – which is of little real use to anyone.  
6.2.3 Approach 
The analysis process used, following Goertz’ guidelines (2006), is divided into three 
phases. The first phase is ontological in that it focuses on what constitutes the phe-
nomenon of interest. The second phase asserts causality by identifying those attrib-
utes of the phenomenon central to forming hypotheses or explanations. The third 
phase involves an empirical analysis of the phenomenon and an operationalization 
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of the attributes identified. The resulting concept is a multi-level structure, involving 
at least three levels, with a clear declaration of inter-level relationships. The first and 
secondary levels constitute the theory of the concept, while the lower levels consti-
tute links to data collection. In our application of the method, the analysis was con-
ducted in a series of seminars attended by teachers, officers and scientists well ac-
quainted with the phenomenon of interest. In order to mitigate foreseeable weak-
nesses in the method, we first included a literature search with the aim of adhering 
to the use of related terms in the military and systems engineering domain. Second-
ly, we chose not to include explicitly the use of specific indicators in the concept, 
but instead made the selection of indicators part of problem assessment. Thirdly, in 
order to avoid the down side of consensus solutions, the chairman of the Concept 
development study (the author of this thesis) was given the final say. The applicabil-
ity of the concept was validated in a comparison with a decision-situation from a 
2008 case of the procurement of Swedish platforms. 
 
The detailed application of the method used to produce the proposed military utility 
concept is presented in Paper II. However, the final phase of the formation of the 
concept has only been completed in connection with the modeling activity, because 
it comprises the choice of indicators. One example is presented in Papers V and VI. 
The validity of the approach and the reliability of the Concept development study 
are discussed in section 7.2.2. 
6.3 Military systems modeling and simulation (Q3) 
6.3.1 Aim and rationale 
In the Modeling study (Papers V and VI) the aim was to demonstrate how the opti-
cal properties of a spectrally designed platform surface (Paper I) can be quantitative-
ly linked to the proposed concept of military utility (Paper II), while using the so-
called Ladder model as a conceptual template for the applied model (Paper I). The 
purpose was to answer sub question three, and hence show that effective evaluation 
of spectral design is possible. Choosing a MOR approach is justified by its central 
role in systems analysis and systems engineering (Sec.1.5). The general merits and 
limitations of a MOR approach were discussed in chapter 3.  
6.3.2 Possible consequences 
The literature highlights a few challenges to be aware of when assessing the validity 
of a warfare modeling activity. Firstly, as discussed in some depth in section 3.6, a 
real combat situation will always differ from its model, because of the inherent 
complexity and uncertainties of military situations. Therefore, it is important, some-
how, to validate that the model is good enough for its purpose.  
 
Secondly, a multi-stage model, like that used in the Modeling study, requires that at 
least the outer attributes of the most detailed objects modeled are well understood 
and described (Holm 2007, p.10).  
 
Thirdly, from a complexity or cost-effectiveness viewpoint, it is often tempting to 
exchange stochastic variables with their expected values. In some situations howev-
er, the results might be misleading (Bracken et al. 1995, p.2; Washburn & Kress 
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2009, p.5).  
 
Fourthly, when using stochastic models it is convenient to assume that events are 
independent. Often this is not a bad assumption about the real world, and the prob-
ability theory is simpler. However, when modeled events are not independent, the 
results might be misleading (Washburn & Kress 2009, p.6).  
 
Lastly, when encountering a poorly understood or controversial phenomenon dur-
ing modeling, the easiest solution might be to ignore it. Washburn & Kress call this 
the Ostrich effect (2009, p.8). Whether or not any omissions may be harmless must be 
taken into consideration. 
6.3.3 Approach 
The Ladder model, proposed in the Technology study, is a developed version of the 
systems approach model, which specifically describes the relationship between the 
spectral design technology and military utility. It is presented in detail in section 
7.1.1 and Figure 7-1. The Ladder model makes the system levels and the relevant 
inter-level parameters explicit. It also integrates the view of capabilities as systems 
discussed in chapter two, thereby incorporating a new capability system level be-
tween the technical system and military mission system levels. The expected ad-
vantages of using the Ladder model as a template when analyzing a problem are, 
firstly, that it highlights the quantitative link between technical parameters at the 
technology level and mission measures of effectiveness at the top system level, and 
secondly, that the interfaces between system levels become explicit. In the context 
of systems engineering, this is beneficial because it assists traceability and coherence 
in requirements analysis, and it clarifies design responsibilities. 
 
The duel between an attack aircraft and a ground based air defense system was cho-
sen as a demonstration. The case is relevant for at least two reasons: there is a de-
bate about the value of stealth, given the cost of reducing radar signature, and there 
seems to be a development in the use of LWIR sensors to complement radars in air 
defense. This raises the question of the military utility of reducing the aircraft’s 
LWIR signature using spectral design. 
 
The analysis scheme chosen is similar to the Soban and Mavris framework for sur-
vivability assessment and probabilistic modeling (Sec.3.5). There are four phases to 
the scheme, the first three of which are part of a modeling activity. Given the prob-
lem, the first phase comprised establishing reference baseline features and perfor-
mance for the modeled attack aircraft, choosing input and output variables for all 
modeled technical systems and the military mission model, and defining a suitable 
scenario with a relevant task and relevant tactical strike options. Input was gathered 
by interviewing military subject matter experts. In the second phase, key decision 
nodes in the mission system, and how they were to be modeled, were defined for 
the strike options studied in the scenario. Operator decisions were modeled accord-
ing to crude doctrines. In the third phase, a simulation environment was established. 
This included the identification of physics based response models for the different 
system level components and their creation in Matlab™. In the fourth and final 
phase, the model was used and the results were analyzed. 
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The modeling is the primary result of the Modeling study and is described in more 
detail in section 7.3.1. The validity of the approach and the reliability of the Model-
ing study are discussed in section 7.3.2. 
6.4 Case study research (Q4) 
6.4.1 Aim and rationale 
In the Case study (Papers III and IV), the aim was to identify lessons as input to a 
discussion on how to use military utility assessments of signature reduction efforts 
to support decision-making in the systems engineering process (Q4). Because the 
literature on the topic is scarce, it was necessary to do an empirical study. The sys-
tems engineering processes of two LO platform development projects were re-
viewed using a case study research method. The method was chosen because it is 
commonly used for studying processes, an in-depth study of just one or a few par-
ticular cases can be used as a basis for generalization, and because it supports data 
collection using multiple methods (Yin 2013; Denscombe 2014).  
6.4.2 Possible consequences 
There are a few general, well-known drawbacks to the method (Denscombe 2014; 
Yin 2013). Firstly, case studies tend to be vulnerable to criticism of the credibility of 
any generalizations drawn from their findings. One remedy is to carefully demon-
strate similarities or contrasts with other cases of the same type. Secondly, in some 
applications it can be difficult to define the boundaries of the cases included and, 
hence, to decide which sources of data to include or exclude. Thirdly, the use of 
qualitative data and interpretive methods might draw criticism from academics using 
quantitative data and statistics. Denscombe states that this can be countered with 
“careful attention to detail and rigor in the use of the approach” (2014, chap.64).  
6.4.3 Approach 
In the Case study in this thesis, we used interviews of key personnel for data collec-
tion, complemented by document reviews.  
 
The two cases, the SEP combat vehicle and the Visby class corvette, were chosen 
on the basis of three criteria: 1) the prominent role played by signature management 
in the respective development programs, 2) the fact that the resulting designs are 
considered balanced, and 3) sufficient data could be collected. The object of study 
was limited in time and scope to the development of a design and the relationship 
between government and contractor. In order to support generalization, possible 
lessons were filtered from the data collected, using an analysis instrument based on 
the fundamental concepts of systems engineering (Friedman & Sage 2004). In addi-
tion, only lessons common to the two cases were considered as lessons identified. 
 
The method is described in detail in Paper IV. The validity of the approach and the 
reliability of the Case study are discussed in section 7.4.2. 
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7 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM THE STUDIES 
 
he aim of this chapter is to present a summary of results from the four 
studies necessary to answer the corresponding research sub-questions. 
Each section focuses on one of the studies performed and ends with a 
discussion of the validity and reliability. The appended papers are refer-
enced. In the next chapter the results are synthesized and discussed in 
relation to the main research question. 
 
The main contributions from the respective studies are presented in Table 7-1, with 
references to the appended papers.  
 
Table 7-1 A summary of results from the respective studies and appended papers 
 Approach Results in summary Paper 
Te
ch
no
log
y-s
tu
dy
  
(Q
1)
 
Hypothesis A proposed model, called the “Ladder model”, for linking 
spectral design performance to military utility. 
I 
Literature  
review 
A proposed set of technical parameters for spectral de-
signs in signature management applications. 
I 
A systematic review of materials and spectral designs suit-
able for signature management applications. 
I 
Co
nc
ep
t-
stu
dy
 (Q
2)
 
Concept  
analysis A proposed concept called “Military Utility”  II 
M
od
eli
ng
-st
ud
y  
(Q
3)
 
Modeling  
and  
Simulation 
A proof-of-concept using the Ladder model applied to 
assessment of the military utility of spectral design in the 
development of Low Observable combat aircraft.  
-The first decision situation is a tradeoff between efforts 
to reduce radar signature, and those to reduce infrared 
signature. 
 
 
 
V 
 -The second decision situation is maximizing the use of 
low emissive properties. 
VI 
Ca
se-
stu
dy
 
(Q
4)
 
 
Case study 
research 
 
Identification of lessons from the development of Low 
Observable combat vehicles. 
 
III, IV 
   
 
  
T 
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7.1 The Technology study (Q1) 
Q1: “How does spectral design affect the design of a Low Observable military platform?” 
 
The first research question was addressed in three steps. Firstly, by forming a hy-
pothesis to quantitatively link spectral design, and the military platform design, to a 
notion of military utility. Secondly, by identifying those technical parameters rele-
vant for spectral design. Thirdly, by identifying materials and techniques for control-
ling the performance using the systematic literature review method described in sec-
tion 6.1. The results are presented in that order. 
7.1.1 The Ladder model – linking spectral design to military utility  
The core of the interdisciplinary systems approach (Sect.1.3) can be formulated as 
follows: in many scenarios it is possible to find a set of relevant measures at each 
system level (see Figure 1-2) to link spectral design performance to mission 
measures of effectiveness, thereby making it possible to quantitatively assess the 
military utility of spectral design using military operations research methods. Hence, 
the first research sub-question addresses the technology system level. 
 
In Paper I the interdisciplinary systems approach was developed into the so-
called Ladder model. The version illustrated in Figure 7-1 is from a later date, after 
development in Papers V and VI. The model represents the signature management 
process as a balancing of needs and design choices in several activities, at different 
system levels. At the lowest level, the technology level (compare with Figure 1-2), 
spectral design activity maximizes the potential of material properties to obtain the 
 
 
Figure 7-1 The Ladder model - a proposed model for linking the performance of spectral designs to 
military utility. Application specific parameters are in parentheses. 
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desired surface structural properties. At the technical system level, the system design 
activity utilizes the surface structural properties obtained by balancing all signature 
reduction efforts to obtain the desired object signatures. In the Ladder model, the 
military system level of Figure 1-2 has  been divided into two system levels, the ca-
pability system level and the mission system level. The capability system level is to 
acknowledge that a system responding to a situation (a respondent system) consists 
of, not only several capabilities comprising technical systems, but also of personnel, 
methods and organization, in accordance with the theory in section 2.1. Hence, at 
the capability system level, the capability design activity takes maximum advantage 
of a military platform’s signatures in the development of tactical procedures and the 
training of operators. Then, at the mission system level, a respondent system in the 
form of a military task force, with the desired capabilities, is designed through a 
planning process. A military situation system is formed when an adversary is en-
gaged.  
 
Furthermore, the Ladder model proposed (see Figure 7-1) assumes that systems 
engineering is used to develop military technical systems and capabilities, in accord-
ance with the theory in chapters 4 and 5. Hence, on the right hand side there is an 
arrow pointing downwards, illustrating the requirements process allocating require-
ments to the design activities at different system levels (climbing down the ladder). 
Correspondingly, on the left hand side there is an arrow pointing upwards, illustrat-
ing the integration, verification and validation processes of systems engineering 
(climbing up the ladder). In the development phase of a military platform, it is pre-
sumed that an  effective requirements analysis process will result in a sufficient set 
of quantitative, verifiable, requirements at each system level. In earlier phases, the 
process will instead deliver key measures of performance sufficient for decision-
making. 
7.1.2 A set of technical parameters  
The following six characteristics are proposed (Paper I) as sufficient definition of 
the optical response of a surface (the “Technical Parameters” in Figure 7-1) in Low 
Observable applications: 
 
1. Spectrally Selective Reflectance 4. Low Emissivity 
2. Low Gloss 5. Non-destructive Properties  
    in Radar  
3. Low Degree of Polarization 6. Controllability 
 
It was found that the first four characteristics were easily parameterized, while the 
last two depend heavily on application.  
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7.1.3 A review of materials and spectral designs 
Trends were identified using the literature review method described in section 6.1, 
and the most interesting materials and spectral designs are presented with relevant 
performance metrics. The results are summarized in the diagram in Figure 7-2. 
 
As far as paints are concerned, there is great interest in combining pigments and 
binders in systems that achieve a synergetic optical response throughout the spec-
trum from VIS to TIR. The best coatings identified in the survey are based on coat-
ed flake pigments of aluminum. Challenges that remain are adhesion, high reflectivi-
ty in the visible spectrum and a tendency to form electrically conductive coatings, 
which destroys radar signature properties. In research into multi-layered structures, 
challenges to paint are addressed using several approaches. One is tailoring the re-
flectivity by breaking metal-based multilayers into pigments. Another is to use non-
conducting bandgap materials, either naturally polaritonic materials or photonic 
crystals, or a combination of the two. However, so far there have been no reports of 
any paint coating system that meets the potential of the respective components sep-
arately.  
 
Another possibility is to exchange paints for electro-chromic coatings, thereby mak-
ing the transmittance controllable to a certain extent across optical wavelengths of 
 
 
Figure 7-2. A diagram summarizing the results of the review of techniques and materials for spectral 
design in the Technology study. The bars on the left indicate potential applications for the respective spec-
tral designs. The Design approach column indicates the category of spectral design approach. In the center 
examples of spectral designs at the forefront of research into the respective categories are presented. The 
color indicates Technical Readiness Level (TRL) and the width indicates the target wavelength band. The 
right column presents concerns identified related to the respective spectral designs. 
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interest. The technology has civilian applications. Hypothetically, the technique 
could be used to produce pixel-sized decals for military platforms, although, one 
foreseeable challenge is high gloss. 
 
Currently there is great interest in biomimic materials and metamaterials. This re-
search explores the potential of combining advanced materials with complex struc-
tures from nature. In biology, there are examples of interesting optical properties, 
such as age-resistant and environmentally friendly colors, originating from structures 
made of relatively simple materials. Developments in nano-technology production 
methods show great promise. Hypothetically, it will be possible to combine proper-
ties that satisfy military requirements for surfaces, other than the optical response, 
such as dirt resistance, thereby increasing the military utility of spectral design. 
 
In the papers reviewed, there was no indication of any attempts to characterize all 
six of the desired characteristics of a surface identified in the previous 
tion. Often specular or integrated reflectance is the only characteristic mentioned.  
7.1.4 Validity and reliability 
None of the reports reviewed dealt with the entire set of technical parameters pro-
posed. On the other hand, two of them, spectrally selective reflectance and emissivi-
ty, were discussed in many. This is not surprising, because survivability theory states 
that signature reduction features, such as spectral design, depend on the assessed 
threat (in our case the sensor threat types), and the most frequently used electro-
optical sensors on the battlefield so far (eyes, imaging cameras, thermal sights etc.) 
detect reflected or emitted radiation. Consequently, we cannot be certain about hav-
ing captured every type of technical parameter associated with signature manage-
ment. The set will change over time and context. However, it seems safe to state 
that, in some situations, it is possible to find a set of technical parameters sufficient 
to coherently describe a desired optical signature. In some of these situations, it is 
also possible to obtain the desired characteristics using spectral design. 
7.2 The Concept development study (Q2) 
Q2: “How should military utility be defined in order to support decision-making?” 
 
A proposed concept called Military Utility was developed using the concept analysis 
approach described in section 6.2.  
7.2.1 A proposed concept called Military Utility 
The proposed concept includes a three-level structure consisting of key features and 
their detailed components. When assessing military utility, an analyst must first de-
termine the values of three situational variables that answer the questions; what is the 
element of interest, to which military actor, and, in what context? The situational variables 
were derived from a firm belief that the outcome of the assessment will be different, 
if assessing the military utility of an aircraft or an air defense capability; or if the as-
sessment is carried out by the US Air Force or the Swedish Air Force; or if the pri-
mary use of an aircraft is to be, for example, air defense or ground attack in hostile 
territory.  
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At the basic concept level, the military utility of something, e.g. a technical system, is 
a compound measure of the military effectiveness, the assessed technical 
tem’s military suitability for the military capability system, and the affordability. See Fig-
ure 7-3.  
 
Military effectiveness is defined as a measure of the overall ability to accomplish a 
mission, when the Element of Interest (EoI) is used by representative personnel, in 
the planned or expected environment, for operational employment of the military 
force. Military suitability is to be understood as the degree to which an EoI can be 
satisfactorily taken into military use in a specified context, taking into consideration 
interaction with other elements of the capability system. Lastly, affordability is a 
measure of compliance with the maximum resources a military actor has allocated to 
the EoI, in a timeframe defined by the context. Therefore, for the concept to have 
its intended meaning, an object (the EoI) only has military utility, if it has the poten-
tial to be militarily effective in achieving the goals defined by the military actor and 
the context. The degree to which this potential can be developed is determined by 
how the EoI fits into the capability system of the actor. However, if the actor can-
not afford to operate the capability system supported by the EoI, it has no military 
utility anyway. 
 
Each dimension of military utility can in turn be operationalized as a compound of 
measures at an indicator level. The concept does not prescribe which indicators 
must be chosen; that is the decision of the analyst. Military effectiveness might be 
measured using indicators such as compliance to desired outcomes, desired sched-
ules, target costs and acceptable risks. If the concept is to be developed into a useful 
quantitative framework for assessment of a specific technology, it is then necessary 
to identify quantitatively expressed links between technical parameters and indica-
tors in the specific area of application.  
 
 
Figure 7-3 The military utility concept. Something has military utility to a specific actor in a specific 
context, if: it is militarily effective, and militarily suitable, and affordable, to that specific actor. 
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7.2.2 Validity and reliability 
The purpose of the Concept development study was to identify those aspects that 
must be considered in order to support decision-making in the design of a military 
platform. A concept formation method was applied to strengthen validity, when 
compared with traditional concept analysis methods. One important advantage is 
that the concept development is based on the actual phenomenon of interest, as 
opposed to being a semantic investigation. Another major advantage is that the 
method chosen requires analysts to rigorously investigate and structure the constitu-
ent attributes in levels, dimensions and indicators, and then to explicitly define the 
relationships between them; see the resulting concept diagram (Paper III). It was 
then shown empirically that the concept was potentially useful in decision-making 
regarding the procurement of an armored vehicle. In conclusion, the proposed con-
cept can serve as a hypothesis for answering the research sub-question. 
 
Reflections on guidelines and discussions from the seminars are documented in Pa-
per II. The empirical data used in the validating example of the procurement of an 
armored vehicle is publicly available. 
7.3 The Modeling study (Q3) 
Q3: “How can the military utility of spectral design in  
a Low Observable platform be assessed?” 
 
The third sub-question was addressed using the military systems modeling and 
simulation method described in section 6.3. The Ladder model and the technical 
parameters from the Technology study, and the military utility concept from the 
Concept study, were used as input.  
7.3.1 Assessment of the military utility of spectral design 
In order to assure capture of the system nature of signatures in the system model, 
the Modeling study started by mapping influences between combat aircraft attrib-
utes. A text analysis of Ball’s book on combat aircraft survivability (2003), and elab-
orating on surface properties, resulted in two diagrams.  
 
The first diagram, Figure 7-4, describes the influences between kill chain probabili-
ties and mission measures of effectiveness. By inspecting this diagram, an analyst 
can see, for example, that in order to account for the secondary effects of suscepti-
bility reduction features on maneuverability, offensive capability must be included as 
a measure of effectiveness. 
 
The second diagram, Figure 7-5, specifically focuses on factors influencing the 
probability of an aircraft being detected. Note the “surface electromagnetic re-
sponse” factor included at the center of the second diagram. It can be seen that if 
the focus is on the impact of spectral design, a relevant model is required, which 
includes all identified influences  from coating materials and structures to mission 
success, including possible secondary (undesirable) effects. 
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Figure 7-4 An influence diagram illustrating the links between combat aircraft survivability enhance-
ment features and measures of mission effectiveness. The relevant measure is to the right and below each 
element. 
 
 
Figure 7-5 A diagram illustrating factors influencing the probability of detecting a combat aircraft when 
using both IR sensors and radar (RR). 
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The results in both Papers V and VI are based on the development and analysis of a 
common system model comprising an air to surface attack mission to neutralize a 
point target defended by surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The air defense in the 
model uses both radar and LWIR sensors for detection and tracking. The modeling 
activity used the Ladder model (Sect.7.1.1) as a template; see Figure 7-6. 
 
After mapping the influences, the modeling was carried out in four phases, as de-
scribed briefly earlier (Sect.6.3): 
  
The first phase comprised defining a high-level mission model, based on a scenario 
with the potential to highlight signature impact. The mission model in this study had 
to include clearly defined objectives, threats, tactical mission profile options (e.g. 
paths, altitude, speed) and situational variables (e.g. summer, night). Mission MoEs 
were derived from the commander’s mission and were quantitatively modeled using 
the probabilistic approach to survivability described earlier (Sect.3.4), thereby estab-
lishing an interface to lower level sub-models. Loss of aircraft was chosen as the 
primary measure of military effectiveness. 
 
The second phase comprised defining key decision nodes for the mission model, 
and how to model them. In this study, operators were modeled to act according to 
simple doctrines. The pilots were modeled to follow pre-determined strike option 
plans until they could launch their weapons and maneuver. The air defense opera-
tors were modeled to fire one missile at each aircraft within range, 20 seconds after 
detection.  
 
The third phase comprised defining the technical sub-models together to produce 
input to the top Mission model. See Figure 7-6. An important part of this phase, 
given the system nature of survivability enhancement features, is determining the 
fidelity of the sub-models. Models should be as simple as possible (Sect. 6.3), but 
they must include all relevant influences identified – otherwise possible secondary 
 
Figure 7-6 Application of the Ladder model in the system model used in Papers V and VI. Each 
system level in the ladder has corresponding sub-models and interlinking output/input parameters. 
(IADS – Integrated Air Defense System) 
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effects will not affect the mission MoEs. For example, in this Modeling study, in-
creased aircraft speed should increase the IR signature, thereby increasing the prob-
ability of detection, but it should also decrease the probability of being hit by the 
missile. Technically, the sub-models were based on rather crude physical shapes and 
motion patterns, on some of the material optics phenomena described in chapter 5, 
and on the kill-chain probabilities and survivability measures described in chapter 3. 
The technical models are described in detail in Papers V and VI. 
 
The fourth phase comprised creation of the models in a simulation environment, 
verifying the code and performing the analysis. In this Modeling study the Mission 
model, including sub-models, were created using MatlabTM. 
 
Paper V analyzes the balancing of efforts to reduce radar and LWIR signature. 
Therefore, the modeling activity includes both the IR and radar signatures. In Paper 
VI, the focus is on efforts to minimize LWIR signature using spectral design. Con-
sequently, the effects of the IR signature model are described in more detail. 
 
Paper V concludes that this modeling approach can be applied, during concept def-
inition, to the problem of balancing radar and long wavelength infrared signature 
properties, within a relevant mission context. The results suggest that the method-
ology supports the quantitative evaluation of aircraft concepts. Paper VI concludes 
that the results support using the modeling approach described for assessing the 
military utility of spectral design. In some situations, such as assessing the military 
utility of tailored emissivity paint for aircraft surface coatings, it is sufficient to as-
sess the military effectiveness dimension. It was shown that low emissive paint, on 
the front sector of an attack aircraft, in low altitude missions, has military utility.  
 
However, the most important result is that the method seems to reduce the risk of 
sub-optimizations. In both cases it was shown how changes in technical or tactical 
variables might very well decrease a capability measure of effectiveness, for example, 
the detection range. However, if the reduction is not large enough, there is little or 
no change in the outcome measures of effectiveness at mission level. The military 
end result is thus unchanged, except perhaps when measured in development costs. 
In Paper VI, such a tipping point is identified. There is no detectable change in the 
expected loss of aircraft until the emissivity of the aircraft paint coating is reduced 
below a critical level. Then suddenly the loss is significantly reduced and, corre-
spondingly, the military utility of the signature reduction effort is significantly in-
creased. 
7.3.2 Validity and reliability 
Challenges to the validity of warfare modeling were discussed in chapter 3 and in 
section 6.3. Below these are discussed in relation to the Modeling study. 
 
Using traditional cause-and-effect modeling, it is only possible to model certain as-
pects of the military system, due to its inherent complexity. In the context of this 
thesis, this means that we can only study the impact of changes in technical parame-
ters in rather crude predetermined mission scenarios. However, as long as the be-
havior of the system can be mathematically modeled, and all stakeholders agree on 
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system objectives, the modeling can still be considered relevant for decision-making 
in systems engineering. In practice, this means that thorough validation of the mod-
el is important (Sect.6.3.2). In this study the military system level model was validat-
ed via a seminar involving military subject matter experts. The modeling of more 
detailed weapon system levels was validated by comparisons with similar models in 
the literature. However, confidentiality surrounding evaluations of real military sys-
tems, such as the performance of weapons or sensors, makes validation of models 
difficult. The numerical results in this study rely, to a large extent, on one source for 
the performance of long wavelength infrared sensors in ground based air defense 
systems. 
 
A multi-stage model like the Ladder model requires, at least, a good understanding 
and description of the outer attributes of the most detailed object modeled (the 
black box behavior) (Sect.6.3.2). In the context of the Modeling study this means 
understanding the most relevant aircraft surface measures of performance. These, 
including the mechanisms governing the low emissive properties of paint, were sat-
isfactorily surveyed in the Technology study. Admittedly, however, the infrared sig-
nature model of the aircraft is too crude in terms of size and shape to say anything 
more than that the emissivity of the aircraft skin has a significant impact on military 
effectiveness in the situations simulated.  
 
The mission system model in the Modeling study is completely deterministic. 
Hence, at some stage, we may have inappropriately replaced a stochastic variable 
input with its expected average (Sect.6.3.2). The static configuration of flight paths 
and positions of ground-based threats could possibly fall under that category. Argu-
ably, however, given the simple infrared signature model of the aircraft, significant 
local variations dependent on aspect are unlikely. 
 
The modeling at the mission system level is based on Ball’s probabilistic survivabil-
ity framework (Sect.3.4), which assumes independent events. This is not necessarily 
true in a duel between a unit of attacking aircraft and an integrated ground-based air 
defense system, which is why the model can produce misleading results (Sect.6.3.2). 
However, the setting here is simple. If detected, it is assumed that all aircraft in the 
unit are engaged simultaneously by single autonomous surface-to-air missile sys-
tems, firing only one missile at each aircraft. These assumptions are pessimistic, 
from an attacker’s point of view, but produce a transparent result for a decision-
maker.  
 
Limiting the military system modeling to only one mission in a campaign will ex-
clude the potential secondary effects on aircraft availability. For example, if new 
signature reduction efforts are introduced, there may be a negative impact on turn-
around times, due to increased maintenance requirements. Thus, if implementing 
the Ladder model in a real development program, it is also important to model the 
campaign level. In this proof of concept study, demonstrating balance between sur-
vivability and offensive capability was sufficient (Sect.3.4.2). 
 
Whilst acknowledging the possibility of the ostrich effect on this study (harmful 
omissions, see section 6.3.2), the risk is arguably reduced by the first step taken, i.e. 
firstly rigorously analyzing the influences of spectral design on other attributes of 
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the platform - both desirable and undesirable (see the resulting influence diagrams 
Sect.7.3).  
 
The modeling in the Modeling study is thoroughly described in Papers V and VI, 
and the computer code can be presented and demonstrated on request. The input 
parameter set is detailed in tables, and key sensor performance parameters are refer-
enced to sources. 
7.4 The Case study (Q4) 
Q4: “How can the proposed model support decision-making in the development 
process of Low Observable platforms?” 
 
The fourth research question was addressed using the case study research approach 
described in section 6.4. Two procurement programs, the SEP multirole armored 
vehicle and the Visby class corvette, were studied.  
7.4.1 Lessons identified 
Results indicate that it is possible to exploit a great deal of the potential of Low Ob-
servable technology in armored combat vehicles, without significant penalties to 
other attributes, or cost. However, it does require a systems approach to develop-
ment and stealth must be established as a key architectural principle from the begin-
ning of the program. Decision-making about design seems to be based on either: 1) 
heuristics, gathered from experience and skillfully applied by system architects or 
designers, 2) tests or measurements of prototypes, or, 3) modeling and simulation. 
 
Paper IV concludes that the nature of signature attributes present a major challenge 
in terms of coherence and traceability between the military needs on the battlefield, 
and the signature requirements of the technical system. This calls for special compe-
tence and tailoring of the technical processes involving requirements analysis, sys-
tems architecture, and system design. A tailored workflow, from mission analysis to 
subsystem design, was derived from lessons identified. The activities in the work-
flow, including implied decision-making, are presented in Table 7-2. 
 
The selection of scenarios is an essential input to the modeling activity. However, 
given the character of the implied decision-making, the type of modeling and simu-
lation proposed in this thesis has the potential to support knowledge building 
throughout the rest of the workflow shown – ranging from choosing the most criti-
cal signature-dependent situation, to verifying system requirements. 
Nevertheless, the study also indicates that there are still challenges in establishing 
coherence and traceability between military needs and lower system levels, at least 
on land and at sea. The following development is required:  
x expansion of the system view to a mission system level, 
x definition of measures of performance at all system levels, and
x linkable modeling and simulation tools that support analysis from top to bottom.
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Table 7-2 A tailored workflow to support: requirements analysis, systems architecture, and system design, 
in the engineering of LO platforms (Paper IV). Typical decision-making included in each activity is pre-
sented explicitly. 
Activity Implied decision-making 
Mission analysis. Use mission sce-
narios and probabilities of threat 
sensors as input to define key 
capability MoPs and signature 
critical situations 
-Which scenarios, taken together, demon-
strate planned use of the platform? 
-Which of these are the critical, signature-
dependent, situations? 
-What are the most influential capability 
MoPs and what are their critical values?  
Capability analysis. Use the output 
from Mission analysis to define 
signature requirements in di-
mensioning configurations 
-What are the dimensioning sensor-target 
configurations, including situational parame-
ters, given planned tactical use? 
-What are the critical values of the signature 
MoPs in these configurations? 
System design and analysis. Use the 
output from Capability analysis 
to allocate subsystem design in-
structions and re-iterate, based 
on the resulting system signature 
response. 
-Which is the optimal system design satisfying 
system requirements, including system signa-
ture requirements? 
-What are the preferred signature design in-
structions, given a system design? 
 
Subsystem model design and IV&V 
(incl. spectral design) 
-Which is the preferred sub-system design, 
given the signature design instructions? 
System model IV&V -Does the integrated design meet the system requirements? 
7.4.2 Validity and reliability 
When using the case study method some challenges require discussion, as pointed 
out in section 6.4.2. 
 
There is often a risk of misleading generalizations. In this study, the risk was miti-
gated by filtering out potential lessons, using a framework based on best practice 
systems engineering, and by comparison with a second similar case.  
 
Fuzzy boundaries pose another risk. Here the boundaries of the object of study 
were, intuitively, those of the development programs of the two cases studied. Only 
the time boundaries became an issue. The SEP case was terminated after the design 
phase. Hypothetically, this was a result of a poor development process, making SEP 
an inappropriate case. However, this hypothesis could be ruled out by comparing 
the consistent statements from respondents, i.e. from industry, the procurement 
agency and the customer.  
 
Confidentiality can be a problem when accessing case settings. The cases were cho-
sen because stealth was defined as a key architectural principle in both development 
programs, and because the resulting designs were considered well balanced. An ad-
ditional case of successful stealth aircraft design in the study would have been desir-
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able, but was assessed to be impossible because of limited access to data. In the cas-
es studied there were some limitations regarding access to documents. However, 
this was compensated for with the necessary access to the key decision-makers in-
volved.  
 
The Case study approach is described in Papers III and IV. Referenced source doc-
uments are publicly available, but data was mainly collected from interviews. The 
risk of participant bias and error was reduced by making appointments well in ad-
vance, and by informing respondents about the purpose and theme of the inquiries 
when making appointments. Furthermore, the participants were given the oppor-
tunity to correct their statements by reading transcriptions of the interviews, and at a 
later stage, when reviewing the draft case study report. Researcher bias and errors 
were reduced by choosing respondents from all the actors involved, by establishing 
interview protocols in advance (based on best-practice systems engineering con-
cepts), by making audio recordings of the interviews, and by sharing preliminary 
results with the respondents. 
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8  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
n this final chapter, the results of the thesis are discussed and conclusions are 
drawn. Firstly, results from the four studies included in the thesis are synthe-
sized in order to answer the overarching research question. Thereafter the limi-
tations of the thesis study are discussed. Next, the more general, conceptual, 
aspects implied in the research question are addressed in a discussion of con-
tributions to theory. Then, aspects related to the specific problem domain of design-
ing Low Observable platforms are addressed in a discussion of contributions to 
practice. Finally, the last two sections present major conclusions and give guidelines 
for future research.  
8.1 Synthesis 
Security developments in Europe over the last decade have again increased interest 
in using advanced technology for military systems development, especially for the 
purposes of increasing the survivability of military personnel. However, in most Eu-
ropean countries, the development of military capabilities is limited by strained 
budgets. The purpose of this thesis is to support decision-making by providing a 
developed approach to assessing the military utility of advances in technology. The 
specific aim is to propose methodological contributions to a framework for effective 
decision-making regarding the use of spectral design in the development of Low 
Observable platforms. The principal research objective is to answer the following 
research question: 
 
“How can the military utility of spectral design be assessed in order to support deci-
sion-making in the development of balanced Low Observable platform design?” 
(Sect.1.2) 
 
A systems approach was chosen based on the possibility of modeling military situa-
tions as systems, and of recursively and coherently linking effects to adjustments 
made at successively more detailed system levels. The basic idea was to be able to 
observe measurable changes in the modeled military situation at the top system level 
when modifying spectral designs. “Because, given that we know how we would like 
to shape the military situation, and given that we can monitor changes due to spec-
tral design, then arguably, it will be possible to assess the military utility of such ad-
justments” (Sect.1.3.2).  
 
In the technology study (Sect.7.1/Paper I) the systems approach was manifested in 
the so-called Ladder model, making explicit the quantitative link between technical 
parameters of spectral design, and mission measures of military effectiveness; see 
Figure 7-1. A set of six technical parameters were identified and proposed as suita-
ble to characterize the optical response of a surface obtained using spectral design, 
including, for example, low gloss and low emissivity. Consequently, these technical 
parameters satisfy the requirement for links between the spectral design level and 
the technical system level in the Ladder model.  
 
I 
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In addition, the Technology study concluded that there are, for example, feasible 
paints and fabrics available for large parts of the optical spectrum, although there 
are challenges in designing an optical response to meet the anticipated multi-spectral 
sensor threat of the near future (Sect.7.1.3). Nevertheless, given the comprehensive 
research into advanced materials, chromic devices and advanced surface structures 
inspired by natural optical phenomena, the study shows there is potential in using 
spectral design technology. 
 
The top end of the Ladder model indicates a measurable military utility (see Figure 
7-1). Therefore, the aim of the Concept development study (Sect.7.2/Paper II) was 
to develop a useful concept for the military utility phenomenon in the context of 
developing a LO platform. Firstly, the study shows that military utility depends on 
three situational parameters of what, for whom, and in what context. These must be 
carefully defined before assessment. Next, it was shown that a military utility con-
cept consisting of three dimensions (military effectiveness, military suitability, and 
affordability)  satisfies these needs. In the military effectiveness dimension, compli-
ance with the planned outcome of a military mission is measured, including bounda-
ry conditions such as: acceptable risks, costs and schedule. In the military suitability 
dimension, the degree of fit of the technical system, or technology, of interest is 
measured relative to the other components of a capability system. The affordability 
dimension provides a measure of whether ownership of the technical component 
assessed is within allocated monetary resources. The exact wording of the defini-
tions can be found in the results section (Sect.7.2). For the concept to be useful in 
the context of this thesis, the indicators of the military utility dimensions (the mili-
tary measures of effectiveness in Figure 7-1) have to be quantitative in order to pro-
vide a link to the lower system levels of the Ladder model. However, the operation-
alization of indicators is not prescribed by the concept. Instead, operationalization 
has to be part of the application of the concept to a problem. 
 
In the Modeling study (Sect.7.3/ Papers V and VI) the Ladder model (including the 
military utility concept) was applied to the problem of quantitatively assessing the 
military utility of low emissive paint on aircraft, in the context of attacking a point 
target defended by ground based air defense. The purpose was to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the proposed model, and concept, in combination with MOR methods. 
At the mission system level, the Ladder model was implemented using a probabilis-
tic framework for survivability assessments. This framework suggests using loss of 
aircraft as the military measure of effectiveness. At the spectral design level, surfaces 
were modeled as low gloss grey bodies, with emissivity as the technical parameter 
characterizing their properties. The modeling of intermediate models in the Ladder 
model and other details are described in Papers V and VI. The study results suggest 
that the approach demonstrated is useful for signature management decision-
making during the concept phase of the development of a LO aircraft. The results 
show that evaluating signature reduction efforts at the military system level, with the 
aid of the military utility concept, helps to avoid sub-optimizations likely to happen 
otherwise.  In summary, therefore, the results show that the modeling approach de-
veloped, including the Ladder model, the military utility concept, and the use of 
MOR methods, can provide an improved basis for decision-making. 
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The aim of the final study of the thesis, the Case study (Sect.7.4/Papers III and IV), 
was to investigate how decisions are made during the development of a LO plat-
form, and how the proposed modeling approach can contribute. The results show 
that, in the two cases studied, the decision-making was based on a combination of 
heuristics, prototyping (both subsystems and full-scale), and modeling and simula-
tion. A workflow for supporting requirements analysis, systems architecture, and 
system design emerged from the analysis. Within this workflow a number of deci-
sion-situations were identified, which are likely to benefit from improved modeling 
and simulation methods, and from expanding the system view to a mission system 
level. However, the analysis also shows that perhaps the greatest challenge to im-
plementing the Ladder model is to identify and define suitable contrast measures for 
the inter-level link between the technical system level and the capability system level 
(See Figure 7-1), at least in the land and maritime arenas. If this challenge can be 
overcome in future development programs, the results indicate that the modeling 
approach proposed in this thesis will assist decision-making in signature manage-
ment, and that it is likely to reduce the need for costly and time-consuming proto-
types and tests. 
8.2 Limitations 
The limitations related to each study were discussed separately in the respective va-
lidity and reliability sections of the results chapter (Ch.7). However, there are a few 
limitations that need to be discussed regarding the overall generalizability of results. 
 
The quantitative assessment in the Modeling study only covers the military effec-
tiveness dimension of the military utility concept. This limitation is not a problem 
for the case demonstrated. It is reasonable to believe that low emissive paint will not 
have a significant impact on the military suitability or affordability dimensions. For 
example, no new facilities are required to implement the technology, the doctrines 
will remain the same, and the associated life cycle cost is, presumably, not signifi-
cantly greater than that of traditional paint coatings. However, the case demonstrat-
ed has to be regarded as a special case of the more general assessment situation, 
where design choices will also affect cost, and induce change in other components 
of the capability system. 
 
Furthermore, the results of the Modeling study support using the demonstrated ap-
proach in the concept phase, where the fidelity requirements of technical models are 
modest. During the development phase, models will have to be more detailed and, 
perhaps, there will also be implications arising from the need to support automated 
design space exploration.  
 
The Case study shows that there is a need for a system perspective, and a viable 
framework for modeling and simulation, to support signature management during 
the development of platforms for the land and maritime arenas, as well as aero-
space. However, the study also shows that difficulties in defining relevant contrast 
measures for some sensor-target configurations might prove to be an obstacle for 
implementation of the Ladder model, and thus the assessment approach demon-
strated. In these cases, the model’s value is not as a template for multi-stage model-
ing, but rather for highlighting the requirements analysis problem. In good systems 
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engineering practice, subsystem requirements have to be consistent and coherent 
with the system requirement from which they originate. 
 
In summary, there are limitations to the generalizability of the assessment approach 
demonstrated. Validity will benefit from future work replicating and expanding its 
use in problem domains requiring assessment in all dimensions of the military utility 
concept, into the development phase, and into arenas other than aerospace. 
8.3 Contributions to theory 
In the introduction, I stated that the background to the problem has a wider scope 
than that of assessing the utility of spectral design. I argued that it is but one exam-
ple of applying the more generic question: “what is the military utility of this tech-
nology, or equipment?” (Sect.1.1). In the Concept study this phenomenon was 
framed in a statement derived from this military technology postulate : “the tech-
nology the military profession chooses, and how it uses that technology, affects the 
outcome on the battlefield and the sustainment of capabilities over time” (Paper 
III). Below I argue that the military utility concept (Sect.7.2), developed in the Con-
cept study, contributes to the understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
In comparison to existing related concepts (Sect.2.6), the military utility concept is 
original in that it has been developed specifically to support a systems approach to, 
and capability centric, analysis. This has resulted in a third dimension to the concept, 
compared to utility concepts built only on cost and operational effectiveness. The 
third dimension, military suitability, was included in order to make it explicit, from a 
military technology viewpoint, that a technical system only has utility if it is viewed 
as a component in a capability system. 
 
The military utility concept should, by definition, be useful because it was developed 
from an identified need to support decision-making in five cases of generic use: 
technology forecast, defense planning, development, use, and lessons learned. How-
ever, the claim can be supported with arguments along two lines of reasoning. Be-
sides quantitative analysis, the concept also supports qualitative analysis. When ex-
pressing the military utility of something, assessments are required in three dimen-
sions, as stated above. In addition, the concept prescribes determining three situa-
tional variables of what, for whom, and in what context. This will undoubtedly help 
to frame the problem, focusing attention and, in turn, aiding discussions and qualita-
tive assessments. These strengths can be illustrated by referring to part of the dis-
cussion about the importance of defining for whom a technical system is to have 
military utility: “Though the military utility of the F-117 was great to the coalition 
forces during the First Gulf War, it is safe to conclude that the military utility of the 
F-117 to the SwAF would be small” (Paper III & Ch.5.1.2). This statement is easily 
understood, if qualitatively analyzing the military suitability dimension of military 
utility. The F-117 simply does not fit into the framework of the Swedish capability 
for air-to-surface air operations. The compatibility between the aircraft and Swedish 
crews, weapons, logistics and doctrine can be assumed to be poor. On the other 
hand, in time, with a plan for training and possible technical modifications, the mili-
tary suitability to SwAF capability, and thereby the military utility, could be en-
hanced. Of course, one could have similar discussions about the effects on military 
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utility of varying the command level perspective, the system border of the assessed 
object, or the context, etc. 
8.4 Contributions to practice 
Unsurprisingly, given the context, I would argue that there are significant contribu-
tions to practice within the disciplines of systems engineering, especially survivability 
engineering, and military operations research. The other disciplines involved in the 
interdisciplinary approach (Sect.1.3), i.e. systems thinking and military science, were 
used to give the perspective and understanding of the problem domain. 
 
The Ladder model (Sect.7.1.1) should be seen as a template for how to quantitative-
ly link a set of technical parameters associated with spectral design (Sect.7.1.2) to 
measures of military effectiveness. Establishing such a link is not part of the military 
utility-concept itself, but an important step in its operationalization for assessments 
in the problem domain (Paper III & Ch. 5.3). The originality lies in applying a bot-
tom-up systems perspective specifically to the spectral design technology, and in 
making the capability system level explicit. The bottom-up perspective focuses at-
tention on the utility of making progress within the area of spectral design, as op-
posed to the current focus on reducing vulnerability or enhancing physical protec-
tion (Sect.3.5). Making the capability level explicit is necessary, if taking a system 
view on capability (Sect.2.1), and thereby acknowledging the risk of sub-optimizing 
capability by favoring technical solutions. Failure to address this risk is a criticism of 
other approaches within the survivability discipline. Making capability components 
explicit will likely also aid assessment of the military suitability dimension, because 
this requires analysis of the gap between the baseline status of capability compo-
nents and the desired state, depicted in the military effectiveness dimension. 
 
The review of related research (Sect.3.5) showed that, so far, the most progressive 
area for gauging survivability effectiveness is that of combat aircraft design. The 
focus, however, has been on reducing vulnerability, or on reducing susceptibility by 
reducing radar signature or by introducing active countermeasures. Hence, the con-
tribution in this area is the introduction of a mission system model suitable for con-
ceptual analysis of the impact of spectral design on the survivability of combat air-
craft, more specifically of the duel between ground based air defense systems and 
attacking aircraft. Here, the mission system model is an application of the Ladder 
model and the probabilistic approach promoted by other academics. In addition, the 
case study of the development of Low Observable platforms revealed difficulties in 
decomposing needs into coherent, traceable, system requirements at the technical 
system level. Establishing corresponding mission system models for the land arena 
would help to mitigate these problems in the future.  
 
Answering the research question also includes demonstrating a viable assessment 
method for balancing Low Observable military designs. The method adopted from 
Soban and Mavris for balancing radar and long wavelength infrared signatures in the 
design of attack aircraft (Paper V), and for optimizing the utility of spectral design 
(PaperVI), contribute in this respect. The method emerging in the Modeling study is 
useful in that, as part of an exploratory research project, it demonstrates the poten-
tial of developing the military utility concept into a framework for quantitatively 
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assessing military utility.  It is also useful in that it complements the Soban and Mav-
ris probabilistic methodological framework regarding infrared signatures.  
 
However, proposing a method for assessing the military utility of different designs is 
not enough to answer the research question. It is also necessary to identify where to 
apply the method in the development process, and to what ends, in order to end up 
with a well-balanced Low Observable platform design. The case study makes a sig-
nificant contribution by identifying the key decision-making situations related to 
requirements analysis and design during the concept and development life-cycle 
phases (see Table 7-2). Using modeling and simulation to address the decision-
making necessary at each system level, is most certainly useful. Applying a military 
utility perspective to the decision-making at each level would be original. As an ex-
ample, the modeling study of low emissive coatings for attack aircraft (Paper VI) 
indicates how military utility-based decision-making could help to determine signa-
ture design instructions. One explicit result of the study was to show that the sur-
face coating on the front aspect of an attack aircraft should be diffuse and have low 
emissivity throughout the long-wavelength infrared spectrum. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The aim of the research reported in this thesis was to propose methodological con-
tributions to a framework for effective decision-making regarding spectral design in 
military signature management applications. The research is justified by several 
trends. There is extensive research, mainly civilian, into materials and techniques 
potentially suitable for spectral design. Meanwhile, there is also a growing interest in 
advanced technologies, and a need for enhanced survivability in military platforms, 
given the worsening security situation in Europe.  
 
The research objective was addressed from a military system and capability centric 
perspective, using methods from several disciplines in the military sciences domain. 
The work was divided into four studies; a Technology study of spectral design, using 
a systematic review of literature; a Concept development study of military utility, 
using a concept formation method; a Modeling study to operationalize a link be-
tween spectral design and measures of military utility, using military operations re-
search methods; and an exploratory Case study of the systems engineering of mili-
tary Low Observable platform designs. 
 
The main finding contributing to theory is a proposed concept, called Military Utili-
ty, which captures how to communicate the utility of technical systems, or technol-
ogy, in a military context. It complements existing concepts in military sciences and 
systems engineering, specifically supporting a capability centric and systems ap-
proach to utility assessments, from a military actor’s perspective.  
 
The first finding contributing to survivability engineering practice is a proposed 
model, called the Ladder model, which supports the quantitative assessment of the 
military utility of spectral design. The novelty lies in it presenting a bottom up sys-
tems perspective for using spectral design to reduce susceptibility to threats, and in 
explicitly including a capability system level to reduce the risk of sub-optimization. It 
is anticipated that this will aid engineers in requirements analysis and design, because 
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it makes explicit the need for the coherent and traceable allocation of quantitatively 
expressed requirements at every system level, from the military mission system level 
to technical sub system levels.  
 
In addition, the Ladder model is expected to be useful to academics studying mili-
tary technology, as it is an example of how to operationalize the military effective-
ness dimension of the military utility concept. 
 
The applied Ladder model is also a contribution to practice, when quantitatively 
assessing the military effectiveness of spectrally designing Low Observable attack 
aircraft. This application of the Ladder model will help to assess the utility of pro-
gress in spectral design, when compared to the current focus on active counter 
measures and reducing vulnerability.  
 
The adapted method used for quantitatively assessing the military effectiveness of 
spectral design in the development of Low Observable attack aircraft, is another 
contribution to practice. Implementation of the method, using the Ladder model, 
complements a probabilistic framework, first developed and promoted by academics 
in the combat aircraft survivability engineering community, especially in terms of 
infrared signature analysis. In this thesis, it was used to expose a possible pivot point 
where further efforts to reduce radar signature were no longer worthwhile, because 
of the probability of detection by infrared sensors; it was also used to demonstrate 
the importance of including earthshine in assessments of infrared signatures. 
 
Lastly, the set of lessons identified regarding successful requirements analysis and 
design, in Low Observable platform development programs, is a contribution to the 
systems engineering discipline. Guidelines from earlier research in combat aircraft 
survivability engineering have been corroborated for use in the development of 
ground combat vehicles and naval vessels. A tailored generic workflow to support 
requirements analysis and design was identified, explicitly identifying decision-
situations potentially aided by modeling and simulations – and thus by employing 
the methodology proposed above. 
 
To summarize, the overall result of the work presented in this thesis is the integra-
tion of related work in military sciences, systems engineering and material optics to 
support decision-making regarding the use of spectral design technology in the sig-
nature engineering of Low Observable military platforms. The resulting major 
methodological contributions comprise:  
x a proposed concept called Military Utility,  
x the Ladder model – a template for operationalizing the military effectiveness 
dimension of the proposed concept regarding spectral design in signature man-
agement applications,  
x an applied Ladder model for analyzing the military utility of spectral designs in 
Low Observable attack aircraft, 
x an adapted methodology to conduct the analysis, 
x a workflow, identified from relevant development programs, with decision-
situations that can benefit from the adapted methodology. 
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8.6 Future research 
The study of the use of spectral design in signature management applications in this 
thesis can be considered an example of an assessment of the Military Utility of a 
technology when applied to a military platform. In order to further validate the pro-
posed Military Utility concept, and to develop an assessment theory, there is a need 
to study its use in addressing the wide palette of problems defining the phenome-
non (See Concept study). Below I present four directions for research, which I find 
particularly interesting. 
 
The object of assessment in the applied examples is one technology in combat aircraft. 
There are other technologies, and it seems that there has been less study of the as-
sessment of signature management applications for land combat vehicles. The Case 
study has shown that the combat vehicles case would be very interesting since the 
background is very different, and perhaps more complex, when compared with that 
of the airspace theater. In addition, dirt and wear are important issues in the land 
theater (Technology study). In accordance with these results, the current multilateral 
project in the NATO science and technology organization called Assessment Methods 
for Camouflage in Operational Context (RTO 2015), has also identified ground combat 
vehicles as a case of interest to all participants. The project acknowledges that the 
military operational context currently plays a minor role in the evaluation and design 
of camouflage systems, although in military practice, it is deemed crucial in assessing 
the performance of these systems. The aim of the project is, therefore, to investigate 
and to recommend techniques for incorporating the operational context in camou-
flage assessment and requirement analysis. Within the framework of Swedish partic-
ipation, I would advocate using and evaluating the Ladder-model. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to see if academics in other military science disciplines would 
also find the Military Utility concept useful. The definition of the concept does not 
limit its use to technology. Following on from the capability system view advocated 
in this study, capability components, such as doctrine or organization, would be 
equally relevant candidates for assessment.  
 
The time perspective in the applied examples relates to decision-situations during the 
development of a military platform (See Modeling study). The Military Utility con-
cept has recently been introduced into the Swedish Armed Forces process for tech-
nology forecasting. The next step is to evaluate its contribution. At the other end of 
the time scale, I plan to study the use of the concept for assessments in the opera-
tion planning process. The first step will be to identify relevant situations in the 
planning process that would benefit from an improved basis for decisions. 
 
The dimensionality is another aspect of Military Utility assessments. In the applied ex-
amples (Modeling study) we found that when studying the impact of low emissive 
paint on attack aircraft, it is only necessary to assess the Military Effectiveness di-
mension. Because we assessed that the technology did not significantly affect either 
the Military Suitability or the Affordability dimensions, when compared with paints 
currently used; however, this must be considered a special case. It is important, 
therefore, to study when, and how, measures of all three dimensions should be 
compounded into a measure of Military Utility. This issue was identified but not 
fully investigated in the Concept study. In addition, of the three dimensions, I found 
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that the Military Suitability dimension is the least studied. Therefore, it would be 
particularly interesting to study assessments of the military utility of alternatives with 
variations in Military Suitability. 
 
The methodology in the applied examples is quantitative, based on a probabilistic 
framework for survivability assessments. This kind of approach is continuously de-
veloping, for example, in the fields of Design Space Exploration and Multidiscipli-
nary Design Optimization (Modeling study). However, the Military Utility concept 
does not stipulate which methods to use for assessments (Concept study). Thus, in 
decision-situations other than those studied in this thesis – for example, if a situa-
tion is too complex to model quantitatively, or if there is insufficient time or re-
sources for modeling – related work indicates that it is beneficial to use qualitative 
methods, or combinations. Therefore, I would welcome academics, who favor dif-
ferent methodologies and methods, adopting the proposed concept to conduct as-
sessments in their respective fields. Theory building in military technology will bene-
fit greatly. 
 
In summary, there is still a lot of work to be done, not only to investigate and evalu-
ate use of the Military Utility concept in general, but also to assess the use of spec-
tral design in signature management application. In addition, there are other tech-
nologies and there are other perspectives. The work presented in this thesis presents 
one stepping-stone on a path towards a theory for better assessments of the utility 
of military technology.   
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ABSTRACT 
The current focus in Swedish policy towards national security and high-end technical systems, together with a rapid 
development in multispectral sensor technology, adds to the utility of developing advanced materials for spectral design 
in signature management applications. A literature study was performed probing research databases for advancements. 
Qualitative text analysis was performed using a six-indicator instrument: spectrally selective reflectance; low gloss; low 
degree of polarization; low infrared emissivity; non-destructive properties in radar and in general controllability of 
optical properties. Trends are identified and the most interesting materials and coating designs are presented with 
relevant performance metrics. They are sorted into categories in the order of increasing complexity: pigments and paints, 
one-dimensional structures, multidimensional structures (including photonic crystals), and lastly biomimic and 
metamaterials. The military utility of the coatings is assessed qualitatively. The need for developing a framework for 
assessing the military utility of incrementally increasing the performance of spectrally selective coatings is identified. 
Keywords: Spectral Design, Signature Management, Camouflage, Military Utility, Military-Technology, Coating  
1. INTRODUCTION
In Swedish defense policy1 focus has again widened from the focus in recent years on force protection in asymmetric 
expeditionary scenarios, to include national security. Military capabilities are assessed to be evolving towards high-end 
technology and a need for more competent personnel - at the cost of volume. In turn, fewer and more expensive 
platforms mean an increased interest in effect, of course, but also mobility. Mobility is often achieved by decreasing 
weight at the expense of less armor and the decreasing force protection capability is in turn compensated for with active 
Electronic Warfare systems and camouflage and deception means – i.e. systems for Signature Management. In parallel 
there is rapid development in multispectral sensor technology and a proliferation among non-state actors of advanced 
optronic, infrared and microwave sensors - increasing the threat to Swedish Armed Forces in international operations.2 
Both factors add to the utility of developing new more effective solutions for signature management. The need to 
camouflage soldiers is high in any event, and the requirement to conduct both expeditionary missions and be prepared 
for national protection scenarios drives the need for adaptive signatures of platforms and hence the need for Signature 
Management Technology (SMT).  
Any property, or a combination of properties, of an object, that makes it distinguishable from its immediate background 
by a sensor defines the object signature.3 However, this study is limited to the signature originating from electromagnetic 
interaction with the surface of an object. In addition, now that the need for SMT increasingly includes the infrared 
spectrum, there is a great demand for solutions meeting the requirements from visible through to long wavelength 
thermal infrared regions simultaneously. Furthermore, the need to adapt the signature to the full range of missions, in 
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Research into materials with the potential to be used in spectral design for SMT applications in the optical and thermal 
spectra is extensive. Apart from the military applications, it covers smart textiles, solar energy, “cool roofs”, decorative 
coatings, heat control of satellites etc. By exploiting these advances in the future, it may be possible to use spectral 
design to satisfy the new survivability requirements of signature management.  
The work presented in this paper is a first effort in adding a military-technological perspective to spectral design for 
signature management, i.e. to assess the military utility. The aim is to review what types of materials and coating 
techniques are available for spectral design purposes and to get a rough idea what their utility is for SMT. Firstly, there is 
an introduction of terminology used and the desired characteristics of a spectral design coating. In order to limit and to 
focus the survey the use case is multispectral optical camouflage, i.e. reducing the contrast with the background. In the 
next section of the paper results are presented and discussed. Finally a summary of results, conclusions and a discussion 
on future work are presented. 
1.1 Terminology and Physical quantities 
Electromagnetic radiation (light) of some wavelength, Oincident on an optically thin coating (thin film) is reflected, 
absorbed or transmitted, hence I(O)=R(O)+A(O)+T(O)=100%, where I(O) is the intensity of the incident light R(O) is the 
reflectance, A(O) is the absorptance and T(O) is the transmittance. If Maxwell´s equations are used to solve the boundary 
problem of a propagating wave at the surface between two media the Fresnel reflection coefficients are obtained, 
ݎ௣ ൌ ܰͳ ൫ߠ݅൯െܰͲ ൫ߠݐ൯ܰͳ ൫ߠ݅൯൅ܰͲ ൫ߠݐ൯, ݎ௦ ൌ 
ܰͲ ൫ߠ݅൯െܰͳ൫ߠݐ൯ܰͲ ൫ߠ݅൯൅ܰͳ൫ߠݐ൯  and  R(O)=࢘ ή ࢘
כ (1) 
where ݎ௣ is the reflection coefficient for light polarized parallel and ݎ௦ for light polarized perpendicular to the plane of 
incidence, respectively. These expressions show the relationship between the observable reflectance of a surface and 
optical properties, since ଵܰ = n1+ik1 is the complex refractive index of the coating material and ଴ܰ is that of the ambient 
air. In a dielectric (non-absorbing) material the refractive index is real valued. ߠ௜ is the angle of incidence to the 
surface normal and ߠ௧ is the angle to the normal for refracted, transmitted, light.  
Light reflected from a smooth surface, like a mirror, is specular, i.e. the angle of reflection is the same as the angle of 
incidence. Light reflected from a rough surface is diffuse, i.e. scattered in all directions. In SMT context the former 
surface is denoted glossy and the latter as low gloss. 
If the x- and y- components of the electric field vector of a light wave propagating in z-direction are completely 
correlated the light is said to be totally polarized. If there is no correlation the light is said to be unpolarized, like from 
the sun or ordinary lamps.6 Polarization features arise from the geometrical orientation, shape, shading and roughness of 
an object surface. In general, man-made objects with smooth surfaces have more defined polarization signatures than 
natural objects and tend to take on a polarized component in reflected or emitted radiation.7 The ratio between the 
intensity of polarized light and the total intensity of light irradiated from a surface is denoted the Degree of Polarization 
(DoP).6 
The radiaton emitted from a perfect blackbody, i.e. a surface emitting maximum possible energy, depends on wavelength 
and the absolute surface temperature T of an object. It is expressed through Planck´s radiation law as the spectral radiant 
exitance, Ebb(O,T), through 
ܧ௕௕ሺߣǡ ܶሻ ൌ ܿͳ
ߣͷሺ݁
ܿʹߣܶെͳሻ
 (Wm-2Pm-1) (2) 
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Furthermore, there are reports of development in Spectropolarimetric imaging. These sensors are sensitive to the 
polarization state of light irradiated from a surface, in addition to spectral intensity, and show potential for more robust 
detection of objects in a complex and cluttered environment.7 Low degree of polarization is, therefore, proposed as a 
third characteristic.  
In the MWIR or LWIR regions the electromagnetic radiation from an object is dominated by its own thermal radiation, 
which is why it is relevant to study material emissivity in this part of the spectrum. The emissivity of naturally occurring 
backgrounds, such as vegetation, rock or sand is almost always higher than man-made objects, especially those made of 
metal. However, since the objects we would like to camouflage are often hotter than their surroundings, this is usually a 
good thing. The apparent thermal contrast with the background stays small. Low infrared emissivity is, therefore, 
considered to be a fourth characteristic of low signature materials in this study. This value can easily be increased as 
needed and in this work an emissivity of about 0.4-0.6 is considered to be acceptable, in accordance with, for example, 
Hallberg et al.10(p7) 
In the radar wavelength region a target is detected by illuminating the object and detecting the reflected energy. A 
signature management coating for optical wavelengths must therefore not interfere with the targets spectral design for 
radar wavelengths.13 In most applications this means the reflectance of the coating should be very low. This can be 
achieved by making the coating very thin and transmissive, deposited on top of a radar absorbing coating, or by using a 
material with high absorption. In some use cases, however, the radar reflectance should instead be high, e.g. when 
deposited on the cockpit glass dome of a combat aircraft.† Our fifth indicator of a low signature coating material relates 
to the radar spectrum and, due to the contradicting requirements of different applications, the indicator is formulated as 
non-destructive properties.  
From the arguments above we find that, in order to be really useful, the signature system of a mobile military object has 
to be adaptable to environment, background, weather, threat level and mission. One way of meeting these demands is to 
use exchangeable skins, camouflage nets, uniforms etc. If, however, the need to change signature is within the 
framework of a mission, the situation requires the surface coating to have adjustable optical properties. Hence, our sixth 
characteristic of a coating for signature management purposes is controllability at optical wavelengths. Hitherto sensors 
have not been very selective, spectrally, in the thermal infrared part of the spectra, but there is a development towards 
multiband detectors. 
2. METHOD AND LITERATURE
The survey was conducted as a literature search followed by a qualitative assessment of utility, using the six 
characteristics of a coating for multispectral optical SMT identified above as indicators. The databases Web of Science, 
Scopus, CSA and SPIE were chosen and probed for articles.‡ Articles were excluded if their focus was clearly on other 
phenomena, properties or applications than those of interest to this study, or if the article focused on measurement 
techniques. In a first iteration the exclusion criteria were applied to titles and in a second to abstracts. Publically 
available research reports with experimental data from the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, are considered of 

ȘIf the glass dome were to transmit radar wavelengths the inside of the cockpit would make an effective radar reflector. A thin 
metallic film on the glass surface reflects radar waves in all directions but transmits visible light.
șModifications of the following search string was used: (review OR characterisation OR measurement*) AND (reflect* OR ”low 
emissive*” OR dielectric OR diffuse OR lambertian OR ”low gloss” OR infrared OR IR OR TIR OR optical OR tunable OR adapt*) 
AND (chromogenic* OR ”thermo chromic” OR ”electro chromic” OR multilayer OR metamaterial* OR pigment* OR polymer* OR 
”nano composite*” OR tailor*) AND (surface* OR coating* OR material* OR structure*) AND (BRDF OR scatterometry OR 
camouflage OR ”signature management”).
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materials also are highly reflective in VIS, they conclude that, unfortunately, these types of pigments reduce the 
camouflage performance in the visible part of the spectrum. An anti-reflectance treated TiO2/Au/TiO2 flake pigment was 
also produced using magnetron sputtering and dividing the thin film into flakes when removed from the substrate. A 
paint meet transmittance requirements in VIS, but not low emittance requirements. Hallberg et al. conclude that among 
pure metal pigments, only Al, in combination with polymer-based binders, gives acceptably low emissivity. They report 
that the most probable explanation is that Al naturally forms a stable oxide protecting it from deteriorating chemical 
reactions with the binder. Furthermore, the level of emissivity can be adjusted easily by tuning the Al flake density in the 
paint. A semiconductor like Si is heavily absorbent of wavelengths shorter than the bandgap wavelength, for Si this is 
below 1.1Pm. Hence, it looks black in VIS and can be used to lower reflectivity.  
A study of the use of metal-coated cenospheres as pigments in low emissive paints was conducted by Hedborg Karlsson 
& Hallberg et al.10,17,18 A cenosphere is an inert and hollow sphere consisting of silicon dioxide and aluminum oxide. 
Coated spheres showed much the same properties as the respective metal powder in both VIS and IR, but when mixed 
with a binder the absorption in LWIR was much too high. One hypothesis was that the spheres fell to the bottom of the 
paint.§ The need for a new binder or a more inert metal coating was identified. The conductivity of the Al-coated 
cenospheres was, however, found to be lower than that of corresponding metal pigments, which is why the authors 
expect the radar transmittance to be better. Metal flakes have a tendency to agglomerate and thus cause high reflectivity 
in RR.** 
A large portion of the hits from the database search for developments in recent years in pigments with NIR-reflecting 
properties concern the roofing industry and originate from an interest in producing “cool roofs” for energy saving 
purposes. Researchers report coatings with pigments yielding different colors while still exhibiting NIR-reflectance in 
the 70-90% range.19–24 The substrates are generally clay and the coatings are applied through engobing.  
In the military sector there is great interest in lowering the signature of soldiers in the VIS-NIR wavelength region where 
night vision goggles are becoming a high volume threat.2,25–32 The blending of artificial and natural fibers in fabric for 
modern uniforms normally gives NIR-reflectance that is too high when compared to natural background,33 which is why 
new pigments are being developed for lowering NIR-reflectivity, such as NIR-absorbing Vat dyes.34 Washing, though, 
seems to deteriorate performance if using textile printing techniques and paste with low emissive pigments. 
Incorporating pigments in the polymer fiber at the fiber forming process, however, seems to be feasible since this can be 
combined with textile printing with reactive dyes for VIS-NIR performance. 
Mao et al. recently presented emissivity as low as 0.63 in coated cotton fabric using pigments of Al and La doped ZnO.35 
In another report Mao et al. show a lowering of the cotton fabric emissivity using a coating with W-doped VO2 pigments. 
They were also able to show that this kind of fabric changed emissivity spontaneously with changes of ambient 
temperature.36 Mao et al. suggest using both coatings on uniforms for infrared camouflage. No other indicator 
characteristics than LWIR emissivity is reported. There are no comments on degradation due to wear and tear. Pigments 
with chromogenic properties would be of interest for the desired controllability aspect of surfaces. There are also reports 
on TC-pigments being characterized.36,37 This development is of interest in spectral design for thermal control purposes, 
especially on simple lightweight systems like uniforms.  
Wake and Brady reported on the impact of binders in paint coating systems in 1993 and suggest selecting pigments with 
refractive indices and particle size and shape that scatter light effectively in bands where resins absorb.15 Resins and 
binders with weak absorption in parts of TIR of interest have been studied by several researchers: e.g. polyvinylidene 

ȚPersonal comm. with Thomas Hallberg 12-08-2014
ȗȗIbid
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fluoride38; dimethyl silicone resins39; inorganic silicate oligomers-form polymers40; polyurethanes, vinyl polymers, 
silicone polymers, epoxy resins, polyethylene and chlorinated polyolefine41. 
There are also a few studies that have reported on complete paint coating systems for optically multispectral SMT. These 
results can serve as a snapshot of current developments. The reported performance of these coatings, filtered using the 
six-indicator instrument, is presented in table 1. Note that the pigments used are based on Al flakes. Hallberg et al. 
comment on the binder that “except for the IR reflective pigment and the binder, the paint should include many other 
ingredients or additives which will improve various properties of the paint, such as: solvent (water), thickener, 
coalescent, dispersing agent, antifoaming agent, extender, anticorrosion agent, and different kinds of color pigments for 
the visual camouflage” and that these additives seem to increase the emissivity of a paint by about 10%.10 Hedborg 
Karlsson et al. point out that the infrared reflectance is higher for the paint than for its individual components. 42  The 
authors also considered the adhesion of their paint to be insufficient. The best combination of visible and TIR properties 
is reported by Shen et al. using a relatively complex Al based flake pigment. They are coated with SiO2 in order to 
prevent them oxidizing, which would otherwise increase the pigment emissivity. The high visible reflectivity of Al/SiO2 
is reduced by depositing metal oxides, ferro-cyanide and pure metal on the surface. None of the studies, however, reports 
on all the characteristics considered of interest for spectral design coatings in this review. 
Table 1. The three best performing paints identified in the survey compared to desired characteristics.  
Coating syst. RVIS-NIR Gloss DoP Emissivity RR Controllabil
ity 
Desired: RVIS <15,  
RNIR(g.)  45-60,  
RNIR(br.) 10-25,  
RNIR(bl.)  5-10% 
Low Low 0.4-0.6 Non 
destruct. 
(low RRR) 
Switchable 
in near real 
time 
18 m Al, flake, in water 
solvable  polymethyle acrylate, 
(Hallberg et al. 2005)10 
“Green” N.R. N.R. EMWIR 0.4 
ELWIR 0.5 
TRR(X)
>70% 
In design 
phase 
10-20 Al, flake, in 
PEDOT:PSS, (Hedborg 
Karlsson et al. 2007)42 
RNIR 50-70% N.R. N.R. 0.2-0.3 N.R. In design 
phase 
Al/SiO2/Fe2O3/FeO 
/Fe4[Fe(CN)6]3/Cr2O3/Cr, 
coated flake, in Appretan® 
N96101, (Shen et al. 2012) 43 
RVIS <15,  
RNIR(g.)  55% 
(0.38~1.2m) 
N.R. N.R. ELWIR  
0.51-0.55 
N.R. In design
phase 
N.R. = Not reported 
Summing up, the paint coating system remains an important area for research. There is currently an interest in 
multispectral aspects, such as: advanced pigments for low emissivity and selective properties in VIS-NIR, binders with 
little absorption in MWIR and LWIR and printing techniques for textiles.  
3.2 One-dimensional structures 
Moving from paints with pigments to coatings with layers of deposited optical films, we find other techniques and 
applications. Results from research in solar energy applications are assessed to be of particular interest since many of the 
challenges in techniques and processing are the same as in signature management, and even some of the desired 
characteristics in coatings are similar.  
C.G. Granqvist sorts spectrally selective coatings into four categories: Low heat transfer (high T/AVIS+NIR, high RTIR); 
Solar control (high TVIS, high RNIR+TIR); Smart Windows (Adaptable R/T) and Passive cooling (Low RTIR).44 From the 
respective design criteria we find the second and third categories of primary interest in this study.  
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Multilayer interference coatings for solar control are traditionally based on thin semi-transparent noble metal films 
deposited on glass substrates, embedded between oxide films of high refractive indices for antireflection and atmospheric 
protection purposes.45 Durability is known to be a problem. Exchanging the metal film for metal nitrides, such as TiN or 
ZrN, is an option studied by Andersson et al. A RVIS of <20%, a RNIR 20-70% was reported.46,47 From reported data the 
emissivity is assessed to be in the 0.2-0.4 range. The films are specular and the polarization and radar-transmission are 
not known. Hallberg et al. have, however, demonstrated a possible method of exploiting the properties of multilayer 
coatings in signature management applications, despite the gloss, by removing the coating from the substrate and 
breaking it up into pigments.10 However, the high RNIR of the Au-pigment could not be achieved in the resulting paint. 
Nevertheless, pending the reasons for insufficient performance in the paint formulated by Hallberg et al. it would be 
interesting to investigate other highly IR-reflective, more stable, multilayer coatings used as pigments. 
Efforts to achieve adaptable signatures in near real time make electro-chromic (EC) switching especially interesting 
since this phenomenon makes the optical performance of a surface controllable by using an electric signal. TC-coatings 
are undoubtedly of interest for spectral design purposes in heat control. Chemical switching48 and other switching 
phenomena could of course add to the knowledge of switching mechanisms for controllability, but have to be omitted 
from this survey because of a lack of space. In a paper on recent advances in chromogenics in 200949 Granqvist et al 
report on EC-coatings for fenestration applications with considerable controllable transmittance intervals. They present a 
short overview of designing EC devices for fenestration purposes, consolidated in Table 2 below. Their latest results 
concern a polyester (PET) foil device, indicated in bold. The substrates were sputter coated and the final device was 
0.4mm thick and flexible. The mid-luminous transmittance, ǻT, is reported to be 55% with maximum transmittance 
around 70%, and the time from colored to bleached state is about 30s. For this paper it is interesting to note that RVIS 
switches between 8 and approximately 15%. RNIR is 30% at its maximum at around 2ȝm. In a later review50 Granqvist 
reports on different EC-designs commercially available, with pros and cons, indicating that EC-switching technology has 
become mature for solar energy applications. A few years earlier some challenges in producing high quality devices on a 
large scale were reported.49  
Table 2. An overview of designs for EC fenestration devices, based on advances reported by Granqvist et al 2009  
(Their own latest device in bold). 
Layer 
# 
Function Alternatives for fenestration49 
1 Substrate Flexible Polyester (PET) foil, Glass
2 Transparent 
conductor, electrode 
In2O3:Sn (i.e. ITO), heavily doped oxide semiconductors such as ZnO:Al, ZnO:Ga, or 
SnO2:F. And possibly Metal-based coatings, carbon nanotubes or graphene 
3 Ion Storage layer/EC “Many”, but IrO2 and NiO are of recent interest. IrO2 is expensive but has good EC- 
properties after dilution with cheaper Ta2O5. NiO-based films mixed with wide band gap 
oxides, such as MgO or Al2O3, is an option. 
4 Ion conducting 
electrolyte 
“Many”, including polymers with ion conduction due to added salts, ionic liquids, and 
hydrous oxides exhibiting proton conduction 
5 Electro Chromic 
layer (EC) 
WO3 
6 Transparent 
conductor, electrode 
See layer 2 
7 Substrate See layer 1 
Chandrasekhar et al.51–53, and others54, have presented different EC-devices with performance of interest to signature 
management in IR and for heat control of spacecraft. Using various parameters Chandrasekhar et al. demonstrate how 
their EC-devices can be tailored for optimized performance in specifically the MWIR and LWIR windows.51 “This is 
seen in practical Conducting Polymer devices in the form of thin (<0.5 mm), flexible, entirely solid-state, variable area 
3URFRI63,(9RO< 
(1cm2 to 1m2) flat panels. Typical properties include: very high reflectance variation; switching times <2 s.”55 The 
MWIR emissivity can be varied between approximately 0.55 and 0.8 and the LWIR emissivity can be varied between 
approximately 0.3 and 0.85. 
The reflectance phenomena exploited in the materials presented so far have originated from boundaries. There are, 
however, some materials with lattice resonances, phonons, in the infrared part of the spectrum caused by light interacting 
with ion-pair dipoles. These quasi-particles are called Polaritons to separate them from ordinary lattice vibrations and 
hence the materials are called polar materials. To conclude, this is a bulk phenomenon and the optical consequence is an 
interval of high reflectance. In the literature this interval is known as the Reststrahlen band or the Polaritonic bandgap56. 
Sigalas et al. studied GaAs, but there are many materials exhibiting reststrahlen bands (see, for example, the Handbook 
of Optics 57), though not that many in that part of IR of interest. 
Beryllium Oxide (BeO) and Boron Nitride (BN) are two examples. They have reststrahlen bands resulting in high 
reflectance in the 9.5-15Ɋm and the 8-9.5Ɋm regions respectively. Ribbing showed in 1993 that a 2.5Ɋm layer of BeO on 
BN could result in a coating with low emissivity, lower than 0.2 on average, covering the width of the LWIR 
atmospheric window58. Later the use of BeO in radar domes was suggested.59 This use would exploit the low emissivity, 
the off-band high emissivity and the excellent heat conducting properties – to reduce the probability of detection from IR 
sensors – combined with the electrical insulating properties allowing radar transmittance. The reflectance is diffuse and 
in the 80% range.59 Since the safe deposition of a thin film of BeO on a substrate “is not a trivial problem”58, Ribbing et 
al. also suggest an alternative solution. A 0.83Ɋm thin layer of Silicon is reported as being deposited on BeO in order to 
maximize the reflectivity on the short wavelength side of the low emissivity band. The resulting emittance is reported to 
be 0.1.59 
Högström et al.60,61 have also studied the coexistence of polaritonic and structure bandgaps in a multi-layer Si/SiO2 one-
dimensional photonic crystal produced using Chemical Vapor Deposition. Silicon was used as a high index dielectric and 
SiO2 was used as a low index dielectric. In addition SiO2 has a reststrahlen band in the 8-9.3Pm wavelength range. It was 
shown that the two bandgap phenomena can be combined and that the polaritonic gap can either be strengthened or made 
to vanish by choice of periodic structure.47 It is even possible to combine the two materials in a coating design to give 
low emittance in both atmospheric windows, 0.24 in MWIR and 0.38 in TIR, exploiting the structure gap for the former 
and the polaritonic gap for the latter.58 In between the windows the emissivity is mostly above 0.7. The polaritonic gap 
reflectance is reported to be robust, while the structure gap reflectance is sensitive to angle of incidence. The structure 
reflectance moves to shorter wavelengths and the polaritonic reflectance widens with angle of incidence.62 
Lately rather complex structured bandgap materials have been reported. Zhao et al. report on the possible performance of 
a one-dimensional, two defect modes, photonic crystal based on principles of Distributed Bragg Reflector microcavity††. 
The structure was modeled with the MWIR and LWIR-transparent materials, PbTe and Na3AlF6, as high refractive index 
and low refractive index materials respectively. This way it is possible to obtain a photon inhibiting, highly reflective, 
band cross the 1-20ȝm spectrum. At the same time, at 1.06ȝm and 10.6ȝm, the two microcavities cause spectral 
transmittance greater than 96%, i.e. at military laser wavelengths. The authors conclude that this performance will satisfy 
laser and infrared stealth in NIR, MWIR and LWIR.63 The material is far from being put to use, but the results show the 
potential in this line of development. 
Ribbing, however, explains that some promising results have been accomplished using photonic crystal as a component 
in a Multi-Spectral Camouflage Coating (MSCC) for ground applications as well as for aircraft applications‡‡. Nordin 

†† Defects in the periodic structure designed to be resonators at a very specific wavelength 
șșǡǦ
ǡʹͲͳͶ
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reported on this at a Swedish seminar on signature management in 2012.64§§ MSCC is a 2mm thick rubber-like decal in 
three layers, supplied by the meter. The bottom layer is for radar absorption, the middle layer is for IR and the topmost 
layer is for VIS and NIR. Decals of the MSCC are cut from the roll and glued directly to the surface of the platform. The 
presentation did not include performance details other than that the IR layer design is based on photonic crystal and that 
it has proved to be transparent for radar wavelengths. Results from characterization would be interesting. 
Summing up, one-dimensional structures, i.e. multilayer coatings, have at least three directions of development. 
Multilayer interference coatings are used to tailor bands of maximum reflectance or transmittance, and hence is one 
approach to better low emissive pigments. Another direction of development is so called bandgap materials, either 
natural polaritonic materials, or (periodic) structured bandgap materials. Their advantage is having bands of reflectance 
without being electrically conductive. However, it is still not clear how to apply them in a coating system. If applied as a 
decal they risk having a strongly angular dependent reflectance. A third direction of development is flexible and 
controllable electro-chromic devices utilizing conducting polymers, potentially applied as decals on military platforms. 
One-dimensional structures, however, run the risk of being glossy.  
3.3 Multidimensional structures 
In 1987 Yablonovitch and John published papers on how to control electromagnetic wave propagation in man-made 
periodic structures of dielectric media, later called Photonic Crystals (PhC). It was shown that, under certain structural 
symmetry conditions and a large enough ratio between refractive indices of the constituent dielectric materials, an energy 
band gap appears. The term (optical) band gap is used in analogy with electronic band gaps.65,66There may be gaps in the 
energy band structure of the crystal, meaning that electrons are prevented from propagating with certain energies in 
certain directions. If the lattice potential is strong enough, the gap can extend to cover all possible propagation directions, 
resulting in a complete band gap. The optical analogue is the PhC, in which the atoms or molecules are replaced by 
macroscopic media with differing dielectric constants, and the periodic potential is replaced by a periodic dielectric 
function. If the dielectric constants of the materials in the crystal are sufficiently different, and if the absorption of light 
by the materials is minimal, then the refractions and reflections of light from all of the various interfaces can produce 
many of the same phenomena for photons (light modes) that the atomic potential produces for electrons.͸͹The optical 
consequences are suppression of emission in the crystal and total reflectance of light in a wavelength region determined 
by the lattice constant of the structure and with a broadening corresponding to the band gap.One might also note that the 
preconditions for constructive interference in multilayer interference coatings and reflectance bands from photonic 
crystals show strong analogy. This would be why interference coatings are sometimes also called one-dimensional 
photonic crystals or structured band gap materials. Thus, a naïve approach to the theory of 3D photonic crystals would be 
to view them as a “3D interference” phenomenon. To conclude, the potential in 3D photonic crystals for spectral design 
is twofold. Firstly, to limit the angular dependence of emission, and secondly, the possibility of tailoring the spectral 
width and position of reflectance and transmittance bands using easy-to-come-by-and-process materials simply by tuning 
structure and symmetry.  
PhCs discussed at the beginning of the section are compounds of dielectrics. As early as 1996, though, Sigalas et al. 
pointed out features using metals. The materials would be much smaller in size and weight than the all dielectric 
photonic band gap materials, but would be absorbent.68 There is a continued interest in metallic PhCs and some reported 
applications in spectral design.69,70 
During the last half of the 1990s the manufacture and characterization of 3D PhCs developed from being possible at 
millimeter wavelengths to NIR.71–73 In 2006 Aliev et al. reported the successful fabrication of large surface areas of 3D 
PhCs optimized for high reflectivity in the MWIR and LWIR bands. The process involved self-assembling large SiO2 

ȚȚǣȀȀǤǤȀȀȀȀȀͲͻͲͺ͵ͳǤǡʹͲȀͲͺȀʹͲͳͶ
3URFRI63,(9RO< 
spheres, of 0.8 – 4.5Pm diameters, followed by melt infiltration with chalcogenide glass Ge33As12Se55 and removal of the 
SiO2 spheres by chemical etching.74 The title of the paper indicates fabrication of pigments, but this part of the process is 
not described. Characterization of a paint coating system with this kind of synthetic pigment would be very interesting, 
but to our knowledge nothing has been reported. 
Today, when doing literature search for PhCs, there is a vast amount of matching and very recent references, most with 
applications such as PhC-fibers, optical waveguides, components in efficient lasers and other. There are, however, a few 
authors reporting research into multispectral SMT. Albertoni et al. simulate a set of PhC structures and show the 
possibility of managing the flow of LWIR light around a target and how to control it in order to make a thermal photonic 
camouflage device. “The PhC is able to collect thermal light from the environment and transport it virtually on every 
point of the devices”. The authors state that these devices can be designed to change the reflection angle in order to 
camouflage the spatial signature of the target.75,76 Kadiyala et al. demonstrate, through optical modeling of polymerized 
colloidal crystalline array (PCCA) structures, a novel concept that has the potential to enable the use of tunable 3D 
photonic crystals for adaptive camouflage. The phenomenon used for tuning is photo-responsive isomerization. The 
wavelength shift reported using a diamond lattice structure of spheres surrounded with azobenzene polymer is only a few 
nanometers.  The authors state, however, that they will continue to optimize the model by varying different lattice 
parameters and material properties and that “the ultimate result of all such optimizations is to achieve an all angle 
adaptive camouflage coating”.77 
To summarize, there is extensive research on photonic crystals and the research for spectral design purposes could 
benefit. 3D PhC pigments have been realized using seemingly cost effective fabrication techniques, but the application in 
paint coating systems remains to be seen. There are results reported indicating that continued research on PhCs turns into 
research on Metamaterials (see next section) and advanced management of light rays. 
3.4 Biomimic and Metamaterials 
Environmental friendly non-fading brilliant colors seen on the feathers of some birds, and on the wings of butterflies, are 
due to structures and are thus called Structural Colors. The phenomenon was first observed and described by Hooke in 
“Micrographia” in 1665.78 There has been a vast number of studies since on the optical properties of multilayers in fish 
scales, on photonic structures in butterfly wings and on the iridescence from golden beetles etc., describing the structural 
colors, the photonic crystals and other optical surface properties in nature.79–86  
Structural coloration is based on the reflection of light while pigment coloration is a result of absorption. Structural 
colors can be both iridescent, when the color changes with viewing angle (interference or diffraction phenomena), and 
non-iridescent, when the color originates from scattering and structural irregularities. Sun et.al. have produced an 
excellent review of the different kinds of colors structures, and have also described attempts at mimicking.87 The 
coloration of mimicked structures will, as in the natural case, arise through common physical mechanisms such as thin 
film or multilayer interference, diffraction gratings, scattering (coherent and incoherent) and photonic crystals etc., 
depending on the composition of the building blocks.  
Biomimetics, introduced by Schmitt in 195788, is the art of mimicking structures, found in nature, to improve 
functionality in artificial devices and to find inspiration for novel applications.89,90 One example is butterfly wings. They 
have been used as a template for preparing replicas in the form of large area periodic ZrO2 structures for potential 
applications and integration in optical technology.91 Another example is the reflective scales on the wings of the butterfly 
Argyrophorus argenteus, which have broadband reflecting properties. Scaled-up replicas with thicknesses < 1m have 
been manufactured and investigated using microwaves.92 It has been suggested that the structures of cicada wings have a 
camouflage-like anti-reflection function93 and inorganic replicas of these structures, for use in solar cell applications, are 
now emerging.94  
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Tailored reflectance is desirable in SMT. Fractals as a concept was first introduced by Mandelbrot in the 1970s.95 A 
fractal is a fragmented geometric shape that is self-similar, i.e. when several parts shaped alike are put together, the new 
larger shape, looks like one of the smaller shapes. Fractal structures often have properties between random and ordered 
structures and can be of interest in obtaining broadband reflectance. Examples of structures closely resembling fractal 
structures are found in nature, these could include mountain ranges, river networks, coastlines, snowflakes, blood vessel 
systems and broccoli. 
Polarization is another important characteristic in SMT. Polarization is in fact important for the sight of birds and insects; 
the dung beetle needs to sense polarization for orientation,96 and there have been some studies of reflected light from the 
cuticles of beetles.97–99 Polarization properties vary between: specular reflection, polarizing light circularly, strong 
scattering of linear polarized light, preserving polarization and having depolarizing properties.99 Attempts to mimic 
polarization effects have also been exemplified by Sun et.al.87 
Controllability is yet another example of desirable features in SMT and several examples of dynamic colors exist in 
nature, for example in insects or squids. A color change can be caused by a variation in the photonic structure, in the 
angle of incident light, in index of refraction contrast, or other environmental stimuli such as humidity or temperature. 
Attempts to mimic are exemplified by Sun et.al.87 
In biology structures with double functionalities are common. One example is the combination of an optical 
characteristic and water repelling function, such as the anti-reflective eyes of a moth. Inspired by this, Askar et.al have 
shown how the hydrophobicity of a substrate surface can be enhanced and self-cleaning AR coatings developed, using 
structures of nanopillars with high aspect ratio properties. These coatings can be useful in improving conversion 
efficiency and reducing glare in optical devices.100 
In biology simple materials are used. The most abundant and complex structures found in nature, chitin, cellulose and 
chlorophyll, are built from combinations of carbon, oxygen and hydrogen. The microstructure of chitin, for example, is, 
however, the origin for iridescent colors of butterflies and insects, which in turn have inspired the development of future 
photonic structure materials.10194102 In the laboratory environment, on the other hand, very complex materials are created, 
but often in very simple structures. Nevertheless, with the development in nanotechnology and manufacturing, and with 
inspiration from nature, future combinations of complex materials and advanced structures are assessed to have great 
potential – for example, in spectral design for SMT. 
Two examples are chosen to show the potential in nano-composites for camouflage. Chun et al. deposit a nanocomposite 
coating of Ni-P-CB on an ABS plastic matrix and show that it has low infrared emissivity.103 Wang shows how improved 
microwave absorption in a wide band, combined with low infrared emissivity, can be achieved by incorporating TiO2 or 
Al2O3 into an ordered mesoporous structure of carbon.Besides good impedance matching, the large surface area and 
tunable pore-size make it an interesting material for a vast range of applications. Wang et al. suggest using it for 
simultaneous microwave absorption and infrared camouflage.104,105 
Metamaterials are often described as artificial structures appearing as a material at some frequency range, with properties 
that cannot be found in nature. The properties of metamaterials are gained from the structure instead of the material. 
Applications range from perfect or super-focusing lenses, antennas, all-optical memories and gradient-index materials to 
“invisibility” cloaking. Even though total invisibility is impossible, the reduction of both optical and acoustic visibility is 
important in general terms for signature reduction. However, today, optical metamaterials at visible wavelengths are 
extremely thin and rather glossy, which means the synthesis is rather challenging.106 
To some extent military signature management and space applications are alike; functionality is needed in a harsh 
environment. Venancio et.al, have presented an excellent list of classification of metamaterial with promising properties 
for space applications, from surfaces with anti-reflection to absorbent properties, sub-diffraction imaging properties and 
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materials with polarization control functions and lastly, spectral properties for filtering and for dichroic properties. They 
suggest further studies on following functionalities and metamaterials for space application: An absorber for stray-light 
baffling using low-density arrays of long nanotubes and polarization scrambling using either 1D meander structure or 
double mesh structures.107 
An important part of research, in order to understand and concretize future advanced structures, such as multispectral 
camouflage, is modeling and simulation. A few examples of theoretical modeling of metamaterials deal with anti-
reflection properties108, modification of radiation characteristics75, tunable photonic bandgaps for electromagnetic 
invisibility cloaks76 and high-absorption surfaces109. Thanks to improvements in micro and nano-technology some are 
even experimentally verified. Realization of large surface area lithographic methods, for example micro contact printing 
or nano-imprint, is enabled through the use of realistic geometrics for the structures, such as metallic cross grating or 
perforated plates.108 Chen has produced an excellent overview and has also theoretically and practically studied the 
feasibility and implementation of mantle cloaks for 1-3D objects.110 He found them beneficial for invisibility and 
camouflage applications because they reduce the overall visibility. 
Today limited bandwidth, losses and imperfections severely limit current metamaterial cloaks. A low profile of an ultra-
thin mantle cloak improves bandwidth limitations; however, little or nothing is said about the robustness to losses. Often 
theoretical simulations show promising results that are difficult to realize due to imperfections.  
To summarize, functionality in nature is, to a large extent, based on complex structures and a lot can be mimicked to find 
new and effective or multifunctional design solutions, not least in spectral design. There is potential in being able to 
combine the complex structures of nature with the complex materials of material science. Great challenges remain to 
overcome problems regarding bandwidth and losses at short frequencies.  
A final note, the categorization of materials and structure concepts used in this paper is not perfect, as there are materials 
and structures that might fit into several categories. There are trends also in materials and structures research it seems.  
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An overview of materials, surface structures and coating principles of potential interest for signature management 
applications using spectral design is presented. In order to limit the scope of the survey, the desired properties used as 
indicators were derived from optical multispectral camouflage, i.e. applications requiring low contrast with the 
background. The major trends and areas of development are covered, but a systematic review proved to be too ambitious 
for the space available in this paper, and some potentially interesting research areas, like for instance graphene or 
mimicking shape shifting surfaces from biology, have been left out. 
The results are structured in order of increasing complexity, where challenges within one order of complexity could be 
regarded a driving force within the next. The starting point is developments in paint coating systems. It is regarded as the 
basic, traditional, technology for signature management since it is relatively easy to apply, protective properties can be 
built in and it is fairly cheap. The challenge is to combine pigments and binders in a system where the properties of the 
components create a synergetic optical response throughout the spectrum from VIS to TIR. Pigments and binders used 
for a narrower spectrum are absorbent (emissive) in thermal infrared and hence cannot meet an optically multispectral 
threat. The best coatings found are based on coated flake pigments of aluminum. Adhesion, high reflectivity in the 
visible spectrum and a tendency to form electrically conductive coatings, which disturb the radar signature, are 
remaining challenges.  
Here multilayered structures are regarded as the second order of complexity. Breaking metal based multilayers into 
pigments is one approach to tailoring the reflectivity, but no paint coating system reported yet meets the potential of the 
respective components. Another approach is using non-conducting bandgap materials in layers, either naturally 
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polaritonic materials, structured bandgap materials (also called one-dimensional photonic crystals) or a combination 
thereof. Using multi-layered structures it is possible to create electro-chromic coatings, making the transmittance 
controllable to a certain extent across interesting optical wavelengths. This latter technique is assessed to have potential 
through the use of suitably pixel-sized decals on military platforms, maybe in combination with other coating systems. 
One foreseeable challenge is gloss. 
The optical response of any one-dimensional structure is, however, bound to be dependent on the angle of incidence of 
irradiating light, which is why there is great interest in the development of structured bandgap materials in three 
dimensions, so called 3D photonic crystals. The advantage expected is not being dependent on rare properties of specific 
materials, but instead being able to tailor reflectance bands by tuning the size of a periodic structure, using suitable 
materials easier to obtain or process. Photonic crystals for infrared wavelengths have been reported, but there are no 
reports yet, to our knowledge, on the characterization of a coating system for signature management.  
Our fourth order of complexity is biomimic and metamaterials. To learn more about the properties of complex structures 
many researchers are now turning to biology. In biology there are examples of interesting optical properties, such as age-
resistant and environmentally friendly colors, originating from complex structures made out of relatively simple 
materials. Laboratories report advanced material combinations, albeit in relatively simple structures. Consequently, there 
is potential in combining advanced materials with complex structures from nature, and developments in nano-technology 
show great promise. Hopefully it will be possible to combine properties and satisfy military requirements for surfaces 
other than the optical response, such as dirt resistance, thereby increasing the military utility of spectral design. 
None of the reports found have studied all six of the desired characteristics of a multispectral optical coating for 
signature management. Gloss is sometimes mentioned indirectly, but without being quantified. Often only the specular or 
integrated reflectance is reported. In research on biomimetics and metamaterials there are reports on polarization 
properties, but only, it seems, because the application is related to antennas. Characterization of optical coatings in the 
radar wavelength range was only found in one report. Either, there is still a lack of interest in studying multispectral 
properties, or the correct nomenclature was not used when probing for results, or these areas are classified. There is, 
however, a great interest in low emissive coatings in the civilian energy sector or, militarily, for heat control or space 
applications. Most coatings are assessed only to have controllability when designed, and could be used for static 
signature systems. Controllability for near real-time applications may be obtained using electro-chromic devices based 
on conducting polymers, or further in the future using tunable 3D photonic crystal. 
In summary there are no ready-made solutions to optically multispectral, spectral design coatings for signature 
management. There are, however, promising ideas about how to move forward, which is why spectral design is assessed 
to have continued great potential. The utility of spectral design is also assessed to benefit from research into other 
applications and from commercial interest in nano-technology, boosted, for example, by the electronics, construction and 
energy industries.  
5. FUTURE WORK
Based on the conclusions of the results reported, there is obviously great interest in continuing research into advanced 
materials and structures, and their characterization. There are, however, few results reported on applied spectral design 
coatings for signature management. It would be interesting, from a military utility point of view, to learn more about how 
the different approaches to spectral design could be combined in applied coatings – and what properties these structures 
could have. A first step must be learning more about how to model the optical behavior of such a compound coating 
system, with multiple materials in complex structures – both in order to be able to design usable coatings meeting 
functional requirements, and to put relevant functional requirements on spectral design.  
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This also highlights a second research area of great interest. What are the requirements of military coatings applied to 
platforms, uniforms or other systems? Without specific requirements the true military utility of spectral design, the 
performance achieved by coatings, and related research, cannot be assessed. Therefore, in order to spend limited military 
R&D funding more effectively, and to meet more quickly the survivability requirements of signature management 
systems from an increased threat, there is a need to study the balancing process depicted in the introduction. There is a 
need to understand or develop the process of how to assess the military utility of advances in spectral design, and in the 
other direction, how to get from desired military utility to the relevant requirements of spectral design. The work 
presented here forms one end of the process and recent work111 on the concept of military utility forms the other. Using 
this concept the military utility of signature management applied to a system, e.g. a combat vehicle, is considered to be a 
compound measurement of its military effectiveness, its suitability to the military capability system concerned, and its 
affordability.  
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a b s t r a c t
A concept called Military Utility is proposed for the study of the use of technology in military operations.
The proposed concept includes a three-level structure representing key features and their detailed
components. On basic level the Military Utility of a technical system, to a military actor, in a speciﬁc
context, is a compound measure of the military effectiveness, of the assessed technical system's suit-
ability to the military capability system and of the affordability. The concept is derived through con-
ceptual analysis and is based on related concepts used in social sciences, the military domain and
Systems Engineering. It is argued that the concept has qualitative explanatory powers and can support
military decision-making regarding technology in forecasts, defense planning, development, utilization
and the lessons learned process. The suggested concept is expected to contribute to the development of
the science of Military-Technology and to be found useful to actors related to defense.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
For Clausewitz, in his masterly analysis of the mental and physical
spheres of war, neglected the material–man's tools. If he thereby
ensured to his work an enduring permanence, he also, if unwit-
tingly, ensured permanent injury to subsequent generations who
allowed themselves to forget that the spirit cannot win battles
when the body has been killed through failure to provide it with
up-to-date weapons [1,p.158].
New requirements and challenges are born from strained mili-
tary budgets and a rapidly changing world, as well as from the fact
that the time when the military industry was in the forefront of
technological development has passed in most areas. In Sweden,
and probably in most other democratic states, the question of how
limited resources should be put to best use is more relevant than
ever before. In general, a military system is complex and already its
early life cycle stages, from R&D to initial operation, span over
several years and often a decade. After that a typical platform on
land, at sea or in the air has an operational lifetime of perhaps thirty
years or more. Hence, decisions today may inﬂuence warﬁghting
capacity for decades.
Our ﬁrst case of a decision situation is the technology forecast.
Even before the technical system is born as a concept, armed forces
have to make decisions about what technologies to invest their
limited R&D budget in. This means there is a need to forecast and
predict the utility of technologies as part of a potential technical
system in some far away uncertain future.
The second case is defense planning. In short to midterm defense
planning, i.e. the next ten-year period, decision makers are faced
with the question of when and with what technical systems to
replace those currently in operation, while keeping within budget
restraints. Furthermore it has to be done taking requirements from
interdependent capabilities and foreseen doctrinal, tactical and
organizational development into accounteoptimizing the whole
capability system.
The third case is development. Once in the concept, development
and production life cycle stages of a technical system, the question
of how to build a technical system of maximum utility to the
customer, the armed forces, within a limited time frame and
budget, is addressed using requirement management within the
systems engineering process.
The fourth case is use. In the utilization and support stage of a
materiel system,military commanders and their staffs plan the best
use of their limited resources in order to maximize the probability
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of mission success. Concretely, during planning, a staff is typically
required to assess what capability systems, i.e. units and technol-
ogy, the opponent is likely to use based on their strengths and
vulnerabilities. Assessing own strengths and weaknesses in the
situation the staff is likewise asked to recommend the best use of
own available capabilities, not least based on expected technical
performance.
The ﬁfth case regards lessons learned. This is the long-term re-
view of systems and capabilities throughout all stages from tech-
nology forecast, development, defense planning and use. The
lessons learned process must be executed in close collaboration
with the system stakeholder in order to be accurate in validation of
system performance and capability but also to be accurate in the
time domain helping decision makers get near-real time informa-
tion regarding the utility development of the system-in-focus.
In light of the above illustrated incentives for competence in
decision making, Military-technology is developing as an academic
subject at the Swedish National Defence University, SEDU, deﬁned
as:
“Military- Technology is the science which describes and ex-
plains how technology inﬂuences military activity at all levels
and how the profession of an ofﬁcer affects and is affected by
technology” [2].
It seems, though, that in every project similar analytic con-
structs have to be deﬁned over and over with moderate adjust-
ments to application. And evidently there are similarities between
central questions in all the presented use cases from decision sit-
uations above. But, is it then possible to form a common theory, to
support decision-making regarding use of technology in military
affairs, from R&D investments to military operational planning? A
more complete Military Technology conceptual apparatus would
make it easier to relate to theories across academia, e.g. to eco-
nomics or management sciences. It would certainly aid effective
communication across disciplines within the defense community,
i.e. between actors within military research agencies, the armed
forces, procurement agencies and industry.
With this paper we intend to propose a concept with potential
for both qualitative and quantitative analysis to support decision-
making in military technology. The concept is named Military
Utility. The starting point is a presentation of the postulates of
Military Technology and the theory of concept analysis. After that
an applied method for concept analysis is presented followed by a
description of the resulting concept. The center of gravity is the
following discussion on the concept dimensions and indicators. The
paper ends with an example, ﬁnal conclusions and proposed future
work.
2. Military-technology
The technology the military profession chooses, and how it uses
that technology, will affect the outcome on the battleﬁeld and the
sustainment of capabilities over time. This phenomenon is at the
centre of interest here. Our viewpoint originates from postulates in
military-technology [3]: the character of war change in pace with
the development of technology, technology has inﬂuence on all
military command levels, and a lack of understanding of technology
causes diminishing military opportunities. Consequently, for an
analyst in military-technology it is essential to understand what is
important to the military decision-makerei.e. what constitutes
military utility?
In an article on the military-technological perspective on
Geographical Information Systems, Åke Sivertun ﬁnds that maxi-
mizing military utility, (translated from Swedish “Milit€ar nytta”) of
the technology, is the core question. He stipulates a deﬁnition of the
conceptehow to in an effective way and at a minimum cost, in
human life as well asmateriel, reach themilitarymission objectives
[4]. This deﬁnition is here regarded as a ﬁrst iteration of the
concept.
Military-technology is cross-disciplinary covering engineering
as well as both natural and social sciences. The terminology used
originates from these and the aim is to propose a concept in har-
mony with the use of related concepts within these disciplines.
Coming from a Systems Engineering tradition viewing problem
phenomena as Systems is fundamental. A System should be un-
derstood as “an integrated set of elements, subsystems, or assem-
blies that accomplish a deﬁned objective. These elements include
products (hardware, software, ﬁrmware), processes, people, infor-
mation, techniques, facilities, services, and other support elements”
[5]. In the military domain, Capability is a key concept. Our un-
derstanding of capability is that it is being able to do something and
being able to do it well [3]. With Military capability an actor can
solve military tasks and thereby achieve desired effects. Using a
systemic approach military capability can be viewed as a system
composed of interacting elements, as thoroughly discussed by
Jukka Anteroinen [6]. We can choose to sort these elements into
categories of Personnel, Organization, Methods and Technology
(POMT) or into Doctrine, Organization, Training, Personnel, Mate-
riel, Facilities, Leadership and Interoperability (DOTPMLFI), as in
NATO publications. Regardless of categorizationwe realize that any
component in a system, e.g. the technology element, has de-
pendencies to other elements. Hence, a component has military
utility only if it is viewed as a contributing element in a Capability
system.
The preﬁx Technical system is used to label the technical
element in an operational military capability system when it is
beneﬁcial to view the element in itself as a system. In this paper the
object for the assessment is an element in the capability system and
it is labeled the Element of Interest (EoI), following the Systems
Engineering tradition.
3. Concepts development and concept analysis
The above identiﬁed need for a concept is based on the view of
them fulﬁlling several important functions within the scientiﬁc
community. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias states that a
concept: provides a common language; provides a perspective to
understand the phenomena; allows classiﬁcation and categoriza-
tion of different phenomena and; ﬁnally, it is the fundamental
building block of theories [7,p.28]. Goertz submits that concepts are
essential theories about ontology [8,p.5]. Govanni Sartori even
claims that “concepts are not only elements of a theoretical system but
equally tools for fact-gathering, data containers” [9]. A conclusion is
that how a concept is designed constitutes not only the building
blocks of theories, but also affects how the phenomena are
measured and examined. Concept analysis is a process where the
characteristics as well as the relations to other relevant concepts
aremade clear. It can be argued that in ﬁelds directly connected to a
profession the need of concept analysis increases. A comparison can
be made to nursing science where concepts analysis has a given
role and where several methods have been developed [10].
There is a lack of lexical deﬁnition of the phenomena indicating
that the concept is underdeveloped. Two approaches can be used in
support of concept development. One is traditional Concept Anal-
ysis where the aim is to capture how the concept is used. The other
approach is to focus on the phenomena, developing the concept,
sometimes referred to as Concept Formation. Which approach is
used is primarily dependent on the purpose of the concept in
question. The difference between developing a concept for broader
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usage, through concept analysis, and providing a stipulative deﬁ-
nition of a word is minimal according to Goertz [8,p.3].
There is a fundamental difference in views on concepts, and how
to measure them. Goertz and Mahoney conclude that quantitative
scholars primarily “use indicators and the aggregation of the in-
dicators that are causes or cause the concepts” [11] to construct the
concept in question. Qualitative scholars on the other hand use a
semantic process identifying the attributes that constitutes the
concept. Goertz and Mahoney argue that which approach to use
depends onwhether reliability or validity is central for the research
in question. Since, in most cases, we cannot choose one over the
other, we need a method to build concepts that both capture a
speciﬁc phenomenon and allow measurement with a level of reli-
ability permitting a systematic comparative and causal analysis
[11].
Since this study aims to ﬁnd a concept aiding communication in
the discourse of military technology and supporting evaluation of
artifacts we ﬁnd Goertz's ontological, causal and realist approach to
concept analysis beneﬁcial. Goertz's view of concept analysis has
been used in several different papers, e.g. Belich (2011) [12] and in
Rapkin and Braaten (2009) [13]. How to operationalize the concept
in a framework for evaluation of any given EoI is left for future
work.
Goertz advocates structuring concepts in multiple levels, or at
minimum three levels, much like Sartori's “ladder” [9]. Below the
basic level, i.e. the concept labelling the phenomena, a secondary
level consisting of the concept dimensions is formed. When for
example Arat, in 1991, states that democracy consists of ‘partici-
pation’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘coerciveness’ he deﬁnes the consti-
tutive three dimensions of the concept democracy at the secondary
level. The next level down Goertz calls the indicator- or the data
level. The intention of this level is to operationalize, i.e. to identify
speciﬁc measures of how to decidewhether a studied phenomenon
falls under the concept, or to what degree. For the concept to be
complete it has to describe how to combine indicators to form the
secondary level dimensions and how to combine secondary level
dimensions to get the basic level concept. Goertz concludes that
“the basic and secondary levels are really the theory of the concept,
while the indicator level is the connection to measures and data
collection” [8,pp.5e10].
Several guidelines exist on how to conduct Concept Analysis
[14]. The methods, however, take on the form of checklists rather
than a structured and stringent research method usually required
for reliability within academic work. The subsequent concept
analysis was conducted roughly according to the guidelines pro-
vided by Goertz [8,Ch.2]. Goertz's guidelines have similarities to
Sartori's ten rules for concepts analysis as well as to part ofWalker's
and Avant's method [10].
At the basic level the negative pole of the concept is analysed
and it is also determined whether the concept as such is to be
considered dichotomous or continuous. At the secondary level,
the dimensions are listed and all necessary conditions are
explicitly given. At the indicator level the theoretical relationship
between the basic and the secondary level are clariﬁed. Ac-
cording to Goertz's guidelines the causal relationship between
the different levels should be examined at the indicator level. In
our work generic indicators are suggested. But since the identi-
ﬁcation of detailed indicators is closely connected to construct-
ing a more formal theory or framework this level will be further
investigated in future research, for example theory building case
studies.
In accordance with Sartori's eighth rule a search for related
concepts was performed in the ﬁelds of War Studies and Systems
Engineering (SE). The rule states that when selecting the term that
designates the concept, it needs to be related to and controlled
against the “semantic ﬁeld to which the terms belong” [9]. For this
text the tentative concepts were identiﬁed using an initial common
requirement from the cases used in the introduction: a measure of
the concept should support an Armed Forces's decision about
which candidate for an EoI to choose, seen as a component in a
capability system, while balancing desired effect against limited
resources.
The analysis evolved in a series of seminars held at the SNDU
Division of Military Technology during an extended period of time.
4. The concept of military utility
The concept analysis resulted in a proposed concept labeled
“Military Utility”; where the conceptual deﬁnition is captured in a
Goertz-diagram, see Fig. 1.
An assessment of Military Utility requires knowledge of three
situational variables: the Element of Interest, the Military Actor and
a speciﬁed Context. The Military Actor being any part of a military
organization having military capabilities and organizational
objectives.
Military Utility consists of three dimensions: Military Effective-
ness, Military Suitability and Affordability. These are not substitut-
able. That is, for an Element of Interest to have Military Utility to a
Military Actor it has to be effective, suitable and affordable to that
Military Actor in a speciﬁed Context.
Military Effectiveness is a measure of the overall ability to
accomplish a mission when the EoI is used by representative
personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational
employment of the military force. Military Effectiveness is oper-
ationalized using measures of the degree to which the mission
objectives are, or can be expected to be, fulﬁlled. There are four
substitutable indicators at this level, mirroring different characters
of objectives: Compliance to desired outcomes, schedule, cost and
risk. Desired outcomes constitute the purpose of the mission.
Schedule, cost and risk objectives are boundary conditions.
Military Suitability is the degree to which an EoI can be satis-
factorily placed in military use in a speciﬁed context with consid-
eration to interaction with other elements of the capability system.
Military Suitability in turn is operationalized using measures of the
degree to which the EoI ﬁts together with other elements of the
resulting capability. In the model above, indicators corresponding
to TEPIDOIL (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Con-
cepts and Doctrine, Organization, Information and Logistics) illus-
trate possible elements on this level. The indicators are chosen from
an analysis of the situational variables.
Affordability is a measure of compliance to the maximum re-
sources a military actor has allocated to the EoI in a time frame
deﬁned by the context. Affordability is operationalized using LCC
(Life Cycle Cost), TOC (Total Life Cycle Cost) or other measures of
ownership cost and allocated resources in the budget.
5. Dimensions and indicators
The Military Utility concept should support a stakeholder's
decision-making concerning the use of technology in military
activities. The concept is hence typically to be used to answer
generic questions like: Is there Military Utility in this emerging
technology? OreWhat is the Military Utility of system X compared to
system Y? OreHow should this technical system be used to maximize
Military Utility? In this section a discussion on the constituent
parts of the concept, i.e. the dimensions and indicators, is pre-
sented capturing the most important argumentation from the
concept development seminars. The starting point is, however, the
top most level and a discussion on the input to an assessment, the
situational variables.
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5.1. Military utilityeBasic level
‘Utility’ was considered a plausible best ﬁt to the proposed
concept, since it is used throughout the three domains covered by
military-technology with a general sense of supporting decisions.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, Utility means “the state of
being useful, proﬁtable, or beneﬁcial” [15]. The word has, according
to the Oxford Political Dictionary, transformed from a general sense
of Usefulness and has today a more speciﬁc meaning when used in
social science [16]. Its primary meaning in economics is the
cognitive process that leads to a decision to choose one thing over
another. In the military domain, according to the American Glos-
sary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, Utility is deﬁned as
“The state or quality of being useful militarily or operationally.
Designed for or possessing a number of useful or practical purposes
rather than a single, specialized one.” [17] This deﬁnition indicates
that the multipurpose aspect is essential. However, this does not
always have to be true in our intended application, at least not
when the artifact or technical system is analyzed within a given
environment. If, on the other hand, the purpose or the context in
which the artifact is going to be used is unknown, the multipurpose
criterion becomes more relevant. In the Systems Engineering (SE)
domain the closest ﬁt is a deﬁnition of Operational Utility, “the
degree to which the system in focus enables users to accomplish
organizational missions and achieve stated goals and objectives,
while posing no unacceptable safety, environment or health haz-
ards or risks to its operators or public” [18,p.50]. There is however a
need to develop the limited resources dimension and to specify the
concept from a speciﬁcally military organizational viewpoint.
There are other related concepts plausible for the basic level.
‘Value’, used in SE or ‘Value Engineering’ [5,p.36], has a focus on a
supplierecustomer relation and is therefore not suitable. The
concept is also too intertwinedwithmonetary proﬁt [19] to be used
as is. SE concepts like ‘Operational Effectiveness’ [17] or ‘Cost
Effectiveness’ [18] were discarded because they are considered
special cases of Military Utility. ‘System Acceptability’ [18] was
discarded since it is considered to be deﬁned from a supplier's
perspective.
Faced with a problem concerning military utility we argue that
an analyst ﬁrst has to ﬁnd the answers to three questions: What is
the System of Interest?; Who is the military actor using it?; and in
what context is it used? These are referred to as the three situa-
tional variables.
5.1.1. What is the Element of Interest?
From a military-technology viewpoint an assessed object has
military utility only if it is viewed as a contributing component in a
capability system. Consequently, if wewant to assess the utility of a
technical system we will have to analyze the effects produced by
the whole capability system, i.e. when asked what the military
utility is of this or that artifact an analyst always has to askeas an
element of what capability system?
If we use a ﬁeld artillery unit as a system example, the resulting
military utility of one unit is dependent on the capability system
that it is a part of. The technical speciﬁcation is one factor as well as
the military context. Field artillery is a highly demanding weapon
system regarding ammunition and intelligence. To obtain military
utility during a battle the artillery gun needs a functional logistic
system as well as a functional communication system between the
target acquisition system and the ﬁre unit (e.g. an artillery obser-
vation team). The artillery gun does not exist in a vacuum and
therefore its utility cannot be assessed as a single unit. The ability of
Fig. 1. The resulting Military utility concept modeled in a Goertz-diagram.
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the crew to operate the gun, the ability to receive and understand
information regarding the location of the target, the ability to
maintain ammunition and spare parts during combat are all
needed to receive any utility.
Another consequence of the system approach is that the
component of military technological interest is not always the
technical element itself but an element interacting with the tech-
nical element, e.g. the doctrine or the organization. This is for
instance the case when developing and evaluating new ways of
how to use existing materiel resources. An analyst typically com-
pares the effect delivered by alternative systems as a whole but
keeps the technical system unchanged and alternates the doctrine
or the tactical procedures.
A technology, on the other hand, underpins system performance
but cannot really be viewed as a system element in itself. Therefore,
in order to forecast the military utility of a technology, using the
proposed deﬁnition, an analyst has to ﬁrst apply the technology to a
technical system, which then in turn is viewed as an element in a
capability system. A challenge is that the same technology could
appear in multiple technical systems. Furthermore, the more
generic the technology is, e.g. miniaturization of electronics, the
more difﬁcult it will become for an analyst to assess the military
utility with any precision. Such an assessment is probably done
supporting decision-makers on strategic level, where the technol-
ogy can be seen having inﬂuence on a wide range of systems.
5.1.2. Who is the military actor using the EoI?
The preﬁx “Military” is used to signal the use of the concept to
support military decision-makersehaving military capabilities,
goals and objectives. As a consequence the military utility of a
technical system is not the same for all user organizations, since
they have neither the same capability systems to integrate the EoI
into, nor the same goals or objectives.
As an example, only a few of the richest nations in the world can
afford to have specially designed aircrafts for all types of missions.
For example, the US stealth aircraft F-117 Nighthawk proved to be
valuable to the coalition forces during the First Gulf War in
1990e1991 [20,21]. It had a modest payload capacity and a limited
maneuverability but was designed for low probability of intercept
(LPI). The F-117 was used for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
and Command and Control facilities. The Swedish Armed Forces on
the other hand, prioritizing the defense of Swedish territory, has
chosen the JAS39 Gripen multipurpose aircraft. It is designed to
balance the requirements from air defense, air to ground as well as
reconnaissance missions. In order to fulﬁll those requirements the
LPI concept has to be balanced as well. Hence, though the military
utility of the F-117 was great to the coalition forces during the First
GulfWar it is safe to conclude that themilitary utility of the F-117 to
the SwAF would be small. It is only rational to have highly
specialized military means if you have the overall capacity to shape
the battleﬁeld in favor of that capability.
A military organization is hierarchical and composed of units at
different levels,1 with different tasks and objectives. In our pro-
posed deﬁnition of the concept it is for example possible to ﬁnd
that the military utility of a EoI is great at the tactical level while at
the same time small at the operational or strategic levels. One
example is assessing the military utility of a patrol vehicle in an
expeditionary mission. A tracked and armored personnel vehicle is
perhaps the ﬁrst choice of the land component commander
whereas transportability and maintainability weigh in favor of a
soft skinwheeled vehicle at an operational or strategic level. Hence,
if the military utility concept were only to be used at the highest
organizational level it would not be useful for supporting assess-
ments and discussions within the military organization. Conse-
quently, the military technology analyst has to identify not only the
military organization, but also to what service, unit or task force
within that organization the EoI should be of use. At higher com-
mand levels the Military Utility at lower command levels will have
to be included, though, making this a more complex assessment. It
should be possible to add an attribute to the concept to mark this
distinction, e.g. military warﬁghting utility, military tactical utility,
military operational utility, military strategic utility etc.
Finally, the proposed concept is designed from a military actor
point of view. Thus, it can be used by the Armed Forces to support
decision-making within their organization, but also to understand
the capabilities of other military actors. This point of view also
makes it useful to other actors supporting military organizations,
since when discussing military utility there is no question of who
the stakeholders are. When used by, for example, procurement
agencies or the industry, the concept should be understood as being
their assessment of the utility from a speciﬁc military actor's point
of view.
5.1.3. In what context is the EoI used?
From the discussion of the ”for what?” and ”for whom?” aspects
of Military Utility it is already clear that an analyst needs to un-
derstand a military actor's purpose for using the EoI and the status
of the surrounding capability system to make an assessment. A
military purpose is typically composed of military objectives stated
within a mission planned for a speciﬁc operational environment.
Hence, in order to assess the military utility of an EoI, within a
capability system, an analyst has to account for all (or the most
important) situational variables that inﬂuence the military actor's
ability to be successful in the speciﬁc context, such as opposing
forces' capabilities, climate, terrain, international law etc., i.e. the
assessed Military Utility of an EoI only has meaning if related to the
planned useeeither expressed as requirements on the EoI planned
contribution to military capabilities or within a planned mission.
5.1.4. Concept level measurement considerations
Bernoulli assumed already in the 18th century through the St
Petersburg paradox that maximizing an individual's income is not
the same as maximizing the utility (Bernoulli 1738) [22]. The utility
one person can have of a speciﬁed amount of money is conse-
quently not the same as that of the next person. If using the tax-
onomy proposed by Stevens [23] on types of scales, i.e. the nominal,
the ordinal, the interval, or the ratio scale, Bernoulli thereby also
showed that utility cannot be measured on a ratio or interval scale.
Neither can the Military Utility be a linearly proportional
product of the number of EoI units available to a military actor, e.g.
two JAS39 Gripens do not double the amount of military utility
compared to one. The system in which the speciﬁc EoI exist offers
constraints as well as possibilities. In economics this is called the
law of diminishing marginal utility (also known as Gossen's ﬁrst
law) [24]. This demonstrates that the military utility curve has a
roof where no more utility can be gained from the system without
external changes. When some kind of cost dimension is included,
there is a tipping point regarding the maximum utility gained from
X number of units. The example of the ﬁeld artillery can be used
again. The military utility of artillery is related to the combined
armed forces. Having two artillery battalions when there is only
one company of infantry in the operation area is not a maximum
use of resources, and therefore the military utility of the artillery is
limited. Military Utility consequently needs to be in relation to
something, another alternative or a minimum status quo.
1 Top down the levels in a military command hierarchy are usually referred to as:
the strategic, the military-strategic, the operative, the tactical and the war-ﬁghting
levels.
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When making choices, ranking one option over another, it is
often desirable to compile the result of the evaluation process into
one number, a scalar assessment. It seems reasonable to say that if
having technical system ‘A’ available in a given context, as
compared to having technical system ‘B’, yields a slightly better
chance of achieving stated goals (assuming they come to the same
cost). System A has arguably greater Military Utility than system B
in this context and hence a continuous scale can be applied to the
concept. Correspondingly, in a scenario where two alternatives
yield the same probability of success but one comes at a lesser
costethat alternative has the greater military utility. Examining the
scale further we ﬁnd that an alternative EoI that yields no better
probability of achieving the organizational goals than status quo,
nor at a lower cost, should be considered ‘useless’. And since there
are probably even worse choices a decision-maker can make there
is evidently a negative pole to military utility, i.e. ‘inutility’ or even
‘harm’.
5.2. Military UtilityeSecondary level
5.2.1. Military effectiveness dimension
The ﬁrst dimension of a utility concept has to account for the
purpose of using the assessed EoI at all, i.e. the military mission.
Hence, it is only meaningful to discuss military utility if the capa-
bility, to which the EoI contributes, has any potential of being
effective in a given context.
In the SE and Military Domain Operational Effectiveness is a
“Measure of the overall ability of a system to accomplish a mission
when used by representative personnel in the environment plan-
ned or expected for operational employment of the system
considering organization, doctrine, tactics, supportability, surviv-
ability, vulnerability, and threat” [17,18]. Wasson explains this
concept as the requirement of a system to be able to support mis-
sions “to a level of performance that makes it operationally effec-
tive in terms of accomplishing organizational goals and objectives,
namely outcomes, cost, schedule, and risk” [18]. That is, achieving
an effect is usually not enough for a system to be operationally
effective, the effect must be delivered at the right time and at the
right cost and at acceptable level of risk.
The Preﬁx “Operational” signals that the measure is assessed
when the EoI is used operationally in the context for which it was
intended, not to be confused with operations performed at a joint
command level. As stated earlier the military utility of an EoI has to
be assessed separately at different command levels. This logic still
holds if using Effectiveness at the secondary level, since an EoI can
have different effects on the different objectives at different com-
mand levels. The preﬁx is however changed to ‘Military' Effec-
tiveness, to make it clear that this dimension is assessed from a
military perspective as well as to broaden the scope of use to any
command level.
The deﬁnition of operational effectiveness is assessed assuming
the best possible ﬁt of the EoI into the capability system, using
trained and experienced personnel, applying the capability ac-
cording to the doctrine and the plan etc. As a consequence the
Military Effectiveness dimension mirrors the full potential of the
EoI. Hence, a possible mismatch between the EoI and interacting
elements of the capability has to be accounted for in another
dimension (See Suitability). Another consequence is that there is an
implied best possible doctrine supporting the plan. Hence, when
assessing an entirely new technology or revolutionary technical
system an analyst ﬁrst has to assume a new tentative doctrine
bringing out the potential in the EoI.
Furthermore, since the concept is aimed to be open to oper-
ationalization, it is not beneﬁcial in the deﬁnition to specify all
factors that possibly affect Military Effectiveness. Consequently
consideration of “organization, doctrine, tactics …” etc. has to be
done at lower levels of the concept model. In summary the Military
Effectiveness dimension is a measure of the overall ability to accom-
plish a mission when the EoI is used by representative personnel in the
environment planned or expected for operational employment of the
military force.
5.2.2. Military suitability dimension
The second dimension of Military Utility produces the means to
analyze the relation between the EoI and the other elements of the
capability system.
In the SE and Military Domain Operational Suitability is “The
degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in ﬁeld use
with consideration to reliability, availability, compatibility, trans-
portability, interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintainability,
safety, human factors, habitability, manpower supportability, lo-
gistics supportability, documentation, environmental effects and
training requirements” [17,18]. In consequence Operational Suit-
ability answers the question of how well suited a system is to a
speciﬁc application for a particular user in a given operating envi-
ronment. Thus, it can be used to characterize how well the EoI ﬁts
within this user's existing capability system, or howwell it ﬁts after
development. The Preﬁx “Operational” is exchanged with ‘Military’
with the same logic as above.
Some degree of Military Suitability is necessary for an EoI to
have any Military Utility. An EoI with low suitability to the other
components in the Armed Forces capability systemwould arguably
be of little use, e.g. there is no trained personnel to use the system,
the Command and Control system is not compatible, there is no
doctrine for how to utilize possible beneﬁts, there are no facilities
to maintain the EoI etc. If, on the other hand, a perfect suitability is
assumed the capability system can beneﬁt from the full potential of
the EoI. Analyzing the Suitability dimension of an EoI is thus
beneﬁcial when answering questions likeehow should a unit be
organized for the organization to get the most out of this EoI?
Orehow should the tactics be developed for the organization to
beneﬁt the most from this EoI? Orewhat changes are necessary in
order to maintain the capability if buying this new system? etc. In
other words, the Military Suitability dimension is important for
understanding the system effects of replacing technical systems.
If the military utility concept is used to study military adver-
saries, the suitability dimension is often very informative. If a
military actor understands under what circumstances the adver-
sary has best possible suitability of his weapon systems, efforts
should of course be made to shape the battleﬁeld in a less favorable
direction.
Opposite to the deﬁnition of ‘Operational Suitability’ above, the
deﬁnition of Military Suitability should be kept generic allowing
modiﬁcations on the indicator level. Though the list of affecting
factors in Operational Suitability is extensive it is probably not
exhaustive. For instance, it should very well be possible to add
suitability from national or international law to the list. Instead the
following deﬁnition is chosen: Military Suitability is the degree to
which an EoI can be satisfactorily placed in military use in a speciﬁed
context with consideration to interaction with other elements of the
capability system.
5.2.3. Affordability dimension
The third dimension of the Military Utility concept accounts for
the consequences of having limited funding.
For SE and the Military Domain DoD deﬁnes Affordability as “ 1.
A determination that the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of an acquisition
program is in consonance with the long-range investment and
force structure plans of the DoD or individual DoD components. 2.
Conducting a program at a cost constrained by the maximum
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resources the DoD or DoD component can allocate to that capa-
bility” [17].
‘Affordability’ is hence more suitable than ‘Cost’ to represent the
limited resources dimension of the concept, since it has a positive
direction, like effectiveness and suitability.
As an illustration, assume that a military actor tries to ﬁnd the
solutionwithmaximummilitary utility. An analysis of the problem,
e.g. a military mission, will then result in requirements of desired
effects delivered by the solution. But for that solution to be possible
the military actor needs to be able to afford iteotherwise no effect
will be delivered. Hence the solution delivering themost possible of
the desired effect, while still being affordable to the military actor,
has the greatest military utility.
In use cases where the Military Utility of an EoI is assessed
supporting a speciﬁc military operation the affordability dimension
is omitted. The rationale is that a military actor does not plan for
using an EoI if it is not available. Any limitations in resources
affecting the use of the EoI are instead accounted for in the mission
cost objectives as indicators of the military effectiveness
dimension.
The DoD deﬁnition, transformed into a measure, yields the
deﬁnition for Affordability used in the proposed concept. Ameasure
of compliance to the maximum resources a military actor has allocated
to the system of interest in a time frame deﬁned by the context. The
last additional condition makes it possible to use the concept in
other time frames than the system lifecycle.
5.3. OperationalizationeIndicator level
The operationalization of the dimensions of military utility is
the bridge between the conceptual-theoretical and the empirical-
observational level. What can be measured and how? During
concept development the ambition was to ﬁnd generic clusters of
indicators, rather than indicators themselves. The indicators ﬁnally
chosen for an assessment will be dependent on use case and
context.
5.3.1. Indicators to military effectiveness
Leaning on existing deﬁnitions the effectiveness of a capability
relates to the ability to reach desired effects stated in objectives for
“outcomes, cost, schedule, and risk” [18].
The Oxford Dictionary deﬁnes Effect as: ”A change which is a
result or consequence of an action or other cause” [25], i.e. there are
potentially both positive and negative consequences of an effect,
pending on viewpoint. From a military perspective US DoD states
that Effect is: ” 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that
results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The
result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a
condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.” [26].
Here it is interpreted as if the outcome objectives constitute all
desired effects for which the EoI is to be assessed. This can be
exempliﬁed using the aircraft decision situation again. Military-
Technology analysts in the SwAF were probably once in the late
1970s faced with a question similar toeWhat combat aircraft sys-
tem should the SwAF choose for the next 30e40 years, within a
given budget? They came up with a recommendation to buy
200þ JAS 39 multirole aircrafts. This seems rational since this
aircraft type is effective in all types of combat air operations needed
to defend Swedish territory: counter air, air strike or reconnais-
sanceeprobably weighted in that order. If the F-117 ever was on the
table, it was probably found very effective for nightly air strikes but
not very effective for anything else.
The former reasoning is logical if the assessment of military
utility is done at the military-strategic command level. Acquisition
of complex, expensive, military technical systems is however often
decided at a strategic level viewing the EoI as a component in the
‘security policy system’, achieving more abstract effect objectives.
Similarly, the greatest military effectiveness of nuclear weapons
might not be in the warﬁghting capacity, but rather for achieving a
deterring effect.
The interpretation of the cost, schedule and risk objectives is
that they constitute the boundary conditions for using the EoI in the
utilization stage of the speciﬁed context. There is a limit to
acceptable additional costs for using the EoI in the operation, there
is a schedule for when the outcome-objectives have to be achieved
to reach a desired end-state, and there is a limit to acceptable risk
for undesired effects.
The planned ownership cost of a technical system is included in
the affordability dimension. All other limiting resources for using
the capability have to be accounted for in the effectiveness
dimension, and they have to be deﬁned as cost objectives. Some
examples could be: in this operation the daily consumption of
diesel for this capability A must not exceed 10 tons; or there are
only one hundred troops available for this capability B, or the
number of spare parts of type X is limited to Y, etc.
Any effect not contributing to achieving the mission objectives
may add to undesired effects, e.g. a risk of a sensor system revealing
its own position, a risk of a weapon system with low precision
resulting in collateral damage, or a safety risk to personnel oper-
ating the EoI. The risk of undesired effects hence has to be
accounted for in mission risk objectives. This is the boundary
condition that, for example, limits the use of weapons delivering
more effect than needed.
The most straightforward way to make a compound quantita-
tive measure of Military Effectiveness is to transform all indicators
into probabilities of achieving the respective objectives, multiply
them with weights and sum up. The operation is allowed since
Military Utility can only be assessed on an ordinal, i.e. a rank order,
scale. This is however one of those things easier said than done and
there are a multitude of textbooks in the ﬁeld of operational
research describing general cases and how to tackle the problem
[27,28].
In the scope of this paper it is sufﬁcient to state that there are
typically four types of substitutable indicators contributing to
Military Effectiveness: Compliance to desired outcomes, Compliance
to Cost, Compliance to Schedule and Compliance to Risk. If they are
not relevant to the assessment at hand they do not all have to be
represented in the compound measure (meaning that they are
assessed to be the same for all alternatives).
5.3.2. Indicators to military suitability
According to Wasson Measures of Suitability (MoS) are “Objec-
tive performance measures derived from subjective user criteria for
assessing a system's operational suitability to the organizational
and mission applications” [18]. When used within the Systems
Engineering domain these measures quantify issues like support-
ability, human interface compatibility, maintainability etc., in order
to answer questions of howwell the technical EoI ﬁts into the user's
organization, mission applications and operating environment.
As Anteroinen states in Enhancing the Development of Military
Capabilities by a Systems Approach USA, UK, Australia, Finland and
NATO among other military actors “view capability as a system of
interlocking and interdependent components” [6]. They do, how-
ever, choose to categorize their system elements differently from
each other. USA uses DOTMLPF: Doctrin, Organisation, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities. NATO
uses DOTMLPF with an additional I for Interoperability. UK uses
TEPIDOIL: Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Concepts
and Doctrine, Organisation, Information and Logistics, Etc. The
Swedish Armed Forces have chosen the British view for assessing
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technical systems [29]. Evidently, there are different ways of how to
view capabilities and hence the concept should not dictate which
architecture to use and thereby what indicators of military suit-
ability to include.
For the continued discussion the TEPIDOIL architecture for ca-
pabilities is adopted. The Doctrine measure should then quantify
how well the EoI is supported by the Doctrine and the tactical and
technical procedures (TTPs), the Organizational measure should
quantify to what degree the military force is organized to make the
most of the EoI etc. etc. If, for example, the British army had made a
correct analysis of the Military Utility of the battle tank before they
used it for the ﬁrst time inWorldWar I perhaps the outcomewould
have been another [30]. The initial success when the tanks broke
through German lines could not be exploited since there was no
doctrine developed for how to combine themwith infantry, i.e. the
Doctrine Measure of Military Suitability was close to nil.
To conclude, a compound measure of Military Suitability is
suggested in percent of maximum expected Military Effectiveness.
If zero, the EoI has no Military Utility, since no capability is devel-
oped, due to no doctrine, no training of operating personnel and/or
no logistics etc. If the compound measure on the other hand is
100%, the full potential of the EoI is developed. The compound
measure is in turn a function of indicators quantifying the EoI ﬁt
with other elements of the capability. A product of the constituent
indicators, individually expressed in percent, meets our need of a
function, but is not the only way to calculate a scalar assessment.
5.3.3. Indicators of affordability
In a study of concepts for future military technical systems it is
nowadays more or less mandatory to take into account the system's
life cycle cost to the owner. “Life cycle cost (LCC) represents all the
costs that will be borne during the life of a System (Main System
and Support System) to acquire, operate, support it and eventually
dispose of it. The list of costs items to be considered in a project is
deﬁned and organized in a Life Cycle Cost Breakdown Structure
(LCCBS) also referred to as a cost breakdown structure (CBS)” [31].
The Swedish CBS is described in a handbook on technical systems in
SwAF [29].
There are other measures of ownership cost than LCC. Total
Ownership Cost (TOC) adds indirect, ﬁxed, linked costs to LCC, e.g.
like common support equipment, common facilities, personnel
required for unit command, administration, supervision, etc. NATO
concludes that TOC is a better measure for budgeting purposes,
determining the use of services between systems, for optimization
purposes and for ﬁnancial analysis [31].
In conclusion, measures for ownership cost are very well
examined and if having a budget of reference and an estimated
ownership cost it should be rather straightforward to obtain a
measure for Affordability. The Affordability must, ultimately, be
weighed together with the Military Effectiveness and Military
Suitability in order to form a balanced measure of Military Utility.
5.3.4. Measurement considerations
However, though the concept allows a scalar assessment this is
not necessarily the best way to present an assessment of military
utility. The compounding process would assumedly involve
assigning weighting factors to dimensions on the secondary level
and then summing globally to get the result. The advantage is that it
is easy to rank the different options - on the other hand, the
disadvantage is that information from the different dimensions is
lost. The opposite of the scalar assessment is the matrix assess-
ment, where e.g. the dimensions of the secondary level (Military
Effectiveness, Military Suitability and Affordability) are presented
in a matrix. Alternatively, as long as the dimensions of Military
Utility are positive numbers, they could be presented in a polar
diagram. Or the elements of the matrix need not even be numbers.
In fact they might as well be colors representing howwell a certain
requirement is fulﬁlled in some situation. Expressing assessments
in scalars has advantages, e.g. when doing multiple simulations or
doing some sensitivity analysis of the results. But an analyst has to
keep in mind that humans are never unbiased, why the quality of
the decision does not necessarily improve with a seemingly neutral
scalar assessment. In fact, in a decision process the most important
thing is often that the assessment is transparent to the decision-
maker. Military utility is a subjective measurement and the need
for an assessment can only be seen from a decision maker's
perspective. Finding a transparent framework for doing the
assessment is, however, not in the scope of this paper. It is enough
to state that the concept in itself allows scalar assessment but is not
limited to such a measure.
5.3.5. The new Swedish Armored Wheeled Vehicle (AWV) decision
situation
But is there an example from reality indicating a need of the
military utility concept, and perhaps illustrating the possibility to
measure? As it turns out procurement is a grateful example of the
sought for decision situation, since Swedish law require a docu-
mented unclassiﬁed model for evaluating tenders. In 2009, in the
example chosen, the Swedish procurement agency, FMV, issued a
Request For Quotation (RFQ) [32] for the acquisition of new
armored wheeled vehicles.
In their defense planning process the Swedish armed forces,
SwAF, had identiﬁed a need to replace their armored wheeled ve-
hicles in two infantry battalions, in total 226 vehicles. There was
also a requirement for delivery in time to reach initial operating
condition for the ﬁrst battalion in December 2014. The RFQ had one
annex stating operational conditions and constraints, including
organization of a mechanized infantry battalion, how it operates,
expected enemy and typical missions [32,Pt.C.4].
A decision-maker, using the military utility concept as a guide-
line, has thereby deﬁned the situational variables; of what?eOf a
combat vehicle in an infantry capability system, for whom?eFor the
land component commander in Sweden, and in what context?eAs
described in the annex operational conditions and constraints.
Hence, it can be argued that the problem for a decision-maker to
solve in this situation can bewritten: -What concept has the greatest
potential military utility to the land component commander in
replacing the combat vehicles of the Swedish army, given the schedule
and operational context described? The next step in a decision pro-
cess, using the military utility concept for support, should be to
operationalize the three dimensions; Military Effectiveness, Mili-
tary Suitability and Affordability.
In the evaluation model [32,Pt.E] enclosed with the RFQ FMV
instead deﬁned six evaluation parameters and a function for how to
make a compound measure. The total grading of a tender was ob-
tained as a weighted sum of the identiﬁed parameters, see Table 1.
Each parameter were to be assessed on a scale from zero to ten
corresponding to ‘no commitment’ and ‘very good’. Furthermore
they were broken down into sub-parameters, with weights, on one
or two more detailed levels. ‘Survivability’ is for example an
important sub-parameter in ‘System performance’ having a weight
of 0,25. Survivability in turn is the weighted sum of mine protec-
tion, ballistic protection, signature management (camouﬂage, red.
remark), etc.
Using the vocabulary proposed for the military utility concept it
can be argued that ‘Survivability’ is a measure of compliance to
desired outcome on the battleﬁeld and hence one of the indicators
needed to assess the Military Effectiveness dimension. In analogy it
is easy to see that the sub-parameters of ‘Costs’ are indicators
related to the Affordability dimension. The Military Suitability
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dimension is about how well the vehicle ﬁts the users existing
capability system. This dimension seems to be addressed in the
‘Implementation’ parameter, measuring the quality of the plan for
obtaining full operation, and in the ‘Through-life responsibilities’
parameter, measuring beneﬁts for the logistic concept and gover-
nance. The remaining sub-parameters, constituting ‘Program
management’, is really about managing the risk of not obtaining the
desired outcome objectives in time and within budget and can be
regarded indicators of Military Effectiveness and Affordability
respectively.
In the end there were two remaining concepts competing for
the contract, the Patria and the Nexter concepts. The evaluation
ended in favor of the Patria tender, see Table 2 [33].
The example with the new Swedish Armored Wheeled Vehicle
(AWV) decision situation thus shows that there is a need for a
quantitative concept capturing the phenomena described by the
Military Utility concept. It also shows that there are decision-
situations were it is both necessary and possible to quantify the
assessments. One could say that the evaluation model in the
example is one operationalization of the Military Utility concept
ﬁtted for administration of an acquisition program. A more
straightforward application of the concept would be for Armed
Forces to feed such an evaluation model with attributes and
weights. That decision-model, for the example above, was however
not available for scrutiny.
6. Conclusions
A concept called Military Utility is proposed for the study of a
central phenomenon in military-technology. This phenomenon,
dealing with the technology the military profession chooses, and
how it uses that technology, affects the outcome on the battleﬁeld
and the sustainment of capabilities over time. The concept is
needed to aid effective communication within the defense com-
munity and to support decision-making. It was derived through
conceptual analysis according to Goertz and is based on related
concepts used in social sciences, the military domain and Systems
Engineering.
Military Utility is a function of three situational variables: the
Element of Interest, the Military Actor and the Context. The concept
has three dimensions. The Military Effectiveness dimension is a
measure of the overall ability to accomplish a missionwhen the EoI
is used by representative personnel in the environment planned or
expected for operational employment of the military force. The
Military Suitability dimension is the degree to which an EoI can be
satisfactorily placed in military use in a speciﬁed context with
consideration to interaction with other elements of the capability
system. The Affordability dimension is a measure of compliance to
themaximum resources amilitary actor has allocated to the EoI in a
time frame deﬁned by the context. In summary, the Military Utility
of an EoI, to a military actor, in a speciﬁc context, is a compound
measure of the military effectiveness, of the EoI's suitability to the
military capability system and of the affordability.
By using the proposed concept and a system approach it is
possible to explain how military capabilities are constituted and
affected by: developments in technology; by different use of
technology and how military actors and command levels are
affected differently. It becomes clear that there are many factors
inﬂuencing the assessment and apart from providing a common
language, which is likely the biggest contribution to theory -
Though assessing Military-Technology is still not easy, it becomes
evident which primary factors and relationships must be consid-
ered in a quality assessment.
The discussion also indicates that the concept has explanatory
abilities, i.e. it supports qualitative analysis of technology in mili-
tary capabilities. This is important to actors in the defense sphere
doing technological forecasts, doing defense planning, developing
technology or tactics, using it, or analyzing lessons learned. Hence
the concept, accompanied by appropriate frameworks and
methods, can support military decision-making regarding tech-
nology in these areas.
7. Future research
Though examples of Measures of performance are suggested for
the indicator level, indicating support for quantitative analysis, the
concept in itself does not stipulate speciﬁc frameworks or methods.
Future research is needed to further validate the concept. This will
be done addressing relevant decision situations and ﬁtting frame-
works of indicators and methods to speciﬁc problems and
applications.
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Abstract—A case study approach, based on interviews and 
document reviews, was used to analyze the systems engineering 
processes of the SEP (Armored Multirole Vehicle, in Swedish) 
and the Visby class corvette cases respectively. The focus was on 
signature management. The result is a thorough investigation of 
what worked in the cases studied. The main conclusions can be 
summarized in three points. 1) A preferred workflow from 
mission analysis to sub system design has been derived from 
lessons identified; 2) The three main success factors identified 
were: building technology demonstrators, having an Integrated 
Product Team approach, and establishing stealth as a key system 
design goal; 3) Coherence and traceability between military 
needs on the battlefield and signature requirements need further 
research.  
Keywords-component; Low Observable Technology, Stealth, 
Signature, Survivability, Systems Engineering, SEP, Visby class 
corvette 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Until the end of the Cold War, Swedish doctrine was 
focused on national defense. Significant expertise and 
experience in signature management for combat vehicles was 
gathered in development projects like the S-tank and the CV90, 
and also in tests and trials when procuring the Leopard main 
battle tank 1 . Here signature is understood to be any 
characteristic making an object detectable with a sensor. In 
1985 an R&D program started with the aim of studying how 
Low Observable Technology (LOT), i.e. for reducing 
signature, could be applied to the next generation of surface 
ships for the Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN). The program 
resulted in a test vessel called Smyge, which was in operation 
until 1995. The Smyge test program not only spurred the use of 
stealth in what became the Visby class corvette, but also 
inspired a joint service R&D demonstrator program for stealth 
on land in 1996 called SAT/Mark. In parallel with the launch 
of the SAT/Mark (LOT/Land, in Swedish) program, a study of 
replacement combat vehicles for Swedish land forces 
recommended developing an Multirole Armored Platform 
concept (SEP, in Swedish). Multispectral signature adaptation, 
particularly in the infrared (IR) and radar domains, was 
identified among the technologies of special interest to support 
the concept [1].  
The SAT/Mark project also resulted in the publication of 
results relating to the development of stealthy land combat 
vehicles [2,3]. However, in the last decade there have been 
                                                          
1 Rickard O. Lindström, strategic specialist in combat vehicles at the Swedish 
Defence Materiel Administration, FMV, interview, 25th of March 2015 
very few reports of new research into the issue. The 
survivability focus of the reports found seem to be on 
vulnerability or active protection (e.g. [4,5,6]), and none of 
them provide any new guidance on the signature engineering 
process or on signature requirements management. 
Since signature management is of increasing importance in 
enhancing the survivability of land forces in future conflicts, it 
is important not to lose sight of lessons identified a decade ago. 
The question in focus is hence how to achieve favorable 
conditions for the design of the next Low Observable military 
vehicle. Therefore, the scope of the first part of the study, 
reported in this paper, is to collect possible lessons identified 
from earlier development of balanced stealth designs. The final 
step will be to analyze these in relation to a presumed European 
capability development environment of the near future. The 
focus is on land vehicles, which is why the SEP development 
process is the primary case studied. The Visby class corvette 
case is mainly used for comparison in order to support 
generalization of results. 
Next, in the theory section of the paper, the survivability 
engineering discipline within Systems Engineering (SE), is 
presented. Thereafter, the research approach, including the case 
study method and the sources, is described, followed by a short 
description of the two cases. In the subsequent analysis section, 
results of the analysis are presented. Finally, the results are 
discussed and conclusions are presented. 
II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
This study takes an SE perspective on signature 
management. SE is recognized among most western states and 
major defense industries as the preferred way of acquiring 
complex military products. It can be described as an iterative 
process, involving both technical and management 
components, with the goal of providing a quality product that 
meets user needs [7]. Best practice SE involves coordinating all 
specialist engineering activities, including survivability 
engineering.  
Survivability of a platform is enhanced either by reducing 
its vulnerability or its susceptibility to hostile actions [8]. LOT 
is used to reduce the passive signature of a platform, thereby 
also reducing the probability of detection. Thus, it is one way 
to reduce susceptibility. In this paper survivability engineering 
activities aimed at meeting signature requirements during 
development are also referred to as signature engineering. 
So far survivability engineering, including signature 
engineering, has mostly been studied in relation to combat 
aircraft design. The main challenge originates from the 
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interdependence of the attributes of a platform. The combat 
aircraft community stresses that the goal of survivability 
engineering is to increase the cost effectiveness of the weapons 
system, not to design the most survivable platform possible [8]. 
The shaping necessary to reduce radar signature will for 
example also reduce maneuverability and payload. It is 
therefore necessary to find a balance in the corresponding 
system requirements on the design. According to Ball the most 
important success factors are [8: p. 44-50, 174]: 
x To measure system effectiveness of a combat aircraft 
in terms of offensive capability, availability and 
survivability, 
x To evaluate the design of a platform as a component in 
a mission system, 
x For the design team to consider survivability at an 
early stage, because retrofitting survivability features 
usually adds unnecessary penalties to the design, e.g. 
weight or cost, and 
x For survivability engineers to work continuously in 
close cooperation with designers, the program manager 
and operators, and that they should be allowed real 
influence. 
Typically, the main SE effort occurs early in a systems life 
cycle, i.e. in the concept or development life-cycle stages. The 
rationale is that already after design some 85% of the total life 
cycle cost of a complex product is committed [7]. A design is a 
solution description resulting from the development life-cycle 
stage. It is based on system requirements derived from the 
stakeholder needs and the conceptual solution identified in the 
concept stage, and it is limited by the competence of and the 
technology available to the development organization [7]. 
Hence, this study is focused on the search for lessons in the 
concept and development life-cycle stages and on those SE 
processes that support the derivation of system requirements 
and system design. 
III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
A. Data collection and sources 
Data was collected using an exploratory case study method 
[9]. The two cases studied, development of the SEP combat 
vehicle and the Visby class corvette respectively, were chosen 
because of the prominent role signature management played in 
the systems architecture of each platform. In this respect these 
projects are currently unique to Sweden, and are two of but a 
few comparable land or maritime projects worldwide. In 
addition, because of their uniqueness, these two programs were 
also the only relevant options where data was available to the 
author.   
The focus of this paper is on land combat vehicles; a 
comparison between the SEP case and the Visby case is used to 
support validation of results. 
Data in the SEP case was collected using interviews of key 
personnel from government organizations and contractors, and 
from a review of relevant documents. The respondents were 
selected on the basis of having played key roles during 
development.  In the Visby case two respondents were 
interviewed, who at the time filled roles as signature 
coordinators in the government project. Table I presents the 
roles of the respondents in the respective cases. 
TABLE I. ROLES OF THE RESPONDENTS 
Respondent SEP program Visby program 
A Head of plans and policies in SwAFa HQ  
B SwAF Project Manager (PM) for SEP program  
C FMV
b PM for SAT/Mark 
demonstrator  
D FMV PM for SEP program  
E FOI
c Senior scientist threat 
assmnt and signature reqs  
F Contractor PM for SEP, and signature specialist  
G Contractor signature specialist for SAT/Mark  
H  
SwAF product mgr for 
Smyge demonstrator and 
FMV Signature coord. 
for Visby prgm 1995-99 
I  FMV Signature coord. for Visby prgm 2000-01 
a. SwAF - Swedish Armed Forces,  
b. FMV - Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (abbrev. in Swedish),  
 c. FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency (abbrev. in Swedish) 
The basic structure of the interviews was to ask respondents 
to describe, from their perspective, each step of the 
development process, and to ask, given their experiences, what 
could be learned for future projects. The questions were 
structured following the technical processes in best practice SE 
[7].  
Document reviews were used, when such documents were 
available, to support key statements from the respondents. 
There are reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency 
(FOI) from the early stages of the SAT/Mark program, in 1998, 
concerning modeling issues and requirements specification [10, 
11], and a handbook on signature management for ground 
vehicles [12]. The handbook provides lessons learned in the 
form of engineering guidelines for the construction and 
evaluation of low observable vehicles. The experiences of both 
the Swedish procurement agency (FMV) and industry from the 
development of the SAT/Mark demonstrator also resulted in 
conference papers presented to SPIE [2, 3]. A lessons-learned 
report to the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) by the SEP 
project management is partly unclassified and useful for 
reviewing the schedule and key management events [13]. 
Symposium proceedings from presentations given after the 
launch of the Visby corvette in June 2000 have been used for 
background information and for general lessons learned in the 
Visby case [14]. Project documentation concerning numeric 
measures for system signature requirements and verified results 
are, however, confidential. Nevertheless, it has been possible to 
discuss results on a general level with the respondents. This has 
proven sufficient for drawing conclusions on methods and 
procedures. 
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B. Analysis approach 
The aim of the analysis was to identify lessons from the 
development processes of the two cases, using a framework 
[15] of concepts for best practice systems engineering as a 
filter. The framework was chosen because it was developed 
for, and has been used as, the baseline assessment tool in 
similar evaluations [15, 16, 17]. Because the focus was on the 
SE technical processes covering requirements analysis, systems 
architecture and design, the following subset of SE-concepts 
[15] were used: 
1) Requirements management 
x “A1. Requirements shall flow down in a coherent and 
traceable manner from the top level to all lower levels of 
the system being engineered.” 
x “A2. Customer and contractor shall share with one 
another their knowledge of the state of technical 
maturity relative to the new, unprecedented systems 
being engineered.” 
x “A3. The government shall integrate the needs of its 
user organizations with the management activities of its 
developmental organizations.” 
2) Systems Architecture 
x “B1. The systems baseline architecture of complex 
programs shall be established early in every program 
and shall involve all dimensions of technical issues, as 
well as such enterprise architecture issues as customer 
needs and satisfaction, political pressures and continuity 
of funding. A properly executed systems architecture 
activity provides benefits of effectiveness far in excess 
of its costs.” 
x “B2. The systems architecture should be established 
early for the reasons stated in B1, and the best judgment 
of both government and contractor shall be employed 
across all the key issues, including the choice of 
employing newly developed or legacy systems.” 
3) System and Subsystem design 
x “C1. System design shall proceed in a logical and 
orderly manner through a process of functional 
decomposition and design traceability that originates 
with the system functional architecture and ultimately 
results in design specifications for the system to be 
engineered.” 
4) System and program management 
x “I2. The role of systems engineering in program 
development and management shall be recognized and 
supported.” 
IV. CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
An overview of the major events and decisions shaping the 
early stages of the SEP and the Visby lifecycles is presented. 
Note that the SEP and the Visby development programs were 
each preceded by R&D Low Observable technology 
demonstrator projects: the SAT/Mark and Smyge projects 
respectively. Subsequently, and in this study, these projects can 
be viewed as knowledge building activities in the respective 
concept stages, not least in terms of the transfer of knowledge 
of low observable technology from long-term defense research 
[2, 18]. 
A. The SAT/Mark and SEP programs 
In 1993 SwAF identified a need to replace about 7000 
tracked combat vehicles in the Swedish Army during a period 
stretching from 2005 to 2015. A SwAF study was initiated in 
1995. 
There were several demonstrator projects supporting 
concept development. The SAT/Mark program, for evaluation 
of low observable technologies and development of standards, 
was launched in 1996 and was terminated in 2002. There was 
also a project called High Survivability Testbed evaluating 
technologies for ballistic protection. In total eight technology 
demonstrators were built. 
The concept idea was to improve cost-effectiveness and 
performance using new technology. The solution sought was a 
modular multirole armored platform with: electric 
transmission, rubber tracks, decoupled running gear, a 
composite fiber hull, add-on ballistic protection and 
multispectral signature adaptation. 
International cooperation was sought as part of the 
procurement strategy, e.g. within the West European 
Armament Group and other Scandinavian countries. There 
were serious discussions with the UK until 2007. 
In 2006 BAE Systems Hägglunds AB was awarded the 
contract for initial development of SEP. See Fig. 1. The 
contractor was also to be responsible for the system design and 
integration. In 2008 FMV decided not to pursue further 
development because the government failed to find 
international partners. 
Sources: Lindström [1], interview with Lindström2, and Olsson 
et al. [2]. 
B. The Smyge and Visby class corvette programs 
In 1988 SwAF initiated the first conceptual study for the 
next class of surface ships. It resulted in concepts for three 
types of ships. 
Already in 1987 a R&D program for evaluation of low 
observable technologies, surface-effect-ship technology and 
integration of weapons in stealth vessels was initiated. The 
Smyge test vessel was launched in 1991 in order to support sea 
trials. The program ended in 1994. 
The Visby concept idea was to exploit new technology in 
order to “combine the survivability, flexibility and endurance 
of a frigate, all in the economy of a corvette sized ship” [18]. 
The solution sought was a multirole surface vessel with limited 
crew size, made possible by automated defense systems, and 
survivability made possible by stealth and countermeasures.  
                                                          
2 Rickard O. Lindström, strategic specialist in combat vehicles at FMV, 
interview, 25th of March 2015 
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International cooperation was sought and Singapore was 
involved in the program during the latter part of the concept 
stage. 
In 1995 FMV launched the Visby class development 
project. Kockums AB was awarded the contract to build the 
ship but FMV was to be responsible for system design and 
integration. 
In 2009 the first two ships entered service. See Fig. 2. 
Sources: Bergman [18] and interview with Mathiasson3. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Each subsection presents lessons identified consistent with 
the corresponding title SE-concept. 
A. Ensure coherent and traceable flow down of requirements 
(A1) 
In both cases the government established an integrated 
product team (IPT) approach early on. It enabled 
representatives of the design organizations to participate in 
requirements analysis activities at a military mission system 
                                                          
3 Urban Mathiasson, Cdr and naval engineer SwAF, interview,  
12th of January 2016 
level as early as the concept stage, thereby gaining a good 
understanding of stakeholder needs.  
Requirements analysis started with identifying the 
dimensioning stakeholder requirements from relevant mission 
scenarios. In both cases it was found necessary to first identify 
signature critical situations. In the SEP case the advance to 
contact was found the most important situation and in the 
Visby case it was the duel with anti-ship missiles. 
Assessing the probability of various sensor threats 
occurring in the scenarios was found to be of central 
importance because this ultimately guides the prioritization of 
any conflicting needs to be satisfied by the design [2]. In the 
SEP case, situations with common sensor threats, such as 
eyesight or infrared sights, were given more weight than 
situations involving the presumed presence of sophisticated 
field radar sensors. In the Visby case the discussion about the 
occurrence of sensors was more binary; either there was a 
sensor threat or there was not. The probability assessment was 
found particularly challenging given the multirole concept, 
because in each mission type scenario there is a new main 
sensor threat. This places conflicting demands on the design.  
Continued analysis then required the identification of the 
key measures of performance most relevant for desired 
capabilities. This link assures traceability between the system 
requirements derived and the stakeholder needs. The choice of 
key measures of performance at a tactical level, such as 
detection range, time to detection, or time to classification, was 
found to be heavily dependent on context. Hence, these 
measures can only be selected after an analysis of the specific 
operational context of interest. 
The SAT/Mark demonstrator project found that coherence 
between stated platform requirements and tactical needs on the 
battlefield requires expressing system requirements as 
signatures, where signature is defined as “any property, or 
combination of properties, of an object, that makes it 
distinguishable from its immediate background by a sensor” 
[12]. However, the statistical nature of the background 
involved in signature measures presents challenges, particularly 
in the infrared signature domain, as reported in both cases. For 
example, the thermal contrast to background changes quickly if 
the platform is first heated by sun and then cooled by rain, or if 
the platform operates close to wooded terrain or in open spaces. 
The derivation of verifiable system requirements was made 
possible by selecting and specifying configurations with sets of 
situational parameters, including: sensor threat type, sensor 
elevations, target vehicle aspects, and typical backgrounds.  
There were difficulties reported expressing all system 
requirements in a system signature format, especially for the 
radar and infrared sensor domains. In the Visby case the radar 
signature was for example measured in terms of the radar cross 
section of the ship in free space, which was advantageous for 
simulation purposes, but impossible to verify through 
measurements. There are also many different contrast measures 
possible. In the SEP case it was suggested that requirements 
should be categorized into three dimensions: spatial, spectral 
and temporal, for both active and passive sensors, thereby 
making it possible to state consistent signature system 
requirements regardless of sensor type. However, some of the 
 
Figure 2. A Visby class corvette at high speed at sea in 2013. Photo Jimmie 
Andersson, Swedish Armed Forces  
 
Figure 1. One of four pre-series SEP vehicles produced by BAE Systems 
Hägglunds AB in 2009. Photo courtesy of Rickard O. Lindström 
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resulting matrix elements lack relevant candidate measures. In 
summary, the difficulties identified make coherent flow down 
from stakeholder requirements, on the military mission level, to 
system signature requirements a challenge. 
At the system level, signature requirements had to be 
formulated as design instructions when allocating them to 
design at sub-system level, since signature requirements at the 
sub-system level was found not to make sense. Instead, the 
design instructions were iterated and reiterated until the system 
design fulfilled system requirements. Being able to model a 
system and to calculate its signature, e.g. the radar signature of 
the Visby hull, reduced uncertainty and hence the cost of 
iterations needed.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the demonstrator 
projects played a major role in building the bank of knowledge 
necessary in the respective design organizations. In addition to 
the de-risking of technology and production methods, the 
demonstrator projects were crucial in forming viable design 
instructions and validating modeling tools. 
B. Share knowledge between government and contractor 
(A2) 
Until termination of the SEP program in 2008, both 
development programs, including the demonstrator projects, 
were implemented in accordance with a national procurement 
strategy that, at the time, had been in place for decades. It 
allowed the Swedish defense industry to benefit from 
development sponsored through government acquisition 
programs, thereby acquiring the use of expertise in export 
programs. In return, this expertise could be called upon in the 
next government acquisition program.  
The respondents stated that the national procurement 
strategy at the time led to close collaboration between the 
contractors and the government agencies. 
The involvement of contractors in the early phases through 
the integrated product team approach mentioned earlier 
promoted fruitful two-way communication. The contractor 
learned to better understand the needs and the procurer learned 
to better understand which requirements increased cost and 
complexity, and hence project risks. 
In the SEP case risk eliminating studies, of such things as 
signature requirements, were performed continuously at the 
contractor. The consequences of system requirements, e.g. 
secondary impacts on other capabilities, were reported to the 
procurement agency. Key requirements were allowed to have 
the impact reported, whilst others were modified.  
C. Integrate the needs of the user organization (A3) 
The military user organization provided scenarios for the 
stakeholder requirements analysis in both cases. Ideally these 
should comprise: descriptions of anticipated missions, own 
tactics and procedures, anticipated physical environments and 
anticipated adversaries. 
Developing the documentation of input mission scenarios 
into concepts of operation, as prescribed in best practice SE, 
would arguably be valuable. In the cases studied a lack of 
documented context seems to have been compensated for, to a 
large extent, by the long-term collaboration in IPTs. 
D. Establish systems baseline architecture early (B1) 
In both cases establishing stealth as a high-level design goal 
from the inception of the development program was found to 
be critical. The arguments were that otherwise the end result 
will not be stealthy, and if considered at an early stage, the cost 
of stealth is significantly reduced. In the SEP case it enabled a 
stealthy design largely using traditional materials. In the Visby 
case stealth was put forward, along with counter measures, as 
the most cost-effective solution to the challenge of building a 
ship with acceptable survivability in future combat scenarios. 
E. Employ best judgment in the use of technology (B2) 
It seems that innovation in both programs benefitted from 
the close collaboration between agencies and contractors. The 
modular principle of the SEP is one example, and the carbon 
fiber reinforced plastic hull of the Visby class corvette is 
another.   
F. System design shall proceed in a logical and orderly 
manner (C1) 
Functional decomposition was aided by a de facto rule for 
prioritizing efforts in some signature domains over others. 
Versions of the rule emerged in both cases based on a principle 
of minimizing the risk of costly corrections later on. Hence, in 
the case of the SEP, the designer addressed the radar signature 
first, then the thermal infrared signature, and lastly the visible 
and near infrared. In the handbook on LOT this was called the 
“work from inside out design rule” [12]. In the Visby case both 
the radar and magnetic signatures seem to have had high 
priority.  
The early adoption of stealth as a key architectural principle 
was recognized resulting in few trade-offs or penalties on other 
attributes. In the SEP case there was some radar signature 
trade-off for ease of production during architectural design, and 
a low signature design of hatch handles was traded for 
functionality. In the visible domain a signature reduction 
coating was traded for maintainability. In the Visby case some 
radar signature was traded for lower technological risks in own 
sensor capability. 
G. SE shall be recognized and supported within the program 
(I2) 
Signature management was an influential and integrated 
element of the systems engineering organization. A system 
approach was seen as a necessity. In the SEP case, the program 
manager himself represented the contractor’s signature 
engineering perspective. He was a member of the team of 
program specialists in the field. In the Visby case the FMV 
project manager appointed a signature coordinator to work 
closely with him, and across subprojects in the organization. 
H. Summary 
The workflow illustrated in Fig. 3 emerges from the 
analysis, covering requirements management and design 
activities.   
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The final result of the workflow illustrated is presumably a 
balanced, implementable, Low Observable design, typically 
documented in system or subsystem specifications. 
The following major success factors can be identified: 
x Establishing stealth as a high-level design goal at an 
early stage of system architecture design 
x Executing a LOT demonstrator project during the 
concept life cycle stage reduce technology risks, 
supports identifying realizable signature levels, 
supports validating methods for modeling and 
measurements, and promotes mutual understanding 
between government agencies and design 
organizations. 
x Establishing a process and organization for 
continuously monitoring system signatures during the 
design 
x Working in integrated product teams facilitates: 
sharing of knowledge, sharing of high level measures 
of effectiveness, as well as a coherent flow down of 
requirements  
In addition, the following major challenges were identified: 
x Coherent flow down from military needs to lower 
levels is a major challenge due to difficulties 
expressing system requirements as signatures 
(contrasts to background). 
x Stating verifiable signature requirements in the visible 
and infrared regions is inherently difficult due to the 
statistical nature of the background. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A preferred workflow for requirements management and 
design have been identified, and overall the results of the 
analysis is in reasonable agreement with the four success 
factors pointed out by the combat aircraft survivability 
community [section II]. (1) Survivability was seen an 
important part of system effectiveness; (3) survivability was a 
prioritized design goal established early on, and; (4) there was 
close cooperation between survivability engineers, designers 
and program management. Some question marks can, however, 
be raised regarding to what extent it was possible to analyze 
requirements on the SEP as a component in a mission system 
(2). In order to satisfactorily link military needs and system 
requirements it seems the following research questions need 
further attention:  
- How should capability measures of effectiveness, such as 
detection range or time to classification, relate to a “cost 
effective weapon system” [Section II]. Arguably, with a 
mission system perspective, the design of a stealthy combat 
vehicle should be evaluated within the framework of a unit, e.g. 
a battalion conducting operations. 
- How should signature measures of performance in the 
radar and infrared domains be expressed in order to be: 
coherent with relevant capability measures of performance, 
verifiable (measurable) and possible to model and simulate? 
Spatial, spectral and temporal contrasts all need to be included. 
- And, how should the statistical variation in background be 
measured and expressed for the respective sensor domains? 
The research approach used relies on both cases having 
succeeded in delivering properly balanced low observable 
designs, and there are good reasons to believe that they both 
did. Analysis of the case study results, using the Friedman-
Sage framework, suggests that both development programs 
adhered closely to good systems engineering practices. This is 
supported by a consensus among respondents and the end 
Identify mission scenarios. Include a description of 
the anticipated use of the procured system in theater 
Assess the probability of possible sensor threats 
occurring in theater within the lifetime of the pro-
cured system, and use this to balance conflicting 
requirements during design 
Identify the situations in the mission scenarios that 
are most critical in terms of signature 
Analyze the operational context of these situations, 
and identify the key measure of performance most 
relevant for the desired capability 
Select and specify dimensioning configurations 
comprising the platform, the sensor threats, and the 
environment, using sets of situational parameters 
Identify critical signature levels in relation to the key 
capability MoPs in these configurations. Express 
system requirements as signatures (contrasts to back-
ground), in order to make them coherent with the 
signals picked up by corresponding threat sensors. 
Transform signature system level requirements into 
design instructions and allocate to sub-system design  
Signature system level 
requirements satisfied? 
Sub-system design, and system integration 
Establish stealth as a high-level design goal  
Balanced system design and 
requirements specification 
 
Figure 3. This is the workflow derived from the analysis of the SEP and 
Visby cases, covering requirements management and design activities.
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results in both cases seem to be well-balanced designs, which 
still satisfy signature requirements.  
However, there is one major uncertainty in the method. It 
seems to the author, that the successful end results in the 
relatively immature domains of radar and infrared signature 
were not necessarily the result of well-justified, quantified, 
military needs.  The analysis shows that it has been impossible 
to demonstrate a robust link between the military needs and 
stated system requirements. Instead, the seemingly successful 
end results were the result of a disciplined implementation of 
stealth architectural principles to obtain the best possible result 
in each domain. In both cases studied the program management 
strongly supported these principles, and, because there was no 
serious conflict between optimal stealth solutions and cost or 
other functional requirements during detailed design, stealth 
could be implemented with few trade-offs.  This raises 
questions about whether or not the designs really represent the 
best achievable balance between stealth and other attributes. 
Finally, the lessons were identified from studies of 
development programs governed by a Swedish national 
procurement strategy that is no longer valid. Hence, in order to 
generalize and to make recommendations for future 
development programs it is necessary to analyze the lessons 
identified in light of the European procurement environment of 
a near future. This analysis will be part of continued research. 
Consequently, the workflow described for requirements 
analysis and design of Low Observable combat vehicles, with 
identified success factors, forms a good starting point for 
continued development and research. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The work reported is the first part of a research study with 
the aim to propose guidelines for the procurement of future 
Low Observable combat vehicles. The engineering processes 
of two Swedish development programs have been studied using 
a case study method – the SEP multirole armored vehicle and 
the Visby class corvette. The result is a thorough investigation 
of what worked in the cases studied. The following three 
conclusions are presented: 
Firstly, a tentative workflow, tailored for requirements 
management and design in programs developing Low 
Observable vehicles, has been derived from lessons identified.  
Secondly, apart from the tailored technical processes a 
shortlist of success factors has been derived. 1) the 
demonstrator projects (had multiple benefits), 2) the integrated 
product team approach established already in the study phase 
of the programs, and 3) establishing stealth as a key system 
design goal already from inception of the programs.  
Thirdly, further research is needed to achieve coherence 
and traceability from military needs to requirements on lower 
system levels, including: expanding the system view to a 
mission system level, and defining measures of performance at 
all system levels. 
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Designing combat aircraft with high military effectiveness, affordability and military suitability requires 
balancing the efforts of many engineering disciplines during all phases of the development. One particular 
challenge is aircraft survivability, the aircraft’s ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions. Signature 
management is one way of increasing the survivability by improving the ability to avoid detection. 
Here, the long-wave infrared and radar signatures are studied simultaneously in a mission context. By 
establishing a system of systems approach at mission system level, the risk of sub optimization at a 
technical level is greatly reduced. A relevant scenario is presented where the aim is to incapacitate 
an air-defense system using three different tactics: A low-altitude cruise missile option, a low and 
medium altitude combat aircraft option. The technical sub-models, i.e. the properties of the signatures, 
the weapons and the sensors are modeled to a level suitable for early concept development. The results 
from the scenario simulations are useful for a relative comparison of properties. Depending on the 
situation, ﬁrst detection is made by either radar or infrared sensors. Although the modeling is basic, the 
complexity of the infrared signature and detection chain is demonstrated and possible pivot points for 
the balancing of radar and IR signature requirements are identiﬁed. The evaluation methodology can be 
used for qualitative evaluation of aircraft concepts at different design phases, provided that the technical 
models are adapted to a suitable level of detail.
© 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
When maximizing the military utility of a combat aircraft for 
the air force operating it, there is a challenge in ﬁnding a balance 
between military effectiveness, affordability and military suitability 
[1,2]. The technical requirements of the design are often driven 
by doctrine and derived tactical needs, but the outcome is limited 
by such things as subsystem performance, properties of materials, 
cost, weight, volume or power consumption.
Hence, it is an unfortunate fact, well known to aircraft design-
ers, that a combat aircraft is a complex compromise of attributes, 
and features introduced to enhance one of them risk resulting in 
sub optimization or even having penalties for the others. Therefore, 
evaluations to balance key characteristics, such as ﬂight perfor-
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mance, availability, survivability etc., must be performed through-
out the design process, as well as evaluations to balance support-
ing features like sensor placement and signature levels. In doing 
this it is important to consider both the technical and tactical de-
velopments of the concept.
The inherent complexity of this process requires the use of 
effective tools and methods that simultaneously encompass all rel-
evant engineering perspectives and assess the aircraft in a mission 
context. A ﬁeld of research developing frameworks for dealing with 
this kind of challenge has emerged during the last decade. The 
ﬁeld is often labeled Design Space Exploration (DSE) [3,4] and 
the frequently disparate requirements on characteristics and sup-
porting features can to some extent be accommodated using so 
called Multidisciplinary Design Optimization, (MDO) [5]. Employ-
ing these methods requires compatible quantitative models cover-
ing the problem space in order to automate the formulation and 
evaluation of solutions potentially satisfying the design needs.
A good example of the challenging engineering disciplines in 
aircraft design is survivability engineering. Its aim is to decrease 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ast.2017.10.022
1270-9638/© 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
734 C. Marcus et al. / Aerospace Science and Technology 71 (2017) 733–741
an aircraft’s susceptibility and vulnerability to man-made threats 
[1], while having minimum impact on other attributes. The intense 
debate during the last couple of decades, regarding programs such 
as the B-2, the F-22 and the FA-35, and whether or not the enor-
mous investment in low signature designs to reduce susceptibility 
pays off, is evidence of this being an important topic – at least to 
the armed forces in all western countries struggling with shrinking 
budgets. Here the signature of a combat aircraft is any charac-
teristic that makes it detectable with a sensor. In addition, views 
on the importance of RF (radio frequency) stealth in the presence 
of bi-static radar, passive bi-static radar and low-frequency radar 
systems [6–8] seem to be changing. Low radar (RF) signature, i.e. 
small radar cross section (RCS), is no longer considered a pivotal 
feature of future combat aircraft designs, while the infrared (IR) 
signature is emerging as an increasingly important factor. The cost 
and size of IR sensors have decreased while their performance has 
increased, and current developments point towards higher spatial 
and spectral resolution [9]. Articles about susceptibility seem to 
address technologies, from the shaping or application of advanced 
materials (for either RF signature reduction or IR signature sup-
pression) to man portable air defense systems. The latter having 
sensors sensitive to aircraft exhaust plumes or hot engine parts 
(3–5 μm).
However, little research addresses the combination of RF and IR, 
i.e. how low either signature is required to be, given the possibility 
of detecting the aircraft with the other type of sensor. Long-wave 
infrared (LWIR) sensors have come to be particularly interesting 
from an air-defense point of view. Already there seem to be op-
erational surface-to-air units (SAMs) associated with Integrated Air 
Defense Systems (IADS), that combine LWIR with radar sensors in 
one control system [10]. This makes sense since it has been shown 
that, for the front sector of an approaching aircraft, emission from 
aerodynamic heating and reﬂected earthshine are the dominant IR 
sources [11,12], and the intensity peaks for both sources are in the 
LWIR atmospheric window 8–14 μm.
Hence, the aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to establish a 
quantitative model for studying how the military system effective-
ness of ﬂying platforms responds to different signature reduction 
measures. Secondly, to implement the model for proof of concept 
and to show how such an approach can be used to support the bal-
ancing of RF and LWIR signature properties in a relevant mission 
context, thereby linking the technical and tactical concept variables 
to military utility.
The models used are at basic level of detail which has the di-
rect consequence that the results have a limited ﬁdelity. One key 
point in this paper is to demonstrate the process of the evaluation 
and how the chain of signatures, propagation and sensors inﬂu-
ence the survivability. To obtain results of high ﬁdelity, the models 
used should be at the appropriately detailed level, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The system approach is out-
lined in Section 2. The mission system level model is described in 
Section 3. The technical sub-models are deﬁned in Section 4. The 
results are presented and analyzed in Section 5 and discussed in 
Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7 and future develop-
ment suggested in Section 8.
2. Methodology – balancing signatures
2.1. A system approach
It has been shown that the interdependence of attributes within 
the survivability discipline, and the context dependence of aircraft 
signatures, call for a system analysis approach [1,13]. By analyzing 
an aircraft technical system at the mission system level, the analy-
sis of its military effectiveness becomes a system of systems inves-
Fig. 1. An illustration of the models necessary at each system level to support con-
ceptual analysis and design.
tigation. Thus, a combat aircraft, and its interdependent attributes, 
can be optimized to fulﬁll mission level goals and objectives, in-
stead of risking sub optimization by doing trade-off studies at the 
technical system level. The analysis in this study was supported 
by a system model in four levels. See Fig. 1. During the concept 
analysis phase, the system design activity results in alternative air-
craft concepts. These models of potential future aerial platforms 
are deﬁned using a set of variables representing technical features 
of its subsystems. This paper focuses on signature reduction fea-
tures; therefore, the surfaces, size and shape of the airframe are 
important. These models can in turn be seen as the product of sub 
system design, as illustrated at the lowest system level in Fig. 1. 
At the capability system level, several aircraft form a strike pack-
age with several tactical air strike options, and at mission system 
level they engage the corresponding threat system when executing 
a mission. Furthermore, Fig. 1 indicates how output technical pa-
rameters or measures of performance, MoPs, from one system level 
should be seen as input variables at the next level. Thus, the aim 
was to construct a mission system model in which the technical 
variables in the subsystems are linked, through response functions, 
to the measures of effectiveness, MoEs, at the top. This should al-
low us to measure the utility of technical developments directly 
in mission outcomes. In summary, the methodological approach in 
this study was to develop a meaningful quantitative model of the 
complete mission system and to use it for the analysis of LWIR and 
RF signatures.
2.2. The analysis scheme
The analysis scheme used is outlined in four phases similar to 
an earlier approach [13]. The ﬁrst three can be seen as part of the 
modeling activity.
Given the problem, the ﬁrst phase comprised: establishing ref-
erence baseline features and performance for the ﬂying platforms 
of interest, choosing input and output variables to aircraft, surface-
to-air missile (SAM) site and mission models, and deﬁning a suit-
able scenario with a relevant task and relevant tactical strike op-
tions. Input was gathered from interviewing experts.
In the second phase, key decision nodes, and how they were 
to be modeled, were deﬁned for the strike options studied in the 
scenario. In our setting we simply used the so-called “kill chain”, 
i.e. the probability of an aircraft being killed is a product of prob-
abilities related to the SAM-units of the air defense system being 
active, the aircraft being detected, identiﬁed and tracked, and then 
the probability of a missile being launched etc.
In the third phase, a simulation environment was established. 
This included the identiﬁcation of response models for the various 
levels of analysis and their implementation in Matlab. In this paper 
the focus is on the relation between RF and IR response models at 
the technical system level. However, in order to acknowledge that 
the response in military system effectiveness is what matters when 
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Fig. 2. The scenario, with planned ﬂight paths and SAM sites.
Table 1
The sensor coordinates.
Sensor Coordinates [x; y; z] [km]
S1 [110; 130; 0.02]
S2 [120; 110; 0.02]
S3 [140; 115; 0.02]
S4 [125; 150; 0.02]
optimizing the balance between signature reduction features, some 
simple probabilistic response functions were implemented for syn-
thesis at higher levels.
In the fourth and ﬁnal phase the model was used and the re-
sults were analyzed.
3. The mission system model (the scenario)
A systems view of the military utility of signature features was 
established by relating performance to mission success in a rele-
vant, but notional scenario.
3.1. The mission
The ﬁctive mission was deﬁned as neutralizing a point target 
defended by short range SAM units in an integrated air defense 
system in the middle of Gotland (a Swedish island approximately 
100 km off the east coast), at the least possible cost, within X 
hours, using Air-to-Surface Air Operations (air strikes). It is as-
sumed that the air defense is not fully operational in the given 
time frame. The positions of the SAM units and the ﬂight paths of 
the planned missions can be seen in Fig. 2 with sensor coordinates 
given in Table 1.
The three different ﬂight paths were chosen with different tac-
tical ideas in mind and were analyzed as three separate options in 
order to cover a spectrum of tactical variables. Baselines and key 
metrics for the depicted strike options are shown in Table 2. All 
missions were assumed to be conducted in the middle of summer, 
at midnight and in clear weather conditions.
3.2. The threat
Each SAM unit was presumed to be conﬁgured with a short 
range SAM launcher, a combined reconnaissance and ﬁring radar 
and a LWIR imaging sensor. Measures of performance data were 
selected to be realistic, but generic and from open sources. See Ta-
ble 3. The normal doctrine was presumed to be scan-detect-track 
using radar, and using the IR-sensor to support identiﬁcation. How-
ever, the IR-sensors could also be used to detect and track, e.g. 
when facing stealthy aircraft, or using silent procedures. In an in-
tegrated air defense system it is possible to get range to target by 
Table 2
The Cruise missile/aircraft (target) variables. The baseline values are underlined.
Variables Cruise missile Attack aircraft
Strike proﬁle/altitude, [m] P1/50 P2/8000, P3/100
Speed, [m/s] 250 300
Waypoints, [x; y; z] [km] [0; 250; 0.05] P2/[0; 130; 8]
[130; 130; 0.05] [130; 130; 8]
P3/[0; 0; 0.1]
[110; 67.5; 0.1]
[130; 130; 0.1]
Size, [m2] (front, side, top) 0.2, 2, 2 or 6, 25, 50 or
0.4, 4, 4 12, 50, 100
Surface coating (emissivity) 0.5, 0.9 0.5, 0.9
29
RCS basic level [m2] 1, 0.1 0.05 0.01 4, 1, 0.1, 0.01
Load – 4× guided bombs
triangulating signals from two or more sensors. However, this lat-
ter feature is not elaborated on in this study.
3.3. The cruise missile option
Path one (P1) illustrates the typical ﬂightpath of a cruise mis-
sile dropped from high altitude over the mainland descending to 
and cruising at low altitude, at subsonic speed, straight to target. 
The main idea of this alternative is to minimize the risk to manned 
aircraft by using a stand-off weapon. We decided to vary the emis-
sivity of the cruise missile surface in order to study the response 
in detection range.
3.4. The medium altitude strike option
Path two (P2) illustrates the ﬂight path of an attacking aircraft 
ﬂying at medium altitude armed with guided bombs. This alter-
native is typically chosen either if the aircraft is expected to ﬂy 
above the threat ceiling, or if the probability of the threat radar 
intercepting the aircraft is presumed to be low.
3.5. The low altitude strike option
Path three (P3) illustrates the navigational polygon of a typi-
cal low altitude air strike with aircraft armed with guided bombs. 
The tactical idea behind this approach is to reduce the probability 
of detection by staying low, below the horizon seen by the threat 
sensor, and in the clutter region originating from the terrain be-
low. A drawback with this proﬁle is high fuel consumption and 
the need to climb before striking the target, i.e. to do a so called 
“pop-up”.
In the two latter options we decided to vary the emissivity of 
the aircraft surface, the speed of the aircraft, and the size of the 
aircraft, in order to study the response in detection range.
3.6. Synthesis modeling and measures of effectiveness
In the ﬁnal step we wanted to relate the detection range ob-
tained, or probability of detection, to measures of effectiveness 
(MoE) at mission level. Since signature reduction measures aim 
to increase survivability, we chose loss of aircraft as the principal 
MoE. By designing aircraft strike packages in the micro-situations 
above to achieve the mission precisely, we also indirectly included 
the offensive capability.
Given the mission described above, we chose the following cri-
teria for Mission Accomplished (MA): The objective is to neutralize 
the point target with 75% certainty within X hours at the least pos-
sible cost in lost aircraft and crew. Hence, in probabilistic terms the 
criteria can be written as follows (see [1] for details)
MoE1 = PMA = (1− P Akill)PN|S > 0.75 , (1)
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Fig. 3. The local coordinate system of the aircraft.
where Pkill denotes the probability one aircraft is killed in an en-
gagement with a SAM unit, A denotes the number of aircraft in 
the strike package, and PN|S denotes the probability one aircraft 
neutralizes the target, if it survives the engagement. The number 
of lost aircraft is then given by
MoE2 = Losses = APkill = APD P E|D PK |E , (2)
where PD is the probability of the aircraft being detected, P E|D is 
the probability of the aircraft being engaged by a SAM unit, if it 
is detected, and ﬁnally, PK |E is the probability of the aircraft be-
ing killed if it is engaged. A mission statement usually includes a 
time requirement, as indicated above, and we could have included 
a third MoE comprising time to execute. For proof of concept, how-
ever, we decided that the MoEs deﬁned above were enough.
4. Technical models
The technical models of the components in the scenario were 
deliberately kept at a basic level, because the purpose is to demon-
strate the methodology and to identify possible pivot points in the 
design, not to determine absolute levels of performance require-
ments. It is important to ensure that all models have a compatible 
level of detail. For example, a detection distance represents a com-
bination of sensor, wave propagation and signature. As long as the 
combination of these three features yields results that are real-
istic and where the inherent limitations of use and accuracy are 
known, the model is useful. The technical systems modeled here 
consists of an aircraft, a cruise missile, IR and RF signatures and 
propagation, IR and RF sensors, a surface-to-air missile and attack 
weapons.
4.1. Aircraft and cruise missile models
The attack aircraft and the cruise missile were rudimentarily 
modeled as points with a position in space and a velocity. The 
local coordinate system for the aircraft is shown in Fig. 3 consisting 
of forward, sideward and upward pointing vectors. It is assumed to 
move along a straight line aligned with the forward pointing vector 
at a constant speed. The attitude is such that the side pointing 
vector is parallel to the ground, assuming a ﬂat earth.
4.2. Signature, wave propagation and sensor models
An RF sensor can provide direction, distance and velocity data, 
whilst an IR sensor mainly provides highly accurate direction in-
formation. With a priori information on the size of the incoming 
objects, it is possible to determine range and position to some ac-
curacy using an IR sensor, provided that the target spans several 
pixels in the sensor. In some situations the maximum detection 
range is limited by the curvature of the earth [14]. In addition, 
rainy or cloudy weather has a hugely limiting effect on IR, but 
only a small effect on RF.
The signatures are described as amplitude functions of angles 
in the local coordinate system. A vector between the aircraft and 
the sensor is used to determine the signature displayed towards 
the sensor and the slant range. In the scenario, the four SAM sites 
are assumed to have one IR and one RF sensor co-located at each 
position, see Fig. 2.
The sensor models are designed so that if the signal received 
exceeds a certain value, a detection threshold, detection is as-
sumed to have occurred. The threshold values were derived from 
open information.
4.2.1. RF models
Radar signature, or Radar Cross Section, σ is a measure of how 
much RF energy is returned by an object when illuminated by a 
plane wave. The monostatic (transmitter and receiver co-located) 
RCS is deﬁned as:
σ (θ,φ, f ) = lim
r→∞4πr
2 |Es|2
|Ei |2 , (3)
where θ and φ are spherical angles in the local coordinate system 
of the aircraft, f is the frequency, Es is the scattered electrical ﬁeld 
and Ei is the impinging electrical ﬁeld. RCS can also be a function 
of the polarization of the impinging and the scattered ﬁeld, but 
this is not considered here. The propagation in the atmosphere is 
considered to occur without any attenuation, since the frequencies 
are below 20 GHz and there is no precipitation in the scenario. 
Although RCS is quantiﬁed in terms of an equivalent area, there 
is normally no correlation between, say, the projected area and 
RCS for complex shapes. The model of the aircraft and the cruise 
missile is very basic. They are modeled as angle-independent RCS 
values representing aircraft ranging from signature-conscious to 
stealth design levels.
The model of the sensor is based entirely on a basic version of 
the radar equation:
Prx = Ptxσλ
2G2
(4π)3 R4
, (4)
where Prx is the power received by the radar, Ptx the transmitted 
power, σ the radar cross section of the aircraft, λ the wavelength, 
G the gain of the radar antenna and R is the distance between the 
radar and the aircraft.
The threshold value is obtained by using information about the 
value of R at which a certain RCS σ is detected. Using this infor-
mation, which is provided in Table 3 the remaining factors in (4)
can be treated as constants. It can be used, as in this paper, to 
determine whether the signal received by the radar, due to a com-
bination of RCS at a certain distance, is large enough to assume 
detection. The environment is assumed to be clutter-free and the 
radar monostatic, see [15].
4.2.2. IR models
The InfraRed Signature contrast Level, I R SL, was modeled in 
the 8–12 μm wavelength band as the apparent contrast irradiance 
[16] at the sensor,
I R SL8–12 μm [W/m2] = τtgt−de
(
Ltgt − Lbgnd
) Aproj
R2
. (5)
Here τtgt−de is the average atmospheric path transmittance 
between target and detector for the wavelength band of in-
terest, Ltgt [W/m2/sr] denotes the radiance from the target, 
Lbgnd [W/m2/sr] denotes the absolute radiance from the back-
ground at the target, and Aproj/R2 represents the solid angle 
corresponding to the target seen from the sensor. Aproj is the pro-
jected area of the target and R is the range between the target and 
the sensor. See Fig. 4. The model assumes an unresolved target and 
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Fig. 4. The IR Signature contrast Level (IRSL) model. It comprises radiation from 
internal sources in the target, radiation due to reﬂected earthshine, and radiation 
from the ambient atmosphere. The target is modeled as a “shoebox”.
by treating the background as a source at target range, path radi-
ance can be eliminated. The aerial platform target was modeled as 
a “shoe box” with varying top, side and front areas.
The transmittance was calculated for points along the scenario 
ﬂight paths using the Modtran software package and assuming a 
sub-arctic summer climate. Values for arbitrary target-sensor con-
ﬁgurations were obtained from interpolating between data points.
The radiance from the target, Ltgt , was modeled comprising two 
components: the radiance from the target due to internal sources, 
Lie(Ts, εs), and radiance due to reﬂections from external sources, 
Lre (εs). The former is a function of the aircraft surface temperature 
Ts [K] and both are functions of the surface emissivity εs .
Target radiation from internal sources, Lie , usually comprises ra-
diation from the engine exhaust plumes, the engine hot parts and 
aerodynamic heating of the airframe. Here, however, the IR model 
was used to analyze the signature level in the front sector of the 
aircraft, so the contribution from the engine hot parts could be ne-
glected. Furthermore, the contribution from the aircraft plume is 
limited to relatively narrow bands in MWIR, outside the sensitiv-
ity range of the 8–12 μm detector in the model. Consequently, the 
dominant component of internal emission was considered to be 
aerodynamic heating. It was calculated using Planck’s law, where 
Ts is skin temperature, assuming perfectly diffuse grey body ap-
pearance with emissivity of εs [16]. The skin temperature, was in 
turn modeled as a function of aircraft velocity,
Ts [K] = T0
(
1+ 0.164M2
)
, (6)
where T0 is the temperature at altitude and M is the target veloc-
ity (Mach number) [17].
Target radiation from external sources, Lre , generally incorpo-
rates reﬂections from the sun, the sky or the earth [16,12]. In LWIR 
the contribution from reﬂected emission is, however, dominated 
by terrestrial illumination, so called earthshine [12]. And since the 
missions were assumed to be carried out at night, the sunshine 
and skyshine contributions were neglected. The earthshine contri-
bution, Les , was in turn calculated using the approach described in 
detail by Mahulikar et al. [12]. It can be written as
Lre [W/m2/sr] ≈ Les = (1− εs)Eearth−tgt/π , (7)
where Eearth−tgt is the irradiance at the target originating from the 
earth disc seen by the target, see Fig. 4. Since the front and sides of 
the airframe only see half of the earth disc, the reﬂected radiance 
from these surfaces was calculated to only half of that reﬂected 
from the bottom of the aircraft.
The absolute background radiance at the target, Lbgnd , in (5)
was calculated using the Modtran package.
Finally, solving (5) for the IR detection range yields
Rdet =
√
τp
(
(Lie(Ts, εs) + Lre) − Lbgnd
) Aproj
I R SLdet
, (8)
where Rdet should be understood as the range from the sensor 
within which the probability of detection is 1.0. The IRSL threshold 
Table 3
The parameters used for modeling the performance of SAM units.
Parameters SAM
Radar acquisition threshold [m2] 1 @ 37 km, ≈18 GHz
IRSL detection threshold, [W/m2] 2 · 10−7
Maximum missile range 20 km
Ceiling 15 km
Mean missile velocity 1000 m/s
σat 0.25 mrad
σgu 5 m (vrel = 2)
PH|I (proximity) 1.0 (<6 m)/ 0.65 (<9 m)
PK |H 0.8
Doctrine detect, track 20 s, one shot
for detection, I R SLdet (see Table 3), was estimated assuming: an 
approaching aircraft of F-16 size, in excellent detection conditions, 
and, in line with tabulated data [10], by solving equation (8) for 
detection at 30 km.
4.3. Weapon models
Susceptibility studies do not focus on models of weapons; 
hence, they are kept at a basic level here. However, since the am-
bition is to support evaluation of the military utility of signature 
reduction features at mission system level, we do need to include 
possible responses from variables in the signature models. From 
Table 2 we ﬁnd that these are the size, speed and altitude of the 
aircraft. Emissivity is presumed not to inﬂuence the effectiveness 
of the weapons; it only reduces the IR signature of the aircraft.
4.3.1. Surface to air missile
The SAM model is based on the lead angle trajectory principle, 
i.e. the missile has a direct path on a constant bearing to the tar-
get trajectory from launch to intercept. Both the missile and the 
target are assumed to have constant velocities. The miss distance 
is the shortest distance between the missile and the aircraft. It can 
be expressed as the total miss distance standard deviation, σmiss , 
and is a function of the SAM system tracking error, and of the mis-
sile control and guidance error [1]. If circular symmetric errors are 
assumed, and the range tracking error is neglected, the expression 
can be written as
σmiss =
√
(R2σ 2at) + σ 2gu , (9)
where R is the slant range to the target, σat is the circular standard 
deviation of the angular tracking error in radians (see Table 3), and 
σgu is the circular standard deviation of the missile control & guid-
ance error in meters [1]. Because the velocity of the missile relative 
to the target is of importance for the end game, and because we 
need to consider the target velocity in our model, as stated earlier, 
we have chosen to approximate σgu using:
σgu = 2σgu(vrel=2)/vrel . (10)
Here, the ratio of the missile velocity to the target velocity is 
denoted by vrel . Using this crude ﬁrst order approximation, the 
tracking errors and the control & guidance errors are comparable 
at maximum range and vrel = 2. Furthermore, σgu and σmiss de-
crease as the missile to target velocity ratio increases, as would be 
expected. Using a cookie cutter approximation [18] the probability 
of intercept on engagement, P I|E , is equal to the probability of the 
miss distance being less than a radius of intercept, Ricpt . This can 
then be expressed as:
P I|E = 1− exp(−R2icpt/2σ 2miss) . (11)
The radius of intercept, Ricpt , is in turn modeled as the sum 
of the target radius, approximated to a sphere, and the maximum 
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Table 4
The parameters used for modeling the performance of attack weapons.
Parameters Cruise missile Guided bombs
σbe (C E P ) 8.5 (10) m 11.0 (13) m
Rkill 20 m 15 m
Maximum drop range (Ceiling) 60+ (−) 27.8 (13.7) km
Minimum drop range – 9.3 km
proximity fuse (see Table 3). Consequently, the size of the target 
has inﬂuence, as mentioned earlier. Finally, the probability of the 
aircraft being killed by the SAM, if engaged, is obtained from our 
version of the kill chain:
PK |E = P I|E PH|I P K |H , (12)
where the probability of the target being hit, if intercepted, PH |I , 
and the probability of the target being killed, if hit, PK |H , are esti-
mated using values from Table 3. If the maximum range or ceiling 
is exceeded PK |E is zero.
4.3.2. Cruise missiles and guided bombs
The target is assumed to be a point target. In addition, the at-
tack weapons are assumed to have circular normally distributed 
ballistic errors with a mean point of impact at the center of the 
target. Using a cookie cutter approximation, the probability of a 
kill with a single shot, Pss , can be expressed as:
Pss = 1− exp(−R2kill/(2σ 2be)) . (13)
The assumed kill radius, Rkill and the standard deviation in 
miss distance due to ballistic error, σbe , are given in meters. The 
ballistic error for a weapon is often tabulated as the Circular Er-
ror Probable (CEP) and σbe is then obtained through the relation 
σbe = 1.1774/C E P . The parameters used in the given scenario are 
listed in Table 4.
The model is straightforward and Jaiswal’s textbook on military 
operational research can be consulted for details [18].
5. Results and analysis
The data obtained from the simulations using the models and 
the scenario is presented as graphs, showing detection curves and 
weapons effectiveness. Condensed results for the mission system 
level are presented in tabular form. The RCS, the size and the emis-
sivity of the aircraft and the cruise missile are varied according to 
the values given in Table 2. The SAM site and the weapon variables 
can be found in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
These two forms of presentation offer different viewpoints and 
ways of understanding the results. In the graphs, the detection 
curves represent signature, wave propagation and sensors as one 
entity. The curves allow instant comparison of several different 
signature reduction technologies and their impact on detection 
ranges, given different sensor functions and performance, for one 
aircraft in a speciﬁc strike option. The table offers a synopsis of 
what this performance of a single aircraft means, if putting sev-
eral aircraft together in a suﬃciently large strike package for a 
successful mission. The results indicate whether the task can be 
accomplished by technical improvements, or if the tactics need to 
be adapted.
5.1. Analyzing strike options
The distance indicated on the x-axis in the graphs is the short-
est distance between the ground track of the aircraft and the point 
target, which is at zero. The SAM units are not at the same location 
as the point target, which explains why the lethality curve (P K |E ) 
of the SAM forms an arc, where the peak roughly coincides with 
Fig. 5. Detection curves and weapons threat for P1, cruise missile option.
Fig. 6. Detection curves, weapons threat and bomb drop for P2, medium altitude 
option.
the position of the SAM site. For each strike option, the SAM site 
closest to the aircraft is assumed to engage. Where applicable the 
bomb drop, either single or multiple, is marked with diamonds.
The detection curves are obtained by normalizing the received 
signal level to the presumed detection threshold of the sensor, 
hence, below 1.0 the aircraft is not yet detected, see section 4 for 
details. The variables used are indicated near each curve, where 
black lines are associated with RF and the numbers represent RCS 
levels in equivalent square meters. Similarly, IR curves are grey and 
“S 0.5” means the small aircraft with a surface emissivity of 0.5.
5.1.1. Balancing signatures for the cruise missile option
Fig. 5 shows that the LWIR sensor is unable to detect the cruise 
missile, regardless of size or emissivity, because none of the detec-
tion curves reach the threshold. In contrast, the radar detects all 
missiles, regardless of RCS, but at different distances. If the target is 
detected and tracked for more than twenty seconds (in accordance 
with the shooting doctrine), and it is within SAM range, P E|D is 
considered to be one and hence Pkill is equal to PK |E , see (2) and 
(12). Consequently, it can be seen from the graph that, in our set-
ting, the probability of a missile being killed is at least 0.6.
Our calculations show that one cruise missile is enough to ac-
complish the mission, PN|S > 0.9, because it is not detected. How-
ever, meeting the mission objectives with the desired certainty, us-
ing the best missile modeled here, requires six missiles – solution 
for A in equation (1). Hence, there is clear potential in adapting 
the RF signature to increase the military utility of the cruise mis-
sile option. Fig. 5 indicates that a radar signature of 0.01 m2 is 
suﬃcient.
5.1.2. Balancing signatures for the medium altitude strike option
Fig. 6 shows the results for an aircraft in a medium altitude 
strike option.
The diagram indicates that the baseline aircraft is detected by 
the LWIR sensor at about the same time as it comes within SAM 
range, about 15 km before the planned drop point. Given the air-
craft speed of 300 m/s, there would then be a 50 second window 
of opportunity for the SAM unit to engage. The large aircraft seems 
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Fig. 7. Detection curves, weapons threat and bomb drop for P3, low altitude option.
to be detected already about 25 km before drop point. The emis-
sivity has negligible impact. Thus, Pkill is about 0.8 for all sets of 
IR variables investigated. However, if the SAM unit relies only on 
radar detection, an RCS in the 0.01 m2 range seems to deny en-
gagement opportunities prior to bomb drop.
Thus, the results seem to suggest that if operations usually 
occur in clear weather conditions, i.e. when LWIR sensors are ef-
fective, there is little to gain from designing an RCS lower than 
0.1 m2. In addition, some other technical or tactical means would 
probably have to be adopted for this option to reach acceptable 
risk levels. If, on the other hand, the climate frequently offers 
weather with low visibility, e.g. due to rain or cloud cover, an RCS 
in the 0.01 m2 range seem to be well justiﬁed.
5.1.3. Balancing signatures for the low altitude strike option
Fig. 7 shows the results for an aircraft in a low altitude strike 
option.
It can be seen that the aircraft are detected by the LWIR sen-
sor as far as 20 to 30 km from the planned point of drop, which is 
comparable to a relatively low RCS, i.e. in the 0.01 m2 range. If an 
aircraft is traveling at 300 m/s, this gives a 70 to 100 second win-
dow of opportunity for the closest SAM to engage. Furthermore, 
a comparison of the low and medium altitude options illustrates 
that the IR signature is signiﬁcantly dependent on the angle of el-
evation in relation to the sensor.
For example, at medium altitude, the LWIR sensor detects all 
aircraft before the radar detects the one with 0.1 m2 RCS. In the 
low altitude strike mission, on the other hand, the IR signatures 
are comparable to an RCS of 0.01 m2. It can also be seen that 
reducing the size of the aircraft by half, i.e. corresponding to ex-
changing a large attack aircraft for the baseline aircraft, results in 
only about 10 s less time for the SAM site to enhance tracking 
quality and for decision-making. Reducing emissivity, though, has 
a signiﬁcant impact. In this setting the time for SAM engagement 
is reduced by about 30 s.
Still, the window of opportunity seems to be large enough from 
an air defence point of view. However, it should be noted that SAM 
site 2 is directly under the ﬂight path and that our models show 
that the probability of detection by sensors further away is much 
lower.
For the low altitude strike option in the scenario depicted the 
results thus indicate that great efforts are needed if stealth design 
is to be the primary survivability measure. Some tactical modiﬁca-
tions, as in the former option should be considered. A toss bomb 
maneuver at the anticipated time of detection may be feasible to 
increase the drop range; although this would increase the risk 
of collateral damage and decrease the probability of neutralizing 
the target. The results also seem to encourage careful reconnais-
sance and navigational planning to avoid ﬂying in close vicinity of 
SAMs. However, the latter suggestion is increasingly diﬃcult be-
cause modern SAM units are highly mobile.
Table 5
The results at mission system level if expressed in the chosen measures of effec-
tiveness.
Option SAM Pkill PN|S A PMA Losses
1 4 0.74 0.94 6 0.78 4.4
2 1 0.79 0.97 7 0.79 5.5
3 2 0.80 0.97 7 0.77 5.6
5.2. Synthesis at mission level
The synthesized results for a version of each strike option are 
presented in Table 5. The options and measures presented were 
described in Section 3 and the missile and aircraft modeled were 
assigned baseline values. For simplicity we chose to use tracking 
information from the closest SAM site in each case, i.e. from the 
same SAM site that engages the aircraft/missiles. From an aircraft 
design perspective it would be advisable instead to use the least 
favorable result when determining the need for signature adapta-
tion.
As shown in Table 5 the cruise missile strike option (row one) 
needs to be composed of at least six missiles (column A) in or-
der to meet the mission criteria of neutralizing the target with 
the required certainty of at least 75% certainty (column PMA ). In 
the scenario modeled 4.4 missiles (column Losses) are expected 
to be shot down before reaching their targets. Note that no air-
craft or crew is in danger using this option because the missiles 
are launched well out of SAM range. In the two remaining op-
tions the strike packages are instead composed of seven aircraft 
with guided bombs in order to meet the criteria for mission ac-
complished. As can be seen, in these cases the losses are expected 
to be high. Unless the mission is of key importance to an operation 
of national security, one would expect that these losses are in fact 
unacceptable. However, since the aim in this paper is to study the 
impact of signatures on the mission level MoEs, the focus is not on 
the absolute values. One could, for instance, complement the mod-
els with electronic warfare or suppression of enemy air defense, 
thereby inﬂuencing the probability of the SAM sites being active 
in the ﬁrst place; alternatively, one could equip the aircraft with 
countermeasures reducing the probability of the aircraft being hit 
etc. However, unless modeling to choose between these features, 
they would only make interpretation of the results more diﬃcult.
6. Discussion
Survivability engineering deals with the issue of balancing fea-
tures introduced to enhance survivability, while possibly penalizing 
other design goals. The aim of this paper is to establish a quanti-
tative mission system model to support the evaluation of different 
signature reduction features on ﬂying platforms, and to implement 
this model to show how it can be used to support the balancing of 
RF and LWIR signature properties. The overall results suggest that 
the proposed system model is feasible for combat aircraft analysis 
at the concept phase, i.e. to support requirements analysis, concept 
validation or design space exploration. They show how technical 
variables, such as RCS or surface emissivity, or tactical parameters, 
such as speed, altitude or SAM positions, affect measures of effec-
tiveness, such as probability of success and losses.
However, there are a few notes to be made on the limitations 
of the implementation of the model in the setting reported here. 
Firstly, the technical and tactical input parameters are discrete and 
the data set is very limited. One example is that either the aircraft, 
or missile, pass directly above a SAM site or right in between two 
sites. This has great impact on estimated losses. For the purpose 
of this paper, doing a comparative analysis, this implementation is 
suﬃcient. Arguably, a real decision situation would instead require 
a systematic study of input variations. When using the model we 
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suggest exchanging the discrete input variables used in our demon-
stration with stochastic variables and then to execute a Monte 
Carlo simulation.
Secondly, the models used here are kept at a basic level. The 
intention in this paper is, after all, not to produce accurate numer-
ical results, but to be able to identify possible pivot points in the 
balancing of RF and IR signature levels. The reader is encouraged 
to replace the models with those more suitable for their particular 
task.
Nevertheless, the applied proof of concept does indicate that, 
for a combat aircraft dueling with integrated ground-based air de-
fense systems, it is important to balance the requirements of LWIR 
and radar signatures. The results show that there are situations 
in which expensive efforts to reduce the radar signature, below 
the corresponding LWIR signature level, could very well be in vain, 
because the aircraft might be detected and tracked by co-located 
LWIR sensors.
We also found that the earthshine component seems to have 
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the LWIR signature in the strike options 
studied. This has been suggested in earlier research (e.g. [12]), but, 
as far as we know, has not been clariﬁed in a mission context until 
now. This is of interest because the IR signature is then composed 
of two important components; One component with behavior pro-
portional to emissivity (the radiation from internal sources), and 
one component with behavior proportional to one minus the emis-
sivity (the earthshine). Consequently, there is also a balancing issue 
at a lower level, and this will be investigated in a second study.
In this setting the basic modeling of the IR signature, as a func-
tion of the projected area of a shoebox, and the RF signature, as 
ﬁxed values, are deemed suﬃcient. For potential future studies of 
the side or aft aspects of the aircraft, where hot engine parts may 
become the dominant IR source, the model needs further work 
and possibly the inclusion of a medium wavelength infrared sensor 
model.
It is also important to point out that, when discussing mul-
tispectral signature adaptation, it is important to consider how 
measures intended for one part of the spectrum may affect the 
signature for other wavelengths. In the technical models used for 
this study, no explicit links between RF or IR signatures were im-
plemented. Hence, implicitly we made the assumption that the 
problem of producing non electrically conducting low emissivity 
coatings [19], thus radar transmitting, has been solved.
It is also worth taking particular note of the importance of eval-
uating technical signature reduction efforts at a mission system 
level. It has been shown how changes in technical or tactical vari-
ables might very well decrease the detection range; however, if 
the reduction is not large enough, there is little or no change in 
the outcome measures of effectiveness at mission level. The mili-
tary end result is thus unchanged, except perhaps when measured 
in development costs.
Therefore, by using the model at a suitable level of detail, it 
should be possible to ﬁnd pivotal performance requirements of 
signatures, i.e. precisely those efforts suﬃcient for a signiﬁcant in-
crease in military utility.
7. Conclusion
In this work we have presented a quantitative model for use in 
the evaluation of signature reduction measures aimed at increasing 
the military utility of a combat aircraft. In addition, it has been 
shown how the model can be applied, during concept deﬁnition, 
to the problem of balancing radar and long wavelength infrared 
signature properties, within a relevant mission context. The results 
suggest that the methodology supports quantitative evaluation of 
aircraft concepts and, consequently, that it is, in all likelihood, a 
contribution to the area of DSE.
8. Future work
The methodology presented in this paper is focused on the bal-
ancing of signature properties in an aircraft concept development 
phase and the implementation is therefore somewhat limited seen 
in an MDO context. It remains to be shown how the proposed 
model can be integrated in a system simulation environment in or-
der to include effects of signature reduction efforts on features like 
shape, mass and volume, in turn affecting important aircraft char-
acteristics like ﬂight performance, fuel consumption or endurance.
Radar signature, and the reﬂected part of the IR and optical sig-
natures, depend on the illumination and observation angles of the 
object and the scattering properties as a function of frequency or 
wavelength. It would be interesting to improve the models used 
in this paper to support signature analysis with higher angular 
and spectral resolution as well as bandwidth. The signature mod-
els need to match the sensor models in order to achieve results 
with satisfactory ﬁdelity, but be simple enough not to cause pro-
hibitively long simulation times.
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An analysis scheme and a mission system model were applied to the evaluation of the military utility of 
efforts to reduce infrared signature in the conceptual design of survivable aircraft. The purpose is twofold: 
Firstly, to contribute to the development of a methodological framework for assessing the military utility 
of spectral design, and secondly to assess the threat from advances in LWIR sensors and their use 
in surface-to-air-missile systems. The modeling was speciﬁcally applied to the problem of linking the 
emissivity of aircraft coatings to mission accomplishment. The overall results indicate that the analysis 
scheme and mission system model applied are feasible for assessing the military utility of spectral design 
and for supporting decision-making in the concept phase. The analysis of different strike options suggests 
that LWIR sensors will enhance the military utility of low emissive paint, at least for missions executed in 
clear weather conditions. Furthermore, results corroborate and further clarify the importance of including 
earthshine when modeling.
© 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is well known that any combat aircraft is a complex compro-
mise of attributes, and that features introduced to enhance one of 
them risk having penalties for others. Design is always a trade-off 
between offensive capability, survivability and availability [1]. Re-
cently it was suggested [2] that effective solutions to these kinds of 
problems, while acknowledging that a technical system is but one 
of the components of a capability (e.g. [3,4]), beneﬁt from formu-
lating the problem to maximize the military utility of the technical 
system in focus. The military utility [2] of a technical system is 
a compound measure of: the military effectiveness in a speciﬁed 
context, the assessed technical systems’ suitability to the military 
capability system, and affordability to the military actor operating 
it. It is anticipated that the concept will support holistic decision-
making, but is in need of a framework for performing assessments.
In this study survivability engineering is of particular interest. 
Its aim is to decrease an aircraft’s susceptibility and vulnerability 
to man-made threats, while having minimum impact on other at-
tributes [1]. Considerable sums of money are spent on low observ-
ability technology in contemporary combat aircraft development 
programs, like the F/A 35, in order to reduce signature and hence 
* Correspondence to: Swedish Defence University, Box 27805, SE-115 93 Stock-
holm, Sweden.
E-mail address: kent.andersson@fhs.se.
susceptibility. Here the signature of a combat aircraft is any charac-
teristic that makes it detectable with a sensor. A reduced signature 
leads to shorter detection range from an adversary’s weapon sys-
tems, and consequently shorter response times, giving increased 
survivability and freedom of action. Due to developments in bi-
static and passive radar, and the fact that low-frequency radar 
systems are becoming operational [5–7], investments in stealth 
radar are being questioned. In addition, the cost and size of in-
frared (IR) sensors have decreased, while their performance has 
increased, and current developments point towards higher spatial 
and spectral resolution [8].
Research has shown that, for the front sector of an approaching 
aircraft, emission from aerodynamic heating and reﬂected earth-
shine are the dominant IR sources [9,10]. Since the intensity peaks 
of both sources are in the long wavelength IR (LWIR) atmospheric 
transmission window (8–14 μm), LWIR imaging sensors are of par-
ticular interest. Early versions of LWIR sensors are already oper-
ational [11]. This calls for further analysis of the implications for 
the duel between attacking aircraft and defending surface-to-air 
missile systems (SAMs); what can be done to increase aircraft sur-
vivability? Since emissivity is the most important surface property 
affecting the magnitude of IR radiation [12], it is important, from a 
signature adaption perspective, to study whether an optimum can 
be found.
In a ﬁrst paper from this study [13] a model and method for 
quantitatively assessing signature reduction efforts on aerial plat-
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ast.2017.02.017
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the models necessary at each system level to support analysis, and the variables of interest needed to link them.
forms were developed. It was shown that the LWIR sensors inte-
grated with SAMs are indeed an increasing threat to aircraft and 
that efforts to reduce signature in radar and LWIR need to be bal-
anced. The aim of this paper is to use a tailored version of the 
same model for assessing the military utility of features to reduce 
LWIR signature in more detail. The focus is on efforts to adapt 
surface emissivity. The purpose is twofold: Firstly, to continue con-
tributing to the establishment of a methodological framework for 
assessing military utility, and secondly, to contribute to the surviv-
ability of combat aircraft.
In the ﬁrst section the methodological approach using modeling 
is outlined. The starting point is survivability and the concept of 
military utility. Then the mission system level model and its tech-
nical sub-models are described, followed by analysis and discus-
sion of the results. Finally, conclusions are drawn and presented.
2. The methodological approach
2.1. The military utility concept
The interdependent nature of the attributes of combat aircraft 
calls for a system approach to design. Researchers in the ﬁeld of 
combat aircraft survivability have shown that trade-off studies on 
the effectiveness of aircraft design should be at the mission sys-
tem level or higher, to avoid the risk of sub-optimization [1,14]. 
This approach is compatible with the concept of Military Utility 
mentioned previously. It is deﬁned [2] as having three dimensions:
• The Military Effectiveness dimension is a measure of the over-
all ability to accomplish a mission when the Element of Inter-
est (EoI) is used by representative personnel in the environ-
ment planned or expected for operational employment of the 
military force.
• The Military Suitability dimension is the degree to which an 
EoI can be satisfactorily taken into military use in a speciﬁed 
context, taking into consideration interaction with other ele-
ments of the capability system.
• The Affordability dimension is a measure of compliance with 
the maximum resources a military actor has allocated to the 
EoI in a timeframe deﬁned by the context.
A military capability is hence viewed as a system composed of var-
ious interacting elements, such as doctrine, organization, training, 
personnel, materiel, facilities, leadership and interoperability, as in 
NATO publications. In this paper a combat aircraft is the element 
of interest in a potential military capability for air to surface oper-
ations. The bottom line is that a component, in this case a combat 
aircraft, only has military utility if it is seen as a contributory ele-
ment in a capability system [4,2].
In the ﬁrst paper from this study [13] an analysis scheme and 
a model, adopting the view on capabilities described, were devel-
oped for assessing the military utility of a low observable aircraft 
in attack missions. The model allows for low observable proper-
ties to be obtained through varying different parameters, tactical 
or technical, and observing responses in mission outcomes. The 
ﬁrst phase of the study concerned the balancing of efforts to re-
duce radar and LWIR signature. In this paper the spectral design 
activity deciding the LWIR signature is of particular interest. Spec-
tral design is here understood as the engineering activity to vary 
surface structure and materials to obtain the desired spectral prop-
erties [15]. Hence, the methodological approach is to analyze a 
tailored version of the mission system model developed earlier, but 
to focus on responses from varying the surface emissivity.
2.2. Modeling the military effectiveness dimension, including a surface
There are rapid developments in materials for spectral design 
coatings and it seems safe to assume that there will be suitable 
paints available for surface coatings once the preferred IR emissive 
properties are known [16,15]. This simpliﬁes the exploratory part 
of the study since it will not be necessary to model the military 
suitability or the affordability dimensions of the military utility 
concept in detail. It can be assumed that exchanging the quality 
of paint will not require changes in maintenance concepts, main-
tenance facilities, training facilities etc., which is why the military 
suitability dimension will not be directly affected. Furthermore, for 
our purposes, the increased life cycle cost for more advanced paint 
is presumably negligible and will not affect affordability for the air-
craft operator. Consequently, any differences between different air-
craft concepts in terms of their military suitability or affordability 
will only be identiﬁed as a direct result of potential differences in 
their military effectiveness. Thus, the problem is reduced to mod-
eling the military effectiveness dimension in suﬃcient detail; i.e. 
a more survivable aircraft will, for example, allow doctrinal devel-
opment, or reductions in the life cycle cost for the aircraft system 
as a whole.
In order to be able to analyze the military effectiveness of spec-
tral design at mission level, a functional system model has to link 
surface models to mission measures of effectiveness, MoEs. See 
Fig. 1.
In the system model developed, see [13] for details, it is suf-
ﬁcient to gauge military effectiveness through probability of suc-
cess and own losses at the mission system level. At the capability 
system level the model requires assembly of strike packages and 
selection of a mission proﬁle. Correspondingly, on the defending 
side, SAM systems, surveillance and ﬁring doctrines have to be 
chosen in order to deﬁne the air defense capability. The capability 
measures of performance deﬁned link the capability models to the 
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Fig. 2. The scenario, with planned ﬂight paths and SAM sites.
MoEs. At the technical system level the aircraft, weapons and sen-
sors are modeled with response functions based on their respective 
technical performance. At the lowest system level the aircraft sur-
face is modeled. In this paper the surface performance is linked to 
the aircraft signature via its emissivity.
3. The mission system model – framing the problem
3.1. The mission
The ﬁctitious BLUELAND mission was deﬁned as the neutraliza-
tion of a point target defended by short range SAM units in an 
integrated air defense system, at lowest possible cost, within X
hours, using air strikes. The positions of the REDLAND SAM units 
and the two alternative ﬂight paths of the planned mission can be 
seen in Fig. 2.
For the analysis it is suﬃcient to include only one of the SAM 
sites, S1, positioned 20 km west of the defended point target. The 
ﬂight paths are chosen so that the attacking aircraft passes be-
tween two SAM sites, S1 and S2 (Path 1), or directly above S1 
(Path 2).
Since the LWIR signature is dependent not only on target prop-
erties, but also on the physical environment, some assumptions 
had to be made. All missions were presumed to be conducted 
in the Baltic Sea region, at midsummer, at midnight and in clear 
weather conditions.
3.2. The air defense model – the threat
Each SAM unit on the REDLAND side was presumed to be con-
ﬁgured with a short range SAM launcher, a combined reconnais-
sance and ﬁring radar and a LWIR imaging sensor. The normal doc-
trine is arguably scan–detect–track using radar, with the IR sensor 
to support identiﬁcation. However, since the focus is on IR sensing, 
the IR sensors in this scenario were used to detect and track while 
the radar was only used during engagement. Given current devel-
opments in IR sensors, this is not an unlikely scenario in the near 
future, especially in the event of air defense facing stealth aircraft 
and radar homing missiles. Single SAMs give the bearing to the tar-
get. Two or more SAMs in an integrated air defense system (IADS) 
also produce range by triangulating bearings. Furthermore, a ﬁring 
doctrine of detect, track for twenty seconds, then ﬁre one missile, 
was presumed. The delay is chosen to summarize all delays in the 
command and control system of the SAM system, including clas-
siﬁcation, identiﬁcation and the decision to engage. Several targets 
could be engaged simultaneously.
3.3. The air strike capability model
BLUELAND air strikes were executed using a strike package of a 
number of aircraft armed with guided bombs (GBU) attacking the 
point target via Path 1 or 2 in Fig. 2. A medium to high altitude 
option is typically chosen if either the aircraft is anticipated to ﬂy 
above the threat ceiling, or if the probability of the threat sensor 
intercepting the aircraft is presumed to be low, e.g. if the strike 
package consists of stealth aircraft. Otherwise a low altitude strike 
option is chosen. The tactical idea behind the latter approach is to 
reduce the probability of detection by staying low, below the hori-
zon seen by the threat sensor and in the clutter region originating 
from the terrain below. The low altitude option requires a bomb 
drop closer to the point target.
Both the speed of the aircraft and the altitude inﬂuence the IR 
signature and the probability of the aircraft being killed by a SAM. 
For this study, a speed of 300 m/s and altitudes of either 8000 m 
or 100 m were chosen as tactical input parameters to the technical 
modeling.
3.4. Synthesis and measures of effectiveness
A probabilistic approach makes it possible to design strike pack-
ages for the capability modeled above to precisely accomplish the 
mission, i.e. to achieve a desired probability of mission success. 
This makes it possible to evaluate the military effectiveness of dif-
ferent alternatives simply using own losses as the principal MoE.
Given the mission stated above, the following success criterion 
was chosen for the study: The objective is to neutralize the point 
target with 75% certainty within X hours at the lowest possible 
cost in terms of lost aircraft and crew.
This success criterion relates well to measures of military ef-
fectiveness in the military utility concept described [2]; the de-
sired outcome translates to the point target being neutralized, the 
cost in losses being minimized, the task being completed within a 
schedule of X hours, and, ﬁnally, the force being designed so that 
the risk of failure is less than 25%.
In probabilistic terms the criteria can be written as follows 
(see [1] for details)
MoE1 = PSuccess = (1− P Akill)PN|S > 0.75, (1)
where Pkill denotes the probability of one aircraft being killed in 
an engagement with a SAM unit, A denotes the number of aircraft 
in the strike package, and PN|S denotes the probability that one 
aircraft neutralizes the target, given that it survives the engage-
ment. The number of lost aircraft is then given by
MoE2 = Losses = APkill = APD P E|D PK |E , (2)
where PD is the probability of the aircraft being detected, P E|D is 
the probability of the aircraft being engaged by a SAM unit, given 
that it is detected, and ﬁnally PK |E is the probability of the aircraft 
being killed, given that it is engaged.
4. Technical models – producing input to the mission level
Technical models were developed for the aircraft, the bombs, 
the radar, the IR sensor and the surface-to-air missile. However, 
since this paper focuses on the impact of emissivity on measures 
of military effectiveness, only the IR modeling is reproduced in 
detail. For detailed information on previous models see Marcus 
et al. [13].
4.1. The aircraft and weapon models – in brief
The attack aircraft is modeled as a large “shoe box” moving in 
level ﬂight along a straight line at constant speed. The size cor-
responds to a small attack aircraft with a front/side/top area of 
6/25/50 m2. The surface of the platform is approximated by having 
a perfectly diffuse gray body appearance (no gloss). The emissivity, 
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Table 1
The parameter set.
Air strike parameters Air defense parameters
Altitude 8000/100 m Missile range 20 km
Speed 300 m/s Ceiling 15 km
Size 6× 25× 50 m2 Missile vel. 1000 m/s
Emissivity 0.1–0.9 Ang. track. err. 0.25 mrad (bas.)
Load 4× GBU Guidance. err. 5 m (baseline)
Drop range 25/10 km PH|I (proximity) 1.0(<6 m)/0.6(<9 m)
CEP 13 m PK |H 0.8
Doctrine Maneuver Doctrine Detect, track 20 s,
After drop One shot
εs , the independent variable in this study, is varied in the range 
0.1–0.9. The higher value is considered the baseline. Note that this 
approximation of aircraft geometry and surface is assumed suﬃ-
cient only for evaluation in the development concept phase.
One aircraft is presumed to carry four GBUs with a 13 m circu-
lar error probable (CEP), if dropped at a range of 25 km to target, 
for medium to high altitude strike options, or if dropped at 10 km 
for low altitude options. With these input parameters the proba-
bility of the point target being neutralized, if the aircraft survives 
to bomb drop, PN|S , is estimated to be 0.97.
The surface-to-air-missile model is based on the lead angle tra-
jectory principle, which is why the missile has a direct path with 
a constant bearing to the target trajectory, from launch to inter-
cept. Both the missile and the target are assumed to have constant 
velocities during the engagement phase. The probability that the 
aircraft is killed by the SAM, given engagement, is obtained from 
our version of the kill chain:
PK |E = P I|E PH|I P K |H , (3)
where the probability the target is hit, given intercept, PH |I , and 
the probability the target is killed, given a hit, PK |H , are estimated 
from tabulated values. The probability of intercept, given engage-
ment, P I|E , is modeled as a function of the SAM system tracking 
error and the missile control & guidance error [1]. Thus, the alti-
tude, the velocity and the size of the aircraft have an impact on 
the probability of the aircraft being killed – as one would expect. 
In this setting the resulting PK |E is in the 0.6–0.8 range, if the air-
craft is within range. If the maximum range or the ceiling of the 
missile is exceeded, PK |E is zero.
A summary of the tactical and technical parameters inﬂuencing 
the modeling results are presented in Table 1. The weapon param-
eters are based on tabulated data [11,17].
4.2. The sensor model – including atmosphere and IR signature
In this scenario the imaging LWIR sensor is used for detection 
and tracking, not identiﬁcation, which is why only the unresolved 
case, i.e. signal level of one pixel, is developed. The detection range 
in the model is limited by the curvature of the Earth [18]. Further-
more, attenuation of the IR signal in the atmosphere is signiﬁcant. 
Rainy or cloudy weather has a huge limiting effect. IR transmit-
tance to the sensor for points along the scenario ﬂight paths, τ , 
was calculated using the Modtran® software package, assuming a 
sub-arctic summer climate. Values for arbitrary target–sensor con-
ﬁgurations were obtained from interpolating between data points.
4.2.1. IR signature
The contrast signature level was modeled (see Fig. 3) in the 
8–12 μm wavelength band as the apparent effective difference be-
tween the irradiance at the sensor from the target aerial platform, 
Etgt , and that from the sky background, Ebgnd . If the sky back-
ground is treated as a source at target range, the path radiance 
can be eliminated [12]. The contrast signature level is then given 
by:
Fig. 3. The IR signature level model (adopted from [13]). It comprises radiance from 
internal sources in the target, reﬂected earthshine, and from the ambient atmo-
sphere. The target aerial platform is modeled as a large “shoe box”.
IRSL8–12 μm[W/m2] = Etgt − Ebgnd = (4)
τtgt-de
(
(Lie(Ts, εs) + Lre(εs)) − Lbgnd
) Aproj
S2
(5)
where τtgt-de is the average atmospheric path transmittance be-
tween the target and the detector for the wavelength band of 
interest; Lie denotes the radiance from the target due to inter-
nal sources and Lre denotes the radiance due to reﬂections from 
external sources. The former is a function of the aircraft surface 
temperature Ts and both are functions of the surface emissivity εs . 
Lbgnd is the absolute radiance from the sky background and ﬁnally, 
Aproj/S2 is the solid angle corresponding to the target seen from 
the sensor. Here Aproj is the projected area of the target and S is 
the slant range between the target and the sensor. In this study 
the IR sensor model was used to analyze the IRSL in the front 
sector of the aircraft; therefore, contributions to Lie from the rear 
fuselage of the aircraft, heated by the engine, could be neglected. 
Furthermore, the contribution from the aircraft plume is limited to 
relatively narrow bands in the 4 μm range and, therefore, outside 
the sensitivity range of the 8–12 μm detector modeled. The con-
tribution from aerodynamic heating was calculated using Planck’s 
law with skin temperature Ts and with emissivity εs [12]. The skin 
temperature was, in turn, modeled as a function of aircraft veloc-
ity,
Ts[K ] = T0
(
1+ 0.164M2
)
, (6)
where T0 is the temperature at the aircraft’s altitude and M is 
the target velocity in Mach numbers [19]. In LWIR the contribu-
tion from reﬂected emission, Lre , is dominated by earthshine [10], 
and since the missions were assumed to be executed at night, the 
contributions of sunshine and skyshine were neglected. The earth-
shine contribution, Les , was in turn calculated using the approach 
described in detail by Mahulikar et al. [10]. It can be written
Les[W/m2/sr] = (1− εs)
π
Eearth-tgt = (1− εs)
N∑
i=1
τi Ledh22RidR
(R2i + h2)2
(7)
where Eearth-tgt is the irradiance originating from the earth disc at 
the aircraft at altitude h, see Fig. 3. The irradiance can be written 
as the sum of the radiation reaching the aircraft from N circu-
lar strip increments of the earth disc. In Fig. 3 it is shown how 
an increment’s area is deﬁned by the width of the strip dR and 
the radius Ri . The earth disc radiance Led from each increment is 
attenuated with its corresponding mean transmittance to the air-
craft τi . In this scenario Led is approximated to the radiance from 
a gray body with emissivity of 0.98 (water). Lbgnd in (5) was cal-
culated assuming gray body behavior at the temperature of the 
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Fig. 4. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface 
emissivity 0.9, at an altitude of 100 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1.
target’s ambient air and with emissivity of 0.8 [20]. Finally, solving 
(5) for the IR detection range yields
Rdet =
√
τp
(
(Lie(Ts, εs) + Lre) − Lbgnd
) Aproj
I R SLdet
. (8)
The sensor threshold contrast, I R SLdet was estimated as 4.5 ·
10−7 W/m2, assuming an approaching aircraft in excellent detec-
tion conditions and by calibrating against tabulated data [11]. Us-
ing this model, the probability of detection, PD , is presumed to be 
unity, if the range to the engaging SAM is less than Rdet ; otherwise 
it is presumed to be zero.
5. Analysis
The mission model was implemented and simulated using pa-
rameter values from Table 1. Firstly, the IR signature response to 
changes in surface coating emissivity was analyzed in some detail. 
Then the resulting impact of the IRSL on the mission measures of 
effectiveness was investigated.
5.1. The signature response to varying altitude and emissivity
In our model the contrast signature level from an aircraft de-
tected by a LWIR sensor comprises three components: the irradi-
ance from the airframe due to aerodynamic heating, the reﬂected 
earthshine, and lastly the contrasting apparent irradiance from the 
sky background at the target position. When the baseline aircraft, 
with a normal high emitting surface coating of 0.9 [16], is ﬁrst de-
tected in the low altitude strike option, at a range of 15 km, the 
irradiance from aerodynamic heating is the dominant component, 
while earthshine is negligible, as shown in Fig. 4. Note that the 
IRSL has been normalized with the estimated detection threshold 
value.
However, at higher altitudes, e.g. 8000 m, the earthshine can 
no longer be neglected, as can be seen in Fig. 5. Furthermore, if 
the emissivity is reduced, to 0.3, for example, as seen in Fig. 6, 
the reﬂected earthshine then becomes the larger component. The 
range to detection increases with altitude to about 26 km, but does 
not seem to change with emissivity.
This impact of altitude on the relative importance of the com-
ponents of the IRSL can partly be understood by examining equa-
tion (6). At low altitude the skin temperature is relatively higher 
than at high altitude because of the different temperatures of the 
ambient air. Consequently, thermal radiance from the airframe is 
relatively high at low altitudes. For the baseline aircraft, with emis-
sivity of 0.9, the modeled radiance from aerodynamic heating is 
estimated to be in the 50 W/m2/sr range for the low altitude strike 
Fig. 5. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface 
emissivity 0.9, at an altitude of 8000 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1.
Fig. 6. The composition of the LWIR signal, from an aircraft on Path 2, with surface 
emissivity 0.3, at an altitude of 8000 m, detected by a sensor at SAM Site 1.
Fig. 7. The radiance from the airframe due to aerodynamic heating as a function of 
emissivity and altitude.
paths, and around 23 W/m2/sr for the high altitude strike paths. 
Instead, emissivity dependence is determined by the gray body ap-
pearance of the components, and the radiance from aerodynamic 
heating is simply proportional to the surface emissivity. In Fig. 7
the component is plotted as a function of emissivity for both a 
low and high altitude strike option. The corresponding radiance 
from the modeled background at target altitude is also indicated.
By looking only at these graphs, thereby omitting earthshine, it 
is deceptively easy to draw the conclusion that the aircraft should 
always be coated with a low emitting coating in the range 0.4 to 
0.5, in order to minimize contrast with the background. Instead, 
however, the earthshine component is proportional to (1 − εs), as 
given by equation (7), and the altitude behavior of the reﬂected 
138 K. Andersson / Aerospace Science and Technology 65 (2017) 133–140
Fig. 8. The reﬂected earthshine radiance from the underside of an aerial platform as 
a function of emissivity and altitude.
earthshine component is not as intuitive. The size of the illumi-
nating earth disc increases with altitude and, at the same time, 
attenuation due to the atmosphere between the earth and the 
aircraft also increases. In Fig. 8 the apparent earthshine radiance 
reﬂected from a surface parallel to and facing the earth disc is 
plotted as a function of altitude and emissivity. These results are 
consistent with earlier research [10].
The bottom graph in Fig. 8 can be seen as representing reﬂected 
earthshine radiance from the underside of the baseline aircraft. In 
general the reﬂected earthshine component increases with reduced 
altitude and emissivity. By comparing Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 it can be 
seen that for high altitude ﬂight paths, and emissivity around 0.4, 
the two IRSL components are of comparable strength and, if emis-
sivity is reduced further, earthshine becomes dominant.
However, since the sensor is situated close to the horizon, there 
is also the shape of the aircraft to consider. The irradiance at the 
sensor due to aerodynamic heating originates from the entire pro-
jected area of the aircraft, while the earthshine component orig-
inates from terrestrial reﬂections. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the front and side of the platform emit proportionally less 
than the underside of the aircraft. This contribution has been in-
cluded in the model using a geometrical factor. For a shoe box 
shaped aircraft, as in this case, the geometrical factor should be 
0.5, since the side or front of an aircraft in level ﬂight only sees 
half of the earth disc. This affects the impact of altitude on the rel-
ative importance of the earthshine component in the IRSL. At low 
altitude the area projected towards the ground sensor is mainly 
the front or sides, while at higher altitude, and closer to the sen-
sor, the underside becomes the more prominent reﬂecting surface. 
Arguably, the geometrical factor for a real aircraft should be some-
what lower, assuming that part of the surfaces seen by the sensor 
will be in shadow from earthshine.
5.1.1. The response in capability measures of performance
In order to synthesize results at the capability system level, 
detection range was calculated and plotted as a function of emis-
sivity, altitude and ﬂight path, see Fig. 9.
It can be seen that, irrespective of emissivity, as long as the air-
craft is above the horizon, the detection range is greater for the 
Path 1 option. This should be expected, since the aircraft projects 
more of its area towards the sensor on Path 1 than it does on 
Path 2. Furthermore, while it seems possible to minimize the de-
tection range to aircraft at low altitude, by reducing surface emis-
sivity below 0.4, the detection range to corresponding aircraft at 
medium altitude seems to increase slightly. These results are con-
sistent with the analysis of the IRSL above. At low altitude aerody-
namic heating dominates the IRSL; consequently, detection range 
is reduced with decreasing emissivity. At higher altitude, however, 
Fig. 9. The detection range, from a LWIR sensor at SAM Site 1 to an aircraft on ﬂight 
Paths 1 and 2, as a function of the aircraft surface emissivity.
Fig. 10. The detection range, from a LWIR sensor at SAM Site 1 to an aircraft on 
ﬂight Paths 1 and 2, as a function of the aircraft surface emissivity.
reﬂected earthshine compensates for reduced aerodynamic heat-
ing.
5.1.2. The response in mission measures of effectiveness
The analysis of the response at the mission system level is 
based on the diagram in Fig. 10. It shows the modeled normal-
ized IRSL of different attacking aircraft, and the probability of the 
aircraft being killed, integrated into one diagram. The probabil-
ity of the aircraft being detected is presumed to be zero, if the 
normalized IRSL is below unity, and one if it is above. The proba-
bilities are given as a function of the aircraft ground track distance 
to the point target. The planned bomb drop points are indicated 
with their associated air defense windows of opportunity, which 
are illustrated with arrows. After bomb drop the aircraft are free 
to maneuver and Pkill is assumed to decrease considerably.
The two left-hand IRSL curves in Fig. 10 originate from an air-
craft with a surface emissivity of 0.9 at different altitudes in strike 
Path 2. They are detected 70 s and 95 s, respectively, before their 
planned bomb drop points. Reducing this window of opportunity 
by a 20 s delay in the SAM command and control system still gives 
considerable time to engage. Hence Pkill is assumed to be 0.79 for 
both scenarios. The third IRSL curve from the left shows that de-
tection can be signiﬁcantly delayed, if the aircraft is coated with 
a low emissive paint. Nevertheless, the effort is not good enough 
to improve the mission measures of effectiveness. The air defense 
window of opportunity is still too wide. However, the fourth curve 
from the left shows that by combining a reduction in emissivity 
with tactical selection of a ﬂight path between SAM sites (Path 1), 
a tipping point is identiﬁed. The window of opportunity is now 
only 37 s wide. This equals the sum of the delay in the command 
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Table 2
The results at mission system level expressed in the chosen measures of effective-
ness.
Scenario Pkill PN|S A PSucc (MoE1) Losses (MoE2)
1–3 0.79 0.97 7 0.77 5.6
4 <0.74 0.97 5 >0.75 <3.7
and control system and the missile ﬂy-out time. Consequently, any 
further efforts to enhance survivability from this point can be ex-
pected to have signiﬁcant effects on mission measures of effective-
ness. Hence, the Pkill value, 0.74, read from the diagram 20 s after 
detection can be considered a conservative estimate.
Table 2 shows the synthesized results for the scenarios ana-
lyzed. The MoEs were obtained by inserting the results into equa-
tions (1) and (2).
The preferred strike option has signiﬁcantly lower expected 
losses. Because the aim of this paper is to study the impact of 
efforts to reduce IR signature at the mission level, this difference 
in MoEs is satisfactory. If the goal had been to ﬁnd a strike option 
that minimizes losses, the models would have to be complemented 
with other means to increase survivability, such as suppression of 
enemy air defense capability or active counter measures etc. Note 
however, that when analyzing results at mission level it is impor-
tant to remember that the model is only valid for the front sector 
of the attacking aircraft. As the aircraft approaches the SAM site, 
at some point, hot parts of the rear airframe, due to heat from the 
engine bay, will become visible and thus enhance the IRSL, even in 
LWIR.
6. Discussion
The results show that use of the proposed mission system 
model, with its current level of technical detail, is feasible for 
quantitative assessment of the military effectiveness of spectrally 
designing aircraft coatings. If the results reported previously by 
Marcus et al. [13] are included, the overall results from the study 
suggest that the model and analysis scheme support the concep-
tual analysis of aircraft survivability. Such assessments are usually 
important elements of, for instance, trade-off analysis in studies of 
various military capabilities or in technology forecasts.
The importance of evaluating technical signature reduction ef-
forts at a mission system level has been demonstrated because it 
has been shown how changes in technical variables, such as sur-
face emissivity, might very well decrease detection range, without 
signiﬁcantly changing the military outcome. If the reduction is not 
large enough, there is no change in the outcome measures of mili-
tary effectiveness at mission level. It was also shown that by using 
the procedure demonstrated, it is possible to ﬁnd tipping points 
in military effectiveness, i.e. those efforts that really make a differ-
ence to mission outcome.
We have reason to believe that the impact of the emissivity of 
paint on military suitability or affordability is negligible. Therefore, 
assessment of its military utility only involves military effective-
ness. However, when modifying the IR signature of an aircraft by 
tuning other technical variables, such as size or shape, it is likely 
that changes will also have unwanted effects on affordability or 
military suitability. Hence, when comparing concepts, any analysis 
of alternatives would generally be more fruitful if overall military 
utility is compared.
The more detailed analysis of the impact of emissivity on IR 
signature corroborates earlier results regarding the importance of 
earthshine as a phenomenon to consider. Its inﬂuence on LWIR sig-
nature, and thereby on detection range, is further clariﬁed in this 
study. The results indicate that earthshine cannot be ignored for 
aircraft at medium or high altitudes. At these altitudes earthshine 
seems to nullify the use of low emissive paint to reduce LWIR 
signature in the front sector of an aircraft. However, the results 
do show that low emissive paint has the intended effect at low 
altitude, where earthshine has little inﬂuence in relation to aero-
dynamic heating.
The limitations of the model raise some uncertainties, in partic-
ular in the analysis of the low altitude options. For aircraft ﬂying 
extremely low, or far away, the results indicate that the earthshine 
contribution is dependent on the geometry of the aerial platform. 
Nevertheless, in our investigation, even if the earthshine contri-
bution in the IRSL from the low ﬂying aircraft were doubled, it 
would make no signiﬁcant difference. In this setting, perhaps, the 
assumption of a perfect scattering surface is more important. Real 
surfaces usually emit less at high angles to the surface normal, 
which implies that the model used overestimates radiance picked 
up from aerodynamic heating. On the other hand, in a more real-
istic background model these phenomena might drown in clutter 
originating from the terrain. In conclusion, background and geome-
try are important; therefore, more detailed background, shape and 
surface models are needed for effective assessment of the military 
utility of speciﬁc aircraft designs.
The results are also only valid for sub-arctic conditions in clear 
weather at mid-summer. To get a more generally accepted value 
of measures of effectiveness, one might have to take results from 
different conditions into consideration. However, this should be 
straightforward, assuming availability of weather statistics for the 
operational area of interest. On the other hand one might also 
consider optimizing the system for speciﬁc weather conditions, in-
corporating tactical considerations into the capability design.
Finally, the requirements for the level of detail in the techni-
cal models used seem to be modest for our purposes. They do, 
however, need to incorporate possible responses from important 
signature variables such as speed or size. Otherwise it will be im-
possible to identify potential penalties to other attributes of the 
aircraft, and the purpose of the system approach will fail.
7. Conclusions
An analysis scheme and model proposed in earlier research was 
used to evaluate the military utility of efforts to reduce LWIR sig-
nature in the conceptual design of survivable aircraft for strike 
missions. The model was speciﬁcally applied to the problem of 
linking aircraft coating emissivity to mission accomplishment. The 
overall results, taking uncertainties into consideration, support the 
use of the proposed system model and analysis scheme for as-
sessing the military utility of spectral design, in the development 
concept phase. In some situations, such as assessing the military 
utility of paint with tailored emissivity for aircraft surface coat-
ings, the results suggest that it is suﬃcient to assess its military 
effectiveness. The results indicate that low emissive paint on the 
front sector of an attack aircraft has signiﬁcant military utility in 
low altitude missions, but its utility is uncertain in high altitude 
missions. Furthermore, in some situations earthshine constitutes a 
signiﬁcant part of the LWIR signature and should not be ignored 
in the analysis.
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